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Abstract 
This research analyzes how a telecommunications regulator can balance regulation with 
innovation, at a reasonable cost. This question has gained critical importance for telecom 
regulators as the unregulated Internet technologies such as voice and video over Internet 
disrupt the regulated traditional technologies such as telephony and television and the 
historical paradigm of the regulator. The existing U.S. telecommunications regulations 
were created in the integral age. In that paradigm, functional components that constitute a 
service compliant with regulation resided inside the network core; each operator was 
vertically integrated and controlled the total functionality necessary to deliver a service; a 
few such operators controlled the industry; they faced low competition and were under 
limited pressure to adopt innovation; and consumers had limited choice. The Internet has 
introduced a polar opposite paradigm—the modular age. In this paradigm, functional 
components that constitute a service are dispersed across the network core and edges; 
each firm controls only a subset of the total functionality necessary to constitute a 
service; many modular firms interoperate to deliver a service; firms compete fiercely and 
are under great pressure to innovate; and consumers enjoy far greater choice due to the 
multi-modal competition among multiple technologies. Although transitioning from an 
integral to a modular age dramatically flips the environment, the current regulatory 
response to this dramatic shift has been hesitant to shift its intellectual roots. 
Consequently, this thesis describes and analyzes the new telecommunications paradigm 
and explores its implications for an appropriate regulatory paradigm. The research uses 
the regulation of voice communications in the United States as a representative case. 
 
We analyze the new telecommunications paradigm as a dynamic complex system. Our 
research approach rests upon four principles of systems: two organizational principles 
(hierarchy and feedback) and two behavioral principles (emergent behavior and strategic 
and statistical behavior).The telecommunications system is viewed as one of the many 
subsystems that together fulfill the objectives of a society. The dynamics of the 
telecommunications system itself are conceptualized as those resulting from the 
interactions of four subsystems: regulatory dynamics, corporate strategy dynamics, 
consumer dynamics, and technology dynamics. The regulatory objectives to be fulfilled 
are conceived as an emergent property of such a system of systems.  
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To carry out this research, we have developed a system-level dynamic feedback model 
and two case studies. As modular entrants of Internet-based technology disrupt integrated 
incumbents of traditional technology, bewildering dynamic complexity complicates 
decision-making by policymakers, managers, consumers, and technologists alike. Our 
model makes understandable the emergent behavior amidst the uncertainty that surrounds 
such a disruption phenomenon. The model formulations are behavioral. They are derived 
from the existing theories of technology and industry disruption, where possible. 
Alternatively, where theories have a gap, the decision processes of stakeholders, gleaned 
from unstructured interviews, are mathematised as the basis for the model formulations. 
The resulting structure is a fully endogenous systems model of regulation, competition, 
and innovation in telecommunications.  
 
In the first case study we analyze the regulatory environment of pre vs. post-Internet 
periods, both quantitatively and qualitatively. For the analysis, public comments in 
response to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Notice for Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM) are compared with those in response to the IP-Enabled Services NPRM 
published in 2004. The analysis demonstrates how the differences in the integral and 
modular age are reflected in the regulatory record. The second case study analyzes how 
market, technology, organizational, and regulatory uncertainties affect technology and 
industry disruption. For this case, we use a combination of industrial statistics and 
content analysis of media publications. The analysis demonstrates the limits to 
technology and industry disruption. The case studies complement the model in two ways: 
first, they facilitate further refinement of the systems model; second, they empirically 
validate the arguments deduced from model analysis.       
 
Through this research we answer three questions: (1) Can the regulatory structure 
designed in an integral age—in its objectives, obligations (requirements), and 
enforcement mechanisms—work for a modular age? (2) How can regulators and 
managers improve decision making amidst the uncertainty surrounding the disruption of 
an integrated technology and industry by a modular one? (3) What is the new role of the 
telecommunications regulator and how can it be fulfilled in the modular age of the 
Internet? Our analysis shows that the current regulatory structure is inadequate for 
responding to the challenges the modular age poses. Firstly, the current objectives are 
appropriate but cannot be met unless regulators discontinue the merely efficiency-
centered thinking and begin to address objectives at the societal level. Secondly, the 
current obligations may attain short-term goals, but have undesirable long-term 
consequences. Devising obligations that are appropriate in the long-term requires 
regulators to discontinue myopic measures such as incremental regulation of new 
technologies. Finally, the current enforcement mechanisms are blunted by the dynamic 
complexity of the modular age. Enforcing regulations effectively in the modular age 
necessitates adding to the regulatory quiver new mechanisms that are more versatile than 
the merely adversarial command-and-control mechanisms.  
 
Through model analysis, we demonstrate how a lack of understanding of the various 
uncertainties, and misperceptions of feedback in a complex system where regulators, 
firms, consumers, and technologists constantly interact, could lead to decisions that are 
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costly for regulators as well as managers. Yet, as we demonstrate, with better grasp of the 
dynamic complexity involved, they can significantly improve decision-making to meet 
the challenges of the modular age.  
 
We argue that the most critical role for the telecommunications regulator in the new 
telecommunications paradigm is to sustain a balance between regulation and innovation, 
at a reasonable cost. Achieving such a balance in a modular structure is not trivial 
because of several natural tendencies. First, achieving high compliance at low cost is 
difficult because in highly modular architectures and industries, coordination costs, such 
as the time to build consensus, can be inordinately large. Second, keeping the innovation-
level high is difficult because it requires fighting the natural tendency of modular firms to 
gain and abuse market power. We propose a combination of two policy levers—Limiting 
Significant Market Power (SMP) Accumulation and Building Broad-based Consensus 
around Regulatory Issues—that most effectively achieve the desired balance and remain 
inadequately explored in the United States. We contend that implementing these policy 
levers will require, first, a more broadly construed antitrust regulation in the United 
States that will ensure higher modularity, and, second, a telecommunications regulatory 
agency that is empowered and organized to pursue objectives at the societal level and to 
build broad-based consensus among divergent interests in a highly modular structure.  
 
Thesis Supervisor: Charles Fine 
Title: Chrysler LFM Professor of Management and Engineering Systems 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Introduction 
This research analyzes the question of how a telecommunications regulator can balance 
regulations with innovation at a reasonable cost. This question has gained critical 
importance for telecom regulators worldwide as the unregulated Internet technologies 
such as voice and video over Internet disrupt the regulated traditional technologies such 
as telephony and television and the historical paradigm of the regulator. The traditional 
paradigm for telecommunications regulation assumes a well-defined set of services, 
offered by a well-identified operator (or a small group of them) in a well-circumscribed 
geographical area. The Internet has shattered each of these foundations. Successful 
regulation in the modular age created by the Internet requires a radically new regulatory 
paradigm and approach. Consequently, this thesis describes and analyzes the new 
telecommunications paradigm and explores its implications for an appropriate regulatory 
paradigm. The explicit objective is to systematically understand regulatory objectives, 
constraints, and opportunities in the modular age, so that critical regulatory objectives can 
be met without losing the bonanza of innovation and value the Internet has brought. 
 
 This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are written as 
stand-alone papers, yet together they say a single story. These chapters are bracketed by 
an introduction (chapter1) and conclusion (chapter 5). Chapters 2 and 4 present the 
current regulatory challenge and its solution, respectively. They may be read as a sequel. 
Chapter 3 studies uncertainties that surround technology and industry disruption, which is 
an area of interest to managers and policymakers alike. The present chapter summarizes 
the three papers (chapters) to follow, providing a comprehensive overview of the 
dissertation to a casual reader.   
1.2 Paper I - From Herding Sheep to Herding Cats: Can the 
Regulations of an Integral Age Work in a Modular Age?  
 
1.2.1 Problem and Research Method 
 
The existing U.S. telecommunications regulations were created in the integral age. 1 In 
that paradigm, each operator was vertically integrated and controlled the total 
functionality necessary to deliver a service; a few such operators controlled the industry; 
they faced low competition and were under limited pressure to adopt innovation; and 
consumers had limited choice. The Internet has introduced a polar opposite paradigm—
the modular age. In this paradigm, each firm controls only a subset of the total 
functionality necessary to constitute a service; many modular firms interoperate to deliver 
a service; firms compete fiercely and are under great pressure to innovate; and consumers 
                                                 
1 Paper 1 and 3 are targeted for an outlet such as the Telecommunications Policy Journal. While the 
references to appropriate literature are kept out to shorten the summaries, appropriate grounding in 
literature will be provided for each paper in their respective chapters.  
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enjoy a far greater choice due to the multi-modal competition among multiple 
technologies. Entering the modular age raises a number of questions for 
telecommunications regulation: Can the regulatory structure designed in an integral 
age—in its objectives, obligations, and mechanisms—work for a modular age? Although 
transitioning from an integral to a modular age dramatically flips the environment, the 
current regulatory response to this dramatic shift has been hesitant to shift its intellectual 
roots. The purpose of this paper (Chapter 2) is to examine the ongoing debate around 
regulation of the Internet, using the lenses of the disruptive shifts in technology, industry, 
and consumer experience. The analysis uses the regulation of voice communications in 
the United States as a representative case.  
 
Metaphorically, this is a tale of three animals – elephant, sheep, and cats. From the time 
the FCC was established (in 1934) until the break up of AT&T, the telecommunications 
regulator was a keeper of an elephant (AT&T). The elephant was monolithic and slow, 
but powerful and demanding because it faced no competition. It had negotiated with its 
keeper a suitable confinement in the form of the 1934 Telecommunications Act.  
 
With the break up of AT&T, the regulator became a shepherd herding a few sheep (the 
Baby Bells). The sheep were inherently docile – not too competitive and not too 
innovative. To control the sheep, the shepherd needed just a crook and a little guidance 
that came in the form the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its enforcement.  
 
But the transition from an integral age to a modular age transforms the regulator’s role 
from that of a shepherd to a herder of cats. The cats are fiercely competitive, highly 
innovative, and agile. Whereas the sheep worked by consensus, the cats are highly 
independent. Controlling the cats requires new schemes – a net around them, a set of 
incentives (mice, catnip?), or something else. Control mechanisms for these species must 
be radically different. The previous approaches cannot control the cats. The disruptive 
change in the industry fabric can only be matched with disruptive change in the 
regulatory approach to managing the industry.   
 
Our research approach is built upon the principles of systems analysis. The 
telecommunications system is viewed as one the many subsystems that interact to fulfill 
the objectives of the social system (the society). The dynamics of the telecommunications 
system emerges from the interaction of four subsystems: regulatory dynamics, corporate 
strategy dynamics, consumer dynamics, and technology dynamics. The regulatory 
objectives to be fulfilled are conceived as an emergent property of such a system of 
systems.  
 
The research uses two models and a case study. The models use coupled-differential 
equations with feedback, and are kept minimally endogenous2. They capture the 
interactions within the telecommunications system over which the regulatory decisions 
take effect. The first model examines the system-level regulatory compliance as the 
modular age disrupts the integral age. The second model examines entrant-versus-
incumbent competition as a function of the various forces, including regulation.  
                                                 
2 The models will be made fully endogenous in Paper II to study the uncertainty. 
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The case study analyzes the regulatory environment of the pre vs. post-Internet periods, 
both quantitatively and qualitatively. For the analysis, public comments in response to the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 NPRM3 are compared with those in response to the IP-
Enabled Services NPRM published in 2004. These two FCC dockets form a natural 
experiment; the 1996 Act centers solely on the public switched telephone networks 
(PSTN) and mentions the term “Internet” just once, whereas the IP-Enabled Services 
NPRM centers on the Internet and is the first document to acknowledge the serious threat 
that Internet-based services pose to the existing regulations. The analysis demonstrates 
that the differences in the integral and modular age are indeed reflected in the regulatory 
record. It then further explores the nature of the regulatory environment in the modular 
age. 
 
1.2.2 A Summary of Results 
 
The appropriateness of a regulatory regime can be evaluated along three dimensions: the 
objectives it serves including cost & innovation outcomes, the obligations it imposes to 
fulfill those objectives, and the mechanisms it uses to enforce those obligations. 
Collectively, these dimensions determine the degree of compliance achieved and the total 
costs of achieving this compliance. The OBJECTIVES may be evaluated by asking the 
following question: are they appropriate for the telecommunications system to fulfill? 
The regulation of voice communications has traditionally fulfilled five objectives: three 
of them are social objectives (law enforcement, public safety, and equal opportunity 
objectives) and two are economic objectives (competition and economic development).  
 
This paper argues that these objectives remain appropriate for the voice communications 
regulations to fulfill in the modular age, but they are currently being pursued at the wrong 
level. The debate about the regulatory objectives is currently stuck at the level of which 
technologies or industries (wired, wireless, internet telephony, etc.) ought to fulfill them. 
This seems inappropriate. For example, public safety is a societal objective that has 
generated emergency calling (E911) obligations for the telecommunications system. The 
PSTN providers have been burdened with the emergency calling obligations since 1976. 
However, ever since wireless telephony and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) became 
viable competitors to the PSTN, the regulatory process has engaged in a debate as to 
whether and when to extend the emergency calling obligations to these new entrants. The 
answer ought to be clear, but it hasn’t been because the public safety debate has been 
pursued at the level of technologies. At the societal level, the telecommunications system 
is one of many subsystems that facilitate public safety. If the telecommunications system 
as a whole fails to aid public safety because some technologies are not regulated, other 
subsystems—maybe non-technical ones—will  have to pick up the slack. But this 
consideration has not been recognized in the discussion.  
 
                                                 
3 Precisely, the Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 Notice for Proposed Rulemaking. 
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The OBLIGATIONS may be understood by asking the following questions: Are they 
appropriate for fulfilling the objective at hand? Who should bear them, and when? For 
the obligations to be apt, every regulatory objective must be pursued at the societal level 
first. Only then can the obligations for the communications system as a whole, or for the 
technologies or industries within it, be correctly understood. Pro-market regulatory 
regimes have already responded to the “who” and “when” questions with incremental 
regulation. Incremental regulation can take two forms: partial regulation, where the 
regulatory scope permanently excludes certain types of firms or technologies from 
regulation; or delayed regulation, where the regulatory scope temporarily excludes 
certain types of firms or technologies but includes them later. Significant uncertainty in 
the early stages of technology disruption has been the driving force for use of incremental 
regulation in periods of technological disruption. Managing incremental regulation 
necessarily involves decisions about the regulatory scope and timing.  
 
This paper argues that incremental regulation is futile in the modular age. Limiting 
regulatory scope in a modular architecture creates perverse incentives. At the industry 
level, it provides incentives to the regulated firms to flee to the unregulated technology 
segments. At the global level, it ignites competition in laxity between nation-states trying 
to lure both consumers and firms with lighter regulatory burdens.  
  
As for the timing of incremental regulation, the far higher dynamic complexity of the 
modular age renders impractical any hope for effectiveness in the timing-related 
decisions. First, the regulator struggles to determine if the regulation is too-early or too-
late, because many competing factors mediate the rate of technology and industry 
disruption, making it virtually impossible to predict how rapidly an unregulated segment 
might erode existing regulatory compliance. Next, the regulator cannot be sure of the 
outcome post-regulation, because the modular age offers far higher flexibility to 
consumers, firms, and technologists to strategically manipulate the competitive outcome, 
the dynamics of which the regulator often does not fully comprehend and cannot fully 
anticipate. So, to understand the appropriate scope or timing of regulation, the dynamic 
complexity of the modular age must be understood as well as possible. Paper 2 focuses 
on further understanding the dynamic complexity. 
  
The ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS may be evaluated by asking whether they are 
effective for the system to be regulated? The enforcement mechanism for traditional 
telecommunications regulation has been command-and-control. This mechanism worked 
because in the integral age the industrial interests were concentrated, which made it 
possible for the regulator to know whom to command and where to control. The 
regulatory fights were easier to identify and address. Also, as a firm possessed full 
functional control over a service, it could easily develop and deploy compliance 
mechanisms post-regulation.  
 
The modular age completely changes the rules of the game.  The modular forces blunt the 
mechanisms of command-and-control. First, the regulator finds it difficult to determine 
where a command-and-control mechanism ought to focus, because the post-Internet era 
has multiple players in the value chain, including consumers, each a capable interest 
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group with a distinct viewpoint on regulatory mechanisms and objectives. Next, 
command-and-control mechanisms are ill-suited for building consensus around 
regulatory issues, which is imperative for meeting critical societal objectives, as the lack 
of consensus inflicts a high coordination cost that could prevent meeting regulatory 
objectives altogether. The modular structure shifts the center of gravity of control from a 
single dominant interest to multiple, from the center of the network to its edges, and from 
the corporations to corporations-plus-consumers. This is a tectonic shift that demands 
completely different enforcement mechanisms. 
 
This paper concludes that for the aforementioned reasons, the regulatory modes of the 
integral age cannot work for the modular era, in their objectives, obligations, and 
enforcement mechanisms. To design regulations that are appropriate and practical for the 
modular era, the following combination must occur: the regulatory debate around 
objectives must be pursued at the societal level; the necessary obligations must follow 
from the objectives construed at the societal level; the incremental regulation being 
utilized for imposing obligations must be abandoned; and new enforcement mechanisms, 
conscious of the dynamic complexity of the modular age, must be designed. Paper 3 
discusses how to achieve such an outcome.  
 
-- 
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1.3 Paper II - Anticipating Uncertainty in Telecommunications 
Regulation, Competition, and Innovation 
1.3.1 Problem and Research Method 
 
Decision making under the constant threat of disruption is a difficult task whether you are 
a policymaker, manager, consumer, or technologist.4 Difficulties arise from the 
bewildering array of uncertainties that surround the disruption phenomenon. This paper 
examines: How can regulators and managers improve decisions taken amidst the 
uncertainty that surrounds the disruption of an integrated technology and industry by a 
modular one? The purpose of this paper is to understand these uncertainties from the 
perspective of dynamic complexity in feedback systems. The paper attempts to improve 
our current understanding of the technology and industry disruption phenomenon at three 
levels. First, the paper maps the existing theories in technology and industry disruption 
into a single, dynamic model to explore the structure of influences that drives the various 
possible industry and technology trajectories. Second, the model makes endogenous key 
parameters that the existing theories have considered exogenous. By doing so, the model 
can address not only what the various scenarios of uncertainty and their outcomes are, but 
also when each scenario arises in the first place and how it may persist. Finally, the paper 
includes consideration of the strategic behaviors of firms (derived from unstructured 
interviews) to explain how different actors may change the game. With the help of these 
features, the paper discusses the impact of the various uncertainties—technological, 
market, organizational, regulatory, or that of the industry structure—at two levels. First, 
at a theoretical level, it discusses the conditions under which a disruption may or may not 
take place, thereby discussing the assumptions and limits of two disruption theories; 
namely: Clayton Christensen’s work on technology disruption5, and Charles Fine’s work 
on industry disruption and clockspeed6. Next, it discusses broadly how policymakers, 
managers, consumers, and technologists can anticipate the behavior of a number of 
parameters of practical importance.   
 
The research starts with a qualitative case study to investigate the following question: do 
potentially disruptive technologies always displace the existing industrial order? This is 
an important question to start with, because the loose and opportunistic use of the term 
“disruptive technology” today, by the media and experts alike, can mislead decision 
makers every time a new technology appears on the horizon. The case research uses a 
combination of content analysis and industrial statistics. First, it analyzes several 
important media publications to enumerate technologies they proclaimed as “disruptive 
technology” in the period between 1997, when the term was coined by Clayton 
Christensen, and August 2008. Next, with the help of the Global Industry Classification 
Standards, it ties these technologies to the industries they were expected to disrupt. 
Finally, it studies the industrial order of the industries threatened with disruption for the 
                                                 
4 Paper 2 is targeted for either the Journal of Industrial and Corporate Change, or the Journal of Innovation 
and Product Management.  
5 More famously, “disruptive technology,” in Ref. Innovator’s Dilemma 
6 Ref. Clockspeed 
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years 2001 and 2007. The analysis shows that in the communications industry alone, 
where changes ought to be easier to visualize because of its rapid rate of change, a 
potentially disruptive technology often does not succeed (i.e., no technology disruption). 
Further, it finds that technology disruption does not always mean industry disruption; in 
other words, in some cases, a new technology may disrupt the old, but the industrial order 
does not change because the leaders of the old technology continue to lead the new 
market. To understand what factors explain such variation in the outcome, the research 
then turns to a dynamic model that more broadly captures the uncertainties involved.  
 
The single, dynamic model in this paper situates the two models discussed in Paper 1 in 
the appropriate theories, and makes the parameters in those models endogenous. First, to 
model the dynamics of technology disruption, several parameters of the simple diffusion 
model, such as quality, innovation, price, and resources of the firms, are made 
endogenous. Next, to explain the dynamics of industry disruption, the industry-level 
modularity is made endogenous, which allows for understanding the level of 
organizational rigidity, dimensional complexity, and functional control the firms 
experience as one industry disrupts another. Finally, the dynamics of regulation are added 
to explain how the cost and resources required for regulatory compliance affects 
competition during technology and industry disruption; and conversely, how the 
disruption affects the level of regulatory compliance, and the time necessary to achieve it. 
The model is analyzed under market, technology, organizational, and regulatory 
uncertainty. The scope of this model is limited to a scenario where a modular technology 
and industry disrupts an integrated technology and industry, which is sufficient for 
studying the Internet’s disruption of traditional technologies. Careful judgment is 
required to port the lessons of this paper to other scenarios of disruption. 
 
1.3.2 A Summary of Results 
 
At a theoretical level, the research discovers several limits to technology and industry 
disruption. The paper first discusses the limits to technology disruption, meaning 
conditions under which an entrant technology fails to displace the incumbent technology. 
It identifies two sets of conditions the lead to such a situation. First, a technology 
disruption is less likely when the incumbent’s product or service enjoys strong network 
effects. The case research supports this finding. It shows that indirect network effects 
have prevented technology disruption in both operating systems as well as the wireless 
operators markets. Second, a technology disruption is less likely in markets where 
consumers prefer innovation in product or services far less compared to their low price, 
high quality, and high compatibility.   
 
The paper next discusses the limits to industry disruption, meaning conditions under 
which a new technology displaces the old but the entrant firms do not displace the 
incumbent firms. Such a situation arises when the incumbent loses the market share 
initially, but then it regains the lost market to become a leader in the new technology. The 
paper identifies two sets of conditions for such a situation to occur. First, an industry 
disruption is less likely when the incumbent can significantly affect the switching 
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behavior through a variety of strategies. The case research confirms this finding. It shows 
that the incumbents in computers and communications industries strategically utilize high 
switching costs to retain or regain their large consumer bases. Second, an industry 
disruption is less likely when incumbents are able to innovate while maintaining certain 
quality. Incumbents are typically stacked against natural barriers to rapid innovation such 
as rigidity of their organization and high dimensional complexity of their product. Yet, 
there are examples of incumbents radically restructuring their products in order to 
innovate while offering lower than before but acceptable quality to their consumers. 
Third, an industry disruption is less likely when entrant struggle to offer quality due to 
lack of functional control or market power. Being able to offer system-level quality is 
easier when a firm has system-level functional control. Such a system-level functional 
control is present when a firm owns critical functional components involved in delivering 
a service, or when the interfaces are standardized and a modular firm can reliably assert 
control over the end-to-end service to offer quality. Modular entrants in nascent markets 
often lack such control. Moreover, in a situation where they cannot accumulate market 
power because of competitive or regulatory reasons, they may lack the ability to deliver 
the necessary quality, either by developing it on their own or by contracting with other 
firms for it.  
  
At a practical level, the research provides guidance to practitioners on understanding 
uncertainty. First, it uncovers three myths about disruption that arise commonly. 
Incumbents often believe that disruptors cannot offer quality so there will be no 
technology disruption, which is a myth that leads to incumbent’s response that is slower 
than necessary. Analysts often believe that every entrant technology is inherently superior 
so there is sure to be technology and industry disruption, which is a myth that creates 
hype around every new technology. Corporate leaders often believe that a highly agile 
firm will survive disruption, which is a myth that leads to disregarding other structural 
influences that may be more important than firm’s agility. Each of these myths arises due 
to the misperceptions of feedback in complex systems.  
 
Next, the research provides guidance on how to anticipate parameter behavior under 
uncertainty before, during, and after disruption. It discusses the system-level structural 
implications that arise because of how the causes and effects are arranged in the whole 
system. The paper explains the structural implications using two types of structural 
forces: reinforcing and balancing. It elaborates upon the several structures of each type 
that the model identifies. In reinforcing structures a change is amplified, so a growth 
leads to further growth and a decline to further decline. In balancing structures a change 
is countered, so either a growth or a decline is countered. Structural influences 
demonstrate why dislodging the incumbent can be so difficult. In the communications 
industry, the incumbent’s large installed base reinforces three of its strengths – high 
quality, low price, and high compatibility. Hence, a potentially disruptive entrant needs a 
great innovation to overcome these forces. The structural forces also explain several 
sources of lock-in. For example, integrated structures have a tendency to remain 
integrated, and modular structures to remain modular. These observations argue that the 
small market share of a modular entrant at the time of entry is not enough reason to 
ignore the entrant as the reinforcing forces may help it grow rapidly. Also, once a 
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modular structure disrupts and becomes dominant, it might persist because of the lock-in, 
so the disruption has real consequences. 
 
Finally, the paper discusses the challenges of observing and measuring parameters. 
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1.4 Paper III - From Animal Trainer to Wildlife Conservationist: 
Balancing Regulation and Innovation in the Modular Age 
1.4.1 Problem and Research Method 
 
Juxtapose the social and economic objectives served by the existing telecommunications 
regulations, and evaluate what the modular age has done to them from the societal 
perspective, and you shall see a very different role emerging for the regulatory agency in 
the new world. The modular forces naturally promote the economic objectives such as 
competition and innovation, but they derail critical social objectives such as law 
enforcement and public safety. The regulator’s new role should be to achieve the 
following vital combination, which we define as the first best (FB) outcome: regulatory 
compliance, innovation, and competition are maximized subject to compliance cost 
constraints. In other words, the necessary regulatory compliance is achieved, the high 
innovation and competition are preserved, and the reasonable cost of compliance is 
maintained. This paper asks: How can such a balance of regulation, innovation, 
competition, and cost be achieved in the modular age of the Internet? 
 
The research begins with analyzing regulatory compliance, innovation, competition, and 
compliance cost as emergent behaviors of the systems model developed through papers 1 
and 2. It then proceeds in three stages. In the first stage, we investigate whether the FB 
can be achieved using the currently-known policy levers such as the scope and timing of 
regulation. For this investigation, we subject the model to a set of optimization exercises. 
In each exercise, the desired objective function needs to be achieved by varying the scope 
and timing of regulation. The optimization exercises are organized in an increasing order 
of complexity. They show that partial and delayed regulations cannot achieve the FB, and 
that balancing the four attributes involves tradeoffs.  
 
Hence, in the second stage, we carry out policy analysis on the systems model to seek 
levers that are capable of achieving the desired balance, but that have not been exploited 
by the policymakers yet. Once we find such policy levers that would, in theory, achieve 
the desired balance, in the third stage of the research, we discuss how the objectives, 
obligations, and enforcement mechanisms might be devised to implement the policies it 
in the practical sense, and from the systems perspective. For the third stage, we extend 
the Pre- vs. Post-Internet Regulation Case Research, already introduced in Paper 1.   
 
1.4.2 A Summary of Results 
 
The first optimization exercise demonstrates that if the regulatory compliance alone had 
to be maximized, the policy of comprehensive regulation, where all market entrants are 
regulated at the time of entry, achieves the necessary regulatory compliance, but it does 
so at the cost of innovation and competition. Here, unless the entrant enjoys a giant price 
and performance advantage over the incumbents that cannot be dwarfed by their 
regulation, the regulation creates a barrier to entry. This exercise shows that there is 
indeed a tradeoff in increasing compliance versus innovation and competition. 
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The second optimization exercise shows that if compliance had to be balanced with just 
innovation and competition but not cost, the regulator can do better if they accept a 
delayed regulation of the entrant; meaning, they give up regulation at the time of entry so 
as to let the modular entrant enter. Such a finding validates the regulatory tendency to 
leave nascent entrants unregulated; for example, the exclusions of the Internet from the 
1996 Act. In theory, delayed regulation may work if entrant can be regulated as soon as it 
has a sufficiently large consumer base but no later, as such careful management of the 
timing of regulation provides the best possible payoff in terms of both regulation and 
innovation. Unfortunately, however, there are several undesirable effects. First, the 
average compliance only reaches a level that can be achieved in a fully modular structure, 
which may be inadequate for the objective at hand. Next, as discussed in Paper 1, such a 
management of the timing of regulation is too difficult in the post-Internet environment 
because of the dynamic complexities. Finally, such improvement in compliance and 
innovation, achieved using delayed regulation, comes at a disproportionately large 
compliance cost due to the inordinate coordination cost of fully regulating the modular 
value chain.  
 
The third optimization exercise shows that if all four – compliance, innovation, 
competition, and cost – had to be balanced; the regulator can do better if in addition to the 
delayed regulation, they accept partial regulation of modular value chain, where the 
regulatory scope includes only those firms that can easily comply with regulation, 
thereby reducing the coordination cost. Such a finding validates the regulatory tendency 
for leaving out the difficult to regulate technologies; for example, the partial regulation of 
IP-Enabled services such as VoIP. However, we know from Paper 1 that such partial 
regulation is unsustainable as it provides perverse incentives for the regulated firms at the 
industry as well as global level in a dynamic environment. But more importantly, even 
after accepting both partial and delayed regulation, the average compliance remains 
inadequate for fulfilling the critical regulatory objectives. 
 
The first stage of research above concludes that the existing arrows in the regulatory 
quiver are blunt. Nonetheless, the above analysis does illuminate the theoretical 
conditions that must be met if the compliance, innovation, competition, and cost had to 
be balanced. These conditions are as follows: the modular structure must disrupt and win 
(i.e., regulation must not act as a barrier to entry); the modular structure must remain 
modular even after gaining market power (i.e., regulation must prevent significant 
accumulation of market power to maintain competitive pressure); and the modular 
structure must have the ability to comply with regulations at low cost (i.e., regulation 
must ensure that the coordination costs remain low). The policy analysis in the second 
stage of research explores which new policy levers must be pulled to achieve such an 
outcome.   
 
The policy analysis on the systems model contends that the highest leverage regulatory 
solution for meeting the above-listed theoretical conditions is a combination of two 
policies: to guard against the build up of significant market power, and to lower the 
coordination cost in modular industries by building consensus around the regulatory 
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issues. The following logic drives this recommendation. When a modular industry 
disrupts an integrated one, there is a great lack of consensus among firms around the 
regulatory issues. This lack of consensus causes two problems: it increases the time 
required to build compliance mechanisms, and it inflicts a large coordination cost that 
inflates the total cost of compliance, both of which reduce the overall compliance. 
Further, the coordination costs pose entry barriers for the nascent entrants. Since meeting 
regulatory requirements in a modular industry necessitates that all firms coordinate, such 
increase in coordination cost is inevitable. For example, when devices, applications, and 
access networks involved in delivering a single service are provisioned by separate 
parties, they must necessarily coordinate actions to comply with public safety or law 
enforcement requirements. Additionally, as the modular components compete fiercely 
over territories in a modular value chain, there will be a constant disagreement over who 
should bear the coordination cost. One market-based solution for reducing coordination 
cost is to let the modular firms integrate, but such integration comes at the cost of 
consolidation of market power, less standard interfaces, and lower pressure for 
innovation adoption. Hence, the coordination cost and the modularity of the industry 
structure, together, play a central role in balancing the compliance, innovation, 
competition, and cost, and the regulator is the best suited to balance these attributes by 
controlling the coordination costs and the level of integration in the industry structure. 
Controlling the coordination cost and the level of integration require the regulator to use 
two policy levers:  building broad-based consensus around regulatory issues, and limiting 
the consolidation of market power in the communications industry. These levers allows 
the regulator to increase compliance levels by containing the time and cost of developing 
compliance mechanisms, and to keep the innovation and competition high by reducing 
the barrier to entry as well as by maintaining the competitive pressure to innovate and 
adopt innovations.  
 
Limiting the consolidation of market power and building broad based consensus may be a 
nice theoretical solution, but are the regulators equipped to achieve it at the practical 
level? As established in Paper 1, to design regulations that are appropriate for the 
modular age in a practical sense, the following combination must occur: the regulatory 
debate around objectives must be pursued at the societal level; the necessary obligations 
must follow from the objectives construed at the societal level; the incremental regulation 
being utilized for imposing obligations must be abandoned; and a new enforcement 
mechanism conscious of the dynamic complexity of the modular age must be designed.  
 
This paper argues that to be able to address the objectives at the societal level, the FCC 
must be empowered to, and in fact must take a philosophical position on regulatory 
objectives, and thereby on the resulting obligations. While the dynamic complexity of the 
environment may complicate the enforcement of regulations, it does not obscure what the 
philosophical position on each objective ought to be. For example, the FCC must clearly 
state that objectives such as law enforcement and public safety cannot be compromised, 
and technologies that aspire to substitute existing channels of voice communications will 
be required to find a way to comply with the necessary obligations. Similarly, the FCC 
must clearly state that it considers promoting multi-modal competition and innovation to 
be of critical importance. Therefore, the interconnection obligations will be considered 
    
32 
 
across any two technologies, not just within a single mode such as PSTN. Similarly, 
universal service obligations may be fulfilled by any acceptable substitute, not just PSTN. 
 
Taking a clear philosophical stance on issues like these will help in several ways. First, it 
will prevent the entrenched interests from defocusing the regulatory debates. The analysis 
of the public comments, posted in response to the 2004 IP-Enabled Services NPRM, 
shows how the absence of a clear position on the objectives allows the political economy 
of entrenched interests to hijack the regulatory debate away from being objective-
centered. For example, the state vs. federal, or local vs. long-distance service interests 
currently overwhelm the debate about the access charges, which ought to be centered 
around how to achieve the objective of high competition. Similarly, interests trying to 
preserve the compensations that currently benefit them monopolize the debate about 
universal service, which ought to be centered on how socio-economic benefit may be 
brought to remote areas through new technologies. As a result, today, the regulatory 
proceedings spend enormous energy on appeasing the entrenched interests, which 
ultimately does not achieve the goal.  
 
The second advantage of taking a clear position is that it reduces the regulatory 
uncertainty, and thereby makes both incumbents and entrants less risk averse. Firms do 
not risk investment in differentiating themselves from the competition when there is 
uncertainty about regulations that may neutralize the advantage. A clear position on the 
objectives makes it clear for the firm if they should expect to be regulated. And 
guaranteed regulation is often better than a threat of regulation.  
 
The third advantage of taking a clear position is that the obligations that follow will 
eliminate misalignment that currently exists between opportunities, objectives, 
obligations, and capabilities. The obligations that follow from public safety, equal 
opportunity, and universal service objectives would then more aggressively leverage the 
new technologies that offer improved ways to achieve these objectives. The obligations 
that follow from critical areas such as law enforcement would not be partial or delayed. 
And, the obligations would not burden only parts of the value chain when the capacity to 
meet the obligation has moved to the other parts as a result of the movement in the 
functional control.  
 
Of course, simply taking a philosophical position will not be sufficient. To fulfill the 
objectives at the societal level, the government institutions, more broadly, and the FCC 
itself, more specifically, will have to organize differently. The fragmentation of 
government and the regulatory agency does not currently empower any party to be 
responsible for understanding and achieving the objectives at the societal level. While the 
full exploration of how to reorganize the government or the FCC is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, here is an example.  
 
We know from our analysis that a merger between two firms can potentially compromise 
two objectives: promoting multi-modal competition and innovation experienced by an 
average consumer. Yet, no merger in telecommunications industry to date has evaluated 
competition between multiple technologies, nor has any been viewed as a precursor to the 
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impending loss of innovation. The reason clearly is the fragmented organizations sharing 
responsibility for evaluating a merger. The FCC is organized in technology-specific silos 
such as wireline, wireless, and media. bureau. Despite that fact that large 
telecommunications firms today are invested in all technologies, every merger evaluation 
is assigned only to one of the FCC bureaus. Hence, the multimodal competition 
perspective could easily fall between the cracks. The FCC evaluates a merger from only 
the “public interest” perspective.  It is the Department of Justice (DoJ) that assesses if the 
merger will “substantially lessen” the competition, but the DoJ does not have the 
technological perspective, let alone that of multi-modal technology. FCC’s “public 
interest” is also inadequate. It only involves the analysis of how the merger affects the 
consumer welfare, and does not recognize that with a merger, the industry integrates, 
product interfaces may go from standardized to proprietary, and the industry may turn 
from one that was innovation-focused to the one that is quality-focused. 
 
Apart from taking a position on objectives and reorganizing the agency as appropriate, to 
be able to build broad-based consensus, a whole new set of capabilities and processes 
will have to be added to the enforcement bureau. Broad-based consensus may be built in 
two ways: by bringing all stakeholders to the negotiation table, or via the process of 
standards. The enforcement bureau has never included negotiators, nor have they 
participated in standard body meetings. It may need to acquire both of these skills. Their 
paradigm has been command-and-control, which only uses fines and punishment.  
Unfortunately, the modular age renders the current enforcement paradigm of command-
and-control ineffective because of the enormous dynamic complexity. Today, the firms 
cannot easily comply with regulation because of the inordinate coordination cost due to 
the heterogeneity of architectures and competitive interests. The regulator must focus on 
reducing the firm’s effort required to comply, so the firms can focus on their core 
competencies. Being able to negotiate a broad-based consensus around regulatory issues 
will allow the FCC to reduce the burden of compliance on modular firms, so that these 
firms can comply with regulation and innovation at the same time.   
 
Metaphorically, in the modular age, the role of the regulatory agency has gone from that 
of an animal trainer to a wildlife conservationist. The animal trainer cared only about 
compliance, but the wildlife conservationist cares also cares about the survival of species. 
The trainer, like a policeman, curtailed unwanted activity, whereas the conservationist, 
like a parent, is interest in a balance, where animals are playful but also grow into 
responsible citizens of the jungle. 
    
34 
 
Chapter 2: FROM HERDING SHEEP TO HERDING CATS: 
CAN THE REGULATION OF AN INTEGRAL AGE WORK 
FOR A MODULAR AGE? 
2.1 Introduction 
Existing U.S. telecommunications regulations were created in the integral age. In that 
paradigm, each operator was vertically integrated, controlling the total functionality 
necessary to deliver a service; a few such operators controlled the industry; they faced 
low competition and were under limited pressure to adopt innovation; and consumers had 
limited choice. The Internet has introduced a polar opposite paradigm—the modular age. 
In this paradigm, a firm controls only a subset of the total functionality necessary to 
constitute a service; many modular firms interoperate to deliver a service; firms compete 
fiercely and are under great pressure to innovate; and consumers enjoy a far greater 
choice due to the multi-modal competition among multiple technologies. Entering the 
modular age raises a number of questions for the telecommunications regulation: Can the 
regulatory structure designed in an integral age—in its objectives, obligations, and 
enforcement mechanisms—work for a modular age? This paper delivers a clear answer to 
this question (No!) and identifies the reasons why the objectives, obligations, and 
enforcement mechanisms of regulations of the integral age cannot work for the modular 
age. 
 
During the 1980s and ‘90s, there was much written about Telecommunications 
Policy in the United States. Several books provide detailed discussions of the regulatory 
challenges, decisions, rationales, and important court cases ((Krattenmaker and Powe 
1994), (Benjamin, Lichtman et al. 2006)). Much of this literature is focused on the 
regulatory challenges of going from monopoly to competition after AT&T’s break up in 
1984 ((Sapolsky 1992), (Stanbury and Institute for Research on Public Policy. 1986)), the 
genesis of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ((Telecommunications Policy Research 
Conference, Brock et al. 1996), (Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, 
Gillett et al. 1999)), and the impact of deregulation in telecommunications ((Tunstall 
1986), (Wilson 2000)). However, this literature barely mentions the modular age created 
by the Internet, understandably so, as the meteoric rise of the Internet through the 1990s 
and 2000s would have been impossible to predict.  
 
The recent academic literature has acknowledged the radical shift from an integral 
to a modular age introduced by the Internet. It poses arguments about the structure of the 
communications industry that has gone from a value chain to a value network (Li and 
Whalley), and about the large choice available to consumers that has altered the 
competitive landscape for the incumbent as well as making real the new regulatory 
challenges such as net neutrality(Pouwelse, Garbacki et al. 2008). This literature also 
calls for broader structural and technological remedies for future regulation (Cammaerts 
and Burgelman 2000). There is generally a growing recognition that the emergence of 
Internet-based services has implications for future communications regulation, market 
structure and competition. This literature explicitly underscores the urgent need for 
further research on the implications of this shift (de Bijl and Huigen 2008). 
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This paper examines the appropriateness of a regulatory regime for the modular 
age. The research approach builds upon the principles of systems in order to broadly 
analyze the regulator’s role and critique decisions taken thus far. We view the 
communications industry as a complex system, with dynamic components such as 
technology, firms, consumers, regulators. The regulatory objectives are conceived as an 
emergent property of such a system of systems. We analyze the appropriateness of a 
regulatory regime along three dimensions: the objectives it serves, the obligations it 
imposes to fulfill those objectives, and the enforcement mechanisms it uses to enforce 
those obligations. We find this three-part framework, originating from the recent political 
economy literature (Reiner 2002), more comprehensive for evaluating regulation than 
using any one dimension, which involves tradeoffs. Focusing solely on objectives eases 
legitimating policy but makes assigning responsibility difficult; focusing on obligations 
eases assigning responsibility but makes legitimating policy difficult; and focusing on 
enforcement mechanisms makes a policy more measurable and ostensibly objective but 
may suffer in terms of legitimacy and appropriate assignment of responsibility. Thus, we 
analyze the ongoing debate around the regulation of the Internet using two lenses. The 
change in the regulatory paradigm is analyzed using the lens of the disruptive shifts 
experienced by the technology, industry, and consumers. And the appropriateness of the 
regulatory regime is analyzed using the lens of objectives, obligations, and enforcement 
mechanisms. The research uses the regulation of voice communications in the United 
States as a representative case.  
 
Broad theoretical analyses of telecommunications regulation of the kind we 
undertake in this paper (and Paper 3) has been traditionally based upon economic theory 
(Laffont and Tirole 2000), legal theories(Kennedy and Pastor 1996), or technological 
architecture (layered regulation argument in (Nuechterlein and Weiser 2005)). All of 
these approaches focus heavily on the efficiency of implementing regulation in a static 
scenario. The dynamics of technology, industry structure, and consumer behavior are 
considered exogenous to their mathematical or analytical models. The research in this 
paper (and Paper 3) focuses on the dynamic complexity in the telecommunications 
system. It strives to make the behaviors of firms, consumers, and technologists 
endogenous with respect to regulation and competition. Recent works have already 
shown that in the new environment of high flexibility and choice, policy and regulation 
indeed influence the technology choice to a varying degree (Huigen and Cave 2008).  
 
Our work should not be misconstrued as opposing the economic principles or 
legal doctrines. The contributions of the economic and legal theories in understanding the 
problems of interconnections and other types of incentive regulations are already well-
known. But both economic and legal theory pursue regulatory efficiency while 
considering one or more of the objectives, obligations, enforcement mechanisms, or 
institutional arrangements as given. By contrast, our research is interested in 
understanding how the regulatory objectives might be fulfilled, even if that takes 
redesigning regulatory obligations, enforcement mechanisms, and reorganizing the 
institutions.  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We begin by discussing the 
paradigm shift of integral to modular age, providing evidence and illustrations for it. We 
will then discuss regulation of voice communications in the integral age, and the hesitant 
regulatory response to the onset of the modular age. Following that, we use case research 
and two models to assess whether this regulatory response is appropriate, and then end 
with conclusion. 
2.2 From Integral to Modular Age: A Paradigm Shift 
The Modular Age radically changes the dynamics of technology, corporate strategy, 
consumer preference, and consequently the regulation. In this section, we show 
illustrations of this radical shift summarized in Table 1. 
  
Integral Age Modular Age 
Technology Dynamics 
Single mode competition Multi-mode competition (Discontinuity) 
Intelligence in the network core Intelligence at the network edges 
(Discontinuity)
Industry Structure/Corporate Strategy Dynamics 
Integrated Modular (Discontinuity) 
Low competition High competition 
Low innovation adoption High innovation adoption 
Low clockspeed  High clockspeed 
Consumer Preference Dynamics 
Less choice More choice (Discontinuity) 
Difficult to introduce innovation Easier to introduce innovation 
(Discontinuity)
Regulatory Dynamics 
Narrowly tailored regulation, as appropriate 
for the Integral Age 
? 
Table 1: From Integral to Modular Age - A Radical Change in the Regulatory Paradigm 
2.1.1 Technology Dynamics 
 
The modular age changes the technology dynamics in two important ways. First, it 
changes the competition from single model (among technologically-similar multiple 
PSTN providers) to multi-mode (between wired technologies such as PSTN, wireless 
technologies, and the Internet technologies that work both on the wired and wireless 
technologies). Figure 1 illustrates the three voice communications technologies in the 
United States. Here, the effective penetration of wireless or VoIP technologies may be 
considered higher than it appears as it is measured on % population basis.  
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(a) 
Multi-
mode 
Competi-
tion 
 
(b) 
Zoom-in 
Figure 1: From Single to Multi-mode Competition in Technology7 
Second, in the modular age, the functional control has migrated from that inside the 
network core towards the network edges. Table 2 shows how the migration of 
functionality affects control over the functional components of a single voice call. To be 
commercially viable, any voice communication service must offer five fundamental 
functions: setup and terminate the call, transport voice, secure the channel, maintain 
user’s privacy, bill the user. The plethora of other features that a service may offer is not 
a part of what is minimally necessary. Table 2 shows that in traditional (PSTN) as well as 
wireless telephony, the control over all five fundamental functions resided in telephone 
switches and base stations that constituted the network core. By contrast, in Internet-
based technologies such as VoIP, particularly peer-to-peer VoIP, the control over four of 
five fundamental functions has migrated to the network edge. In computer science, the 
                                                 
7 Sources: 
PSTN: Statistical Trends in Telephony, 2008, Wireline Competition Bureau, The Federal Communications 
Commission, http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/trends.html 
Wireless: Commercial Mobile Radio Services (CMRS) Competition Reports, 1995-2008,Wireless 
Telecommunications Bureau, The Federal Communications Commission, 
http://wireless.fcc.gov/index.htm?job=cmrs_reports 
VoIP: eMarketer estimates, obtained via MIT library access to InfoTech Trends 
(http://infotechtrends.com/login.htm) 
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reason for such a movement of functionality to network edges can be traced back to the 
end-to-end principle (Saltzer, Reed et al. 1984).  
   
Technology 
Functions of a Typical Voice Call 
Setup and 
terminate the 
call 
Transport 
voice 
Secure the 
channel 
Maintain 
user’s 
privacy 
Bill the user 
PSTN 
(Traditional) 
In the 
Network 
Core 
In the 
Network 
Core 
In the 
Network 
Core 
In the 
Network 
Core 
In the 
Network 
Core 
Wireless 
Telephony 
In the 
Network 
Core 
In the 
Network 
Core 
In the 
Network 
Core 
In the 
Network 
Core 
In the 
Network 
Core 
VoIP 
(Internet-
based) 
At the 
Network 
Edge 
At the 
Network 
Edge
At the 
Network 
Edge
At the 
Network 
Edge
In the 
Network 
Core 
Table 2: Functional Control From Inside the Network Core to Its Edges 
2.1.2 Industry Structure and Corporate Strategy Dynamics 
The modular forces dramatically alter the dynamics of industry structure and corporate 
strategy. The industry structure for both PSTN and wireless telephony was integrated. By 
contrast, the industry structure for the multi-mode competition is highly modular. Figure 
2 contrasts the integrated ownership of the PSTN value chain with the fragmented the 
ownership of the multi-mode technology value chain. It shows that the PSTN value chain 
was owned and controlled by a vertically integrated operator, whereas each link of in the 
multi-mode value chain is provisioned by different set of firms.  
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Figure 2: From Integrate to Modular Industry Structure8 
The corporate strategy dynamics also change in several ways. First, the modular age has 
induced far higher competition than before from several perspectives. From a service 
perspective, before the 1990s, the competition was mainly within a technology (i.e. 
between the different PSTN providers), but now it is also inter-modal (i.e. across the 
PSTN, wireless, and VoIP providers). According to the 2007 National Health Interview 
Survey (“NHIS”), 14.5 percent of adults, or one out of every 7 (or 18% of households 
with phone service), lived in households with only wireless phones in the second half of 
2007, up from 11.8 percent in 2006, 7.8 percent in the second half of 2005, and more than 
quadruple the percentage (3.5 percent) in the second half of 2003(Wireless Competition 
Bureau 2009). From a value chain perspective, the competition was contained within each 
                                                 
8 Sources: 
PSTN Value Chain: 
Graham-Hackett, M. (1999). Industry Surveys: Computers-Networking, Standards & Poor's. 
 , Wohl, P. (1999). Industry Surveys: Telecommunications-Wireline, Standards & Poor's. 
  
Multi-mode Technology Value Chain: 
Bensinger, A. (2008). Industry Surveys: Communications Equipment, Standards & Poor's. 
 , Kessler, S. and K. Kawagauchi (2008). Industry Surveys: Computers-Consumer Services & the 
Internet, Standards & Poor's. 
 , Rosenbluth, T. (2008). Industry Surveys: Telecommunications-Wireline, Standards & Poor's. 
 , Rosenbluth, T. and K. Kawagauchi (2008). Industry Surveys: Telecommunications-Wireless, 
Standards & Poor's. 
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link (e.g., an equipment provider competed with other equipment providers, a service 
provider with other service providers, and a device provider with other device providers), 
but now it is among the different links of the value chain (e.g., the service providers and 
application or device providers are competing for territory, or the service and access 
providers are in a fierce competition, and so on). Recently released data shows how peer-
to-peer traffic generated by the web-based applications are changing the competitive 
landscape for the access and service providers (Pouwelse, Garbacki et al. 2008)   
 
Next, with higher competition, corporations are under far greater pressure to 
adopt innovation than before. Before the breakup of AT&T, its research arm, Bell 
Laboratory, made breakthrough inventions but did not have the competitive pressure to 
adopt them. For example, in networking-related research alone, Bell Laboratory invented 
data networking in as early as the late 1940s, but became serious about its adoption only 
when they carried out the first trial of the digital subscriber lines (DSL) in the 1980s. 
Similarly, they proposed the cellular network in 1947, but it installed the first cellular 
network in Chicago in the 1970s9. By contrast, today the pressure to adopt innovation has 
altered the character of corporate research altogether. The corporate research labs today 
have a research agenda that is shorter term, and increasingly aligned with the bottom line 
on the corporation’s balance sheet.10 
  
Finally, the modular age induces higher clockspeed; in other words, the time 
available to make critical business decisions is shorter. We know that clockspeed may be 
measured along product, process, and organizational dimensions, but measuring it is 
complex (Fine 1998). Unfortunately, the US government’s data collection does not gather 
any data directly pertinent to clockspeed. Hence, disparate observations must be 
combined to understand why the clockspeed of the communications value chain has 
increased. To begin with, research on measuring industry clockspeed has shown that the 
telecommunications equipment industry has a slower clockspeed than the personal 
computers and consumer electronics industries ((Mendelson and Pillai 1999), figure 1). 
As the functionality migrates from the network core to its edges and processor speeds 
increase due to Moore’s law, the architecture of the telecommunications equipment 
increasingly resembles that of personal computers. With this metamorphosis, the product 
life cycles in the telecommunications equipment industry are shortening over time 
((Mendelson and Pillai 1999), figure 3), indicating the increased clockspeed of the 
telecommunications industry. The interview data in Table 3 confirms this increasing 
clockspeed by showing how the time between two product releases has shrunk for 
communications equipment. The product release cycle before the Internet was, on an 
average, 3 years. It has now compressed to less than a year. The time available to make 
decisions is far shorter today than before.   
 
Before 1990s Between 1990-2000 During 2000-2008 
~ 2.5-3 years ~1-2 years ~6 months-1 year 
                                                 
9 Constructed from Bell Lab’s historical timeline available at, http://www.alcatel-
lucent.com/wps/portal/BellLabs/History 
10 Hecht, J. (2007). Bell Labs: Over and Out. New Scientist. 
 (http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19325895.500-bell-labs-over-and-out.html) 
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Table 3: From Low to High Clockspeed11 
2.1.3 Consumer Preference Dynamics 
 
The modular age radically changes the dynamics of consumer preference. First, the 
consumers enjoy a far greater choice today than before. Figure 3 shows how the 
consumer choice has changed from year 2000 to year 2007 in each mode of technology. 
It shows that more than 85% of the US population today enjoys a choice of three or more 
providers of PSTN, wireless communications, and Internet broadband service, each. 
Second, it is much easier for the consumer to introduce innovations. The best example of 
this change is the burgeoning array of open source freeware (ref?).  
 
 
Figure 3: From Low to High Consumer Choice12 
                                                 
11 As the data for measuring clockspeed is not officially recorded, the information in this table is produced 
with unstructured interviews with major telecommunication equipment vendors who participate in the 
Communications Futures Program (http://cfp.mit.edu) at MIT.  
12 Sources: 
PSTN: Wireline Competition Bureau, F. (2008). Local Telephone Competition: Status as of December 31, 
2007, Federal Communications Commission. 
  
Wireless Operators, from reports such as the following between 2000-2006, 
Wireless Competition Bureau, F. (2000). Fifth Annual Commercial Mobile Radio Services Competition 
Report, Federal Communications Commission. 
 , Wireless Competition Bureau, F. (2006). Eleventh Annual Commercial Mobile Radio Services 
Competition Report, Federal Communications Commission. 
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As the Internet becomes more ubiquitous, its hourglass architecture of the Internet, shown 
in Figure 4, is likely to continue offering consumers even a higher choice.  The hourglass 
is an abstraction illustrating the Internet architecture’s ability to accommodate a variety 
of applications over a variety of network technologies.  
 
 
Figure 4: A four-layer model of open data network (adapted from the hourglass on page 122 of 
Realizing the Information Future: The Internet and Beyond, Copyright 1994, The National Academy 
of Sciences) 
Many of the changes discussed above are discontinuities introduced by breakthrough 
inventions or landmark decisions. They radically alter the trajectory of change in a 
sustainable manner. Multi-modal competition is a discontinuity that was introduced by a 
combination of inventions such as cellular telephony, digital transmission, optical-fiber 
communication; and it is here to stay as the wireless, broadband technologies mature 
along side the PSTN. The modular architecture is a discontinuity that was introduced 
with the decision to breakup AT&T’s monopoly in PSTN; and it is here to stay as long as 
the competitive pressure from multi-modal competition persists. The burgeoning 
innovation, at the network edge and by corporations and consumers alike, is a 
discontinuity that was introduced by the advent of packet switching; and it is here to stay 
as long as the modular, hourglass-like architecture of the Internet survives. What do these 
discontinuities mean for regulation? To answer this question, we must first understand 
the theory and practice of regulation in voice communication.  
                                                                                                                                                 
High-speed Internet Lines: 
Wireline Competition Bureau, F. (2008). High-Speed Services for Internet Access: Status as of December 
31, 2007, Federal Communications Commission. 
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2.2 Regulation of Voice Communications in the Integrated Age 
Voice communications in the United States have a long history of regulation. The Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), the US telecommunications regulatory agency, was 
created by the Communications Act of 1934 to regulate the PSTN. The purpose of this 
paper is not to review the history. Several excellent accounts detail the chronological 
development of regulation in voice communications ((Nuechterlein and Weiser 2005), 
(Kennedy and Pastor 1996)). We are interested in examining those regulations that 
continue to be important as we enter the modular age. 
 
In 2004, when the FCC invited public comments on how to regulate Internet-
Enabled Services such as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), it acknowledged for the 
first time the serious threat the Internet-based services pose to the existing regulations, 
and identified a set of economic and social regulation that continue to be of critical 
importance. We will first outline these regulations using the three-part framework of: 
objectives they serve, obligations they impose to fulfill those objectives, and enforcement 
mechanisms they use to enforce those obligations.  
 
Two areas of economic regulation continue to be relevant for the modular age: the 
rate regulation of the interconnection (access) charges imposed to fulfill the objective of 
promoting competition (or preventing monopolistic behavior); and the universal service 
regulation imposed to fulfill the objective of economic development by including high-
cost and low-income areas. Three areas of social regulation continues to be relevant for 
the modular age: emergency calling regulation imposed to facilitate public safety 
objectives, Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) imposed to 
facilitate law enforcement objectives, and disability access regulation imposed to 
facilitate equal opportunity objectives. Each area of regulation has a set of obligations 
that the “telecommunications service”13 providers must fulfill. Table 4 summarizes the 
objectives and the obligations for each regulation. 
 
Regulation Objectives Obligations14 
Economic Regulation 
Interconnection 
(Access) Charges 
Competition 1. Call-originating company pays per-minute 
access charges to call-terminating company 
Universal Service Economic 
Development 
1. Long-distance companies must contribute to 
the USF15 
2. Companies servicing high-cost, low-income 
areas receive subsidy from the USF 
                                                 
13 To mean “the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users 
as to be effectively available to the public, regardless of facilities used.” Appendix A provides a brief 
evolutionary outline of statutory definitions such as this one.  
14 The obligations are presented in a language distilled from the legal statutes. The process of summary and 
a detailed list of statutes relevant to each area can be found in Chapter 2 of the author’s masters thesis, 
Vaishnav, C. (2005). Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP): The Dynamics of Technology and Regulation. 
Technology and Policy Program. Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: 166. 
  
15 Universal Service Fund (USF) 
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Social Regulation 
Emergency Service 
(911/E911) 
Public Safety 1. Telecommunications provider identifies an 
emergency call and route to appropriate PSAP16 
2. Telecommunications provider provides call-
back information of the caller 
3. Telecommunications provider provides 
location of the caller 
Wiretapping 
(CALEA) 
Law 
Enforcement 
Capability 
1. Telecommunications provider provides call-
identifying information such as the source, 
destination and the duration of a call 
2. Telecommunications provider records 
conversations (lawful intercept) upon court 
request 
3. Telecommunications provider submits recorded 
information securely, while ensuring user’s 
privacy 
Disability Access Equal 
Opportunity 
1. Equipment manufacturer manufactures 
accessible telecommunications equipment 
2. Telecommunications provider provides text and 
voice relay service 
3. Telecommunications providers must not install 
network features, functions or capabilities not 
compliant with disability access requirement 
Table 4 Economic and Social Regulation of PSTN 
 
The FCC’s primary enforcement mechanism so far has been command-and-control. The 
FCC conducts two types of enforcement proceedings. First, under section 207 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, anyone aggrieved by a carrier’s unlawful conduct may file 
a complaint and may recover the full damage sustained. Second, the FCC has 
independent authority to investigate violations of the Act, its regulations, and filed tariffs. 
Before the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the FCC’s complaint procedures were 
generally invoked by the disgruntled consumers, but post-1996 Act the FCC also 
entertains complaints about business-to-business conduct. The FCC has the authority to 
fine violations. For run-of-the-mill violations, its authority is limited, but where a 
common carrier “repeatedly” and “willfully” violates its legal obligations, the 
Commission can assess a far higher “forfeiture penalty.”17 
 
Over time, the enforcement mechanisms, but more likely other factors such as the 
functional control enjoyed by the integrated firms, have rendered a high order of 
regulatory compliance in the PSTN. Figure 5 shows the levels of regulatory compliance 
                                                 
16 Public Service Answering Point (PSAP) coordinating the police, the fire and the medical response.  
17 This summary of FCC’s current enforcement mechanisms is borrowed from Nuechterlein, J. E. and P. J. 
Weiser (2005). Digital crossroads : American telecommunications policy in the Internet age. Cambridge, 
Mass., MIT Press. 
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Universal Service, Emergency Calling, and Wiretapping regulation18. The figure makes 
several important points. First, the obligations in each of these areas are being met higher 
than 95% of the time. Second, in two of the three areas depicted, such high level of 
compliance has been achieved over several decades. Finally, and unfortunately, the 
setting of the modular age has begun to erode regulatory compliance just as such high 
level of compliance was achieved.  
 
 
Figure 5: Regulatory Compliance in the Integral Age 
2.3 Regulatory Response to the Modular Age 
Ever since the IP-Enabled Services NPRM was published in 2004, the regulatory action 
has demonstrated that the objectives for the five areas of regulation, stated in Table 4, 
continue to be relevant for the telecommunications system. In the area of economic 
regulation, the FCC has undertaken what it terms “comprehensive reform” of Intercarrier 
Compensation, and Universal Service regulation19. The FCC has also adopted orders to 
                                                 
18 The remaining two areas are excluded because, for interconnection charges the percentage compliance is 
not a meaningful measure; and for disability access the compliance statistics is not available. That said, in 
both areas, the carriers comply with regulation. 
19 These reform span several FCC dockets: High-Cost Universal Service Support, WC Docket No. 05-337; 
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, CC Docket No. 96-45; Lifeline and Link Up, WC Docket 
No. 03-109; Universal Service Contribution Methodology, WC Docket No. 06-122; 
Numbering Resource Optimization, CC Docket No. 99-200; Implementation of the Local 
Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98; 
Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, CC Docket No. 01-92; 
Intercarrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, CC Docket No. 99-68; IP-Enabled 
Services, WC Docket No. 04-36 
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extend social regulations for emergency calling, CALEA, and disability access 
regulation.20 With the increased emphasis on homeland security post-9/11 attacks, the 
FCC, in response to an FBI petition, has expanded CALEA obligations to Internet, 
Broadband and VoIP service. It also moved around the same time to include VoIP under 
911/E911 regulation (2005). 
 
In each of these proceedings, the central question has been, who should bear the 
obligations and when. The FCC has responded to the challenge with incremental 
regulation. Incremental regulation takes place in two ways: partial regulation, where the 
regulatory scope permanently excludes certain types of firms or technologies; or delayed 
regulation, where the regulatory scope temporarily excludes certain types of firms or 
technologies but includes them later.  
 
The providers of the Internet service (classified by the 1996 Act as “information 
service”21) were left unregulated under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as 
information service was considered nascent. Starting with 2004 IP -Enabled Services 
NPRM, the FCC has begun regulating Internet services, but only incrementally. The FCC 
has concluded that VoIP services that are categorized as “interconnected” service are 
subject to CALEA and E911 regulation as telecommunications carriers. The peer-to-peer 
“unmanaged” service is not regulated.22 As summarized in Table 5, the FCC considers 
Phone-to-Phone and PC-to-Phone VoIP as “interconnected” service and regulates them 
with emergency calling, CALEA, and disability obligations (listed in Table 4); whereas it 
considers PC-to-PC VoIP  as “unmanaged” service, and does not regulate it.  
 
Wireless telephony has similarly faced incremental regulation. In this case, the 
FCC grafted social regulations such as emergency calling (known as, wireless E-911) on 
to a service that was already mature. The wireless telephony was already available to 
more than 50% of the US population when the petition for wireless E-911 was made in 
                                                 
20 Report and Order: E911 Requirement for IP-Enabled Service Providers. WC Docket No. 05-196, Second 
Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order: Communications Assistence for Law Enforcement 
Act and Broadband Access and Services. FCC No. 06-56, Report and Order: Disability Requirement for IP-
Enabled Service Providers. WC Docket No. 07-110 
 
21 To mean “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, 
retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications, and includes electronic 
publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of 
a telecommunications network or the management of a telecommunications service.” 
22 In the exact language of the order, “Law Enforcement describes interconnected or mediated VoIP 
services as those services that offer voice communications calling capability whereby the VoIP provider 
acts as a mediator to manage the communication between its end points and to provide call set up, 
connection, termination, and party identification features, often generating or modifying dialing, signaling, 
switching, addressing or routing functions for the user.  Law Enforcement distinguishes interconnected 
communications from “unmanaged” or “peer-to-peer” communications, which involve disintermediated 
communications that are set up and managed by the end user via its customer premises equipment or 
personal computer.  In these unmanaged, or disintermediated, communications, the VoIP provider has 
minimal or no involvement in the flow of packets during the communication, serving instead primarily as a 
directory that provides users’ Internet web addresses to facilitate peer-to-peer communications.” 
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the year 2000 (see Figure 1).23 The full compliance is expected only by 2012, assuming 
no schedule overruns.  
  
Typically, the regulator cites the underlying uncertainty surrounding the impact of 
regulation on competition, and vice versa, to justify incremental regulation. By partial 
regulation, they intend to improve the regulatory efficiency in meeting a mandated 
regulatory compliance, since firms or technologies that are difficult to regulate are not 
regulated. And by delayed regulation, they intend to achieve higher competition, as 
nascent and innovative technologies are initially left unregulated. 
  
  
Mode Service Example Regulatory Classified Current 
Regulation 
Phone-to-Phone VoCable, VoDSL, 
Vonage, 8x8 
“interconnected” service 
(i.e., PSTN 
interconnection) 
Regulated with 
emergency 
calling, CALEA, 
and disability 
obligations 
PC-to-Phone SkypeOut,Net2Phone “interconnected” service 
PC-to-PC Skype, Yahoo, IM, 
Google Chat 
“unmanaged” service 
(i.e., no PSTN 
interconnection) 
Not regulated 
Table 5 Modes of VoIP and the Current Regulatory Terms 
The enforcement mechanism for the modular age continues to be command-and-control. 
For areas of regulation where the FCC has adopted regulatory orders, it provides the 
regulated services a “safe harbor” period after which they must file a letter or form to 
indicate their level of compliance. For example, in the case of emergency calling, the 
FCC required interconnected VoIP providers to file a letter detailing compliance in 120 
days of adopting the order24. This period was 90 days in the case of CALEA order.25   In 
“comprehensive reform” of interconnection charges and universal services, the FCC 
proposes to continue the practice of requiring the regulated parties to file periodic reports. 
The FCC does recognize that the there will need to be coordination among the different 
parties in the value chain to deliver regulatory compliance. For example, in the case of 
E911, it recognizes that, “the deployment of E9-1-1 requires the development of new 
technologies and upgrades to local 9-1-1 PSAPs, as well as coordination among public 
safety agencies, wireless carriers, technology vendors, equipment manufacturers, and 
local wireline carriers.”26 However, it does not initiate any specific actions for the 
coordination.  
 
                                                 
23 http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Wireless/News_Releases/1999/nrwl9016.html 
24 Commission Requires Interconnected VoIP Providers to Provide Enhanced 911 Service, 05/19/2005, 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-258818A1.pdf 
25 FCC Adopts Order to Enable Law Enforcement to Access Certain Broadband and VoIP Providers, 
05/03/2006, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-265221A1.pdf 
26 http://www.fcc.gov/pshs/services/911-services/enhanced911/Welcome.html 
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Regulatory Aspect Response to the Modular Age 
Objectives Remains relevant for the telecommunications system 
Obligations Extended to new technologies using incremental 
regulation 
Enforcement Mechanisms Continues to be command-and-control 
Table 6: Incremental Regulation of the Entrants 
   
Table 6 summarizes the regulatory response to the modular age. The FCC’s response 
indicates that the objectives remain relevant for the telecommunications system to fulfill, 
the obligations are being incrementally extended to new technologies, and the 
enforcement mechanisms continue to be command-and-control.  Is such a regulatory 
response appropriate for the modular age? To answer this question, we now use a case 
research and two dynamic models.  
2.4 Research Method 
This research uses the systems approach to evaluate whether the current objectives, 
obligations, and enforcement mechanisms would work in the modular age. The following 
five principles of systems are deployed through this research: synthesis, hierarchy, 
emergent behavior, feedback, and statistical and strategic behavior. Each principle will be 
introduced in the appropriate place.  
 
At the highest level, what differentiates the systems approach from others is its use of 
synthesis for the inquiry. Synthesis can be defined as a three-step process ((Ackoff 1999), 
p.17): 
 
1. Identifying a containing whole (system) of which the thing to be explained is a 
part, 
2. Explaining the behavior or properties of the containing whole,  
3. Then explaining the behavior or properties of the thing to be explained in terms of 
its role(s) or function(s) within its containing whole27.  
 
Such an exercise shows that the social system (the society) is containing whole (the 
system) whose objectives the telecommunications system fulfills. Therefore, the 
appropriateness of the objectives, obligations, and enforcement mechanisms of 
telecommunications regulation must be evaluated from the perspective of how well they 
fulfill the societal objectives. Figure 6 illustrates a hierarchical decomposition of such a 
system of systems. 
 
Such hierarchical decomposition is founded upon the argument that complex 
systems are hierarchic ((Simon 1981), Chapter 8). Simon defined a hierarchic system, or 
                                                 
27 Synthesis reverses the three-step order of analysis, which is: (1) decomposition of that 
which is to be explained, (2) explanation of the behavior or properties of the parts taken 
separately, and (3) aggregating these explanations into an explanation of the whole. 
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hierarchy, to mean “a system that is composed of interrelated subsystems, each of the 
latter being in turn hierarchic in structure until we reach some lowest level of elementary 
system.”  Two caveats to this definition, also offered by Simon, are important to consider.  
First, it is somewhat arbitrary as to where we leave off the partitioning and what 
subsystems we take as elementary. Second, not all systems adhere to the rules of a strict 
hierarchy. In a strict hierarchy, “each of the subsystems is subordinated by an authority 
relation to the system it belongs to.” By contrast, in the system of interest to this research, 
the relationships may be more complex, ranging from no relationship among subsystems 
to more than just the strict hierarchic relationship. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: A Hierarchical Decomposition of the Telecommunications System 
 
The hierarchical decomposition demonstrates two important observations. First, the 
telecommunications system is one of the many infrastructure systems that contribute to 
achieving the social objectives. The infrastructure systems themselves fall into the class 
of socio-technical systems, meaning systems where the complexity arises due to the 
interaction of technical and human factors (Magee and de Weck 2004). Second, the 
behavior of the telecommunication system itself emerges as a result of not just the 
regulatory dynamics, but the interaction of regulatory-, corporate strategy-, industry 
structure-, consumer preference-, and technology dynamics.  
 
With this understanding as a backdrop, we will now describe the research method, 
consisting of one case research and two dynamic models, designed to answer the question 
of interest: Can the regulation designed in an integral age—in its objectives, obligations, 
and enforcement mechanisms—work for a modular age? 
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2.5 Case Research: An Analysis of Pre. vs. Post-Internet 
Regulatory Environments 
 
So far, we have shown that radical changes defining the transition from the integral to 
modular are indeed taking place. We have also discussed that the regulatory response to 
this radical shift has been incremental. But do the modular forces reflect themselves in 
regulatory matters? This is the question that motivates the analysis of pre vs. post-Internet 
regulatory environments in this case research. The answer will validate our implicit 
assumption that the regulator must respond to the shift to modular age. 
2.5.1 Case Selection and Setup28 
 
For the analysis, public comments against the Telecommunications Act of 1996 NPRM29 
are compared with those against the IP-Enabled Services NPRM published in 2004. 
These two FCC dockets form a natural experiment; the 1996 Act centers solely on the 
public switched telephone networks (PSTN) and mentions the term “Internet” just once, 
whereas the IP-Enabled Services NPRM centers on the Internet and is the first document 
to acknowledge the serious threat the Internet-based services pose to the existing 
regulations.  
 
Pre-Internet Environment Case 
(The 1996 Telecom Act NPRM) 
Post-Internet Environment Case 
(The IP-Enabled Services NPRM) 
FCC Docket: 96-98  
Released: 05/23/1996  
Period Analyzed: 05/1996 – 03/2009  
Total Public Comments: 10763  
Total Comments Analyzed:  
6626 (randomly selected) 
Each Comment Coded with 
Commenter’s: 
Value Chain Position  
(Categories: Equipment, Access, Service, 
Application, Device, Consumer),  
Stakeholder Type 
(Categories: Corporation, Interest Group, 
FCC Docket: 04-36  
Released: 04/06/2004  
Period Analyzed: 06/2004 – 03/2009  
Total Public Comments: 2053  
Total Comments Analyzed:  
2053 
Each Comment Coded with 
Commenter’s: 
Value Chain Position  
(Categories: Equipment, Access, Service, 
Application, Device, Consumer),  
Stakeholder Type 
(Categories: Corporation, Interest Group, 
                                                 
28 To harvest thousands of public comments from FCC’s electronic document management system, EDOCS 
(http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/), a software was developed using web-programming languages 
(XHTML, XML and XPath) and  Perl scripting. An Excel database was then used for further analysis. I 
sincerely thank Jesse Sowell for the architecture and programming of the first version of the software. 
Those trying to replicate this feat should know that currently the FCC does not have the ability to compile 
all comments against a docket and issue it on a physical medium such as a CD, so comments have to be 
downloaded individually. Also, while EDOCS reduces much work with its ability to tabulate all comments 
in response to a given document, their tabulation of comments has many peculiarities as some records in 
the comments database are manually edited and have additional fields, which necessitates that the web 
programs be tailored to such peculiarities (a truly laborious undertaking).    
29 Precisely, the Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 Notice for Proposed Rulemaking 
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Independent, State Regulator, Federal 
Regulator) , 
Technology Type 
(Categories: PSTN, Internet, Cable, 
Wireless, Satellite, Utility, Any)  
Independent, State Regulator, Federal 
Regulator) , 
Technology Type 
(Categories: PSTN, Internet, Cable, 
Wireless, Satellite, Utility, Any) 
Table 7: Content Analysis Setup to Study Pre vs. Post-Internet Regulatory Environments 
In the first phase of analysis, we perform content analysis on the two NPRMs as detailed 
in Table 7. The content analysis reveals who the stakeholders are (i.e., Corporation, 
Interest Group, Independent, State Regulator, or Federal Regulator), which technologies 
(i.e., PSTN, Internet, Cable, Wireless, Satellite, Utility, or Any30), and which value chain 
position they represent (i.e., Equipment-, Access-, Service-, Application-, Device 
Provider, or Consumer). The comparative analysis is intended to reveal how the 
stakeholder interest changes from 1996 to 2004, the two NPRMs representative of 
integral and modular age, respectively. 
 
The second phase of analysis, we perform conceptual analysis on a sample of 
comments from the two NPRMs as detailed in Table 8. The conceptual analysis reveals 
the position of a stakeholder on the central issue of the respective NPRM. For the 1996 
Telecom Act NPRM, the stakeholders took a position the central issue of: whether or not 
to unbundle the local loops. For the 2004 IP-Enabled Services NPRM, they took a 
position on the central issue of: whether or not to regulate VoIP. In both cases, a sample 
of 400 comments is taken to keep the error under 5%. 31   
 
Pre-Internet Environment Case 
(The 1996 Telecom Act NPRM) 
Post-Internet Environment Case 
(The IP-Enabled Services NPRM) 
FCC Docket: 96-98  
Sampling Technique: Stratified Sampling  
Total Public Comments: 10763  
Population:  
6626 (comments analyzed for content 
analysis) 
Equipment Providers: 195 (2.94%) 
Access Providers: 1860 (28.07%) 
Service Providers: 3501 (52.84%) 
Application Providers: 165 (2.94%) 
FCC Docket: 04-36  
Sampling Technique: Conceptual 
Analysis  
Total Public Comments: 2053  
Population:  
2053 (comments analyzed for content 
analysis) 
Existing Concepts Searched For: 
Forbear(ance), Ancillary (Jurisdiction) 
Conceptual Sample:  
                                                 
30 “Any” is used when the commenter takes a position in their comment that is agnostic to technology. 
31  Having decided that we are willing to tolerate 5% error in estimating the population parameters, the 
sample size of 400 is determined as follows. Assume that the set of all comments represents a binary 
population where each commenter takes a position for unbundling (or VoIP regulation) with probability p, 
and conversely against it with probability q. Further, lets assume that the population is equally divided on 
the issue (p = q= 0.5), then the minimum sample size necessary keep the error under 5% must be: 
݊ ൌ ݌ݍሺܼ௖ܧ ሻ
ଶ ൌ ሺ0.5ሻሺ0.5ሻሺ1.960.05ሻ
ଶ ൌ 384 
Where, zc is the critical standard normal deviate for 95% confidence interval, and E is the error Kachigan, 
S. K. (1986). Statistical analysis : an interdisciplinary introduction to univariate & multivariate methods. 
New York, Radius Press. 
 .  
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Device Providers: 47 (0.71%) 
Consumers: 858 (12.95%) 
Stratified Sample: 
Total Comments: 400 
Equipment Providers: 12 (2.94%) 
Access Providers: 112 (28.07%) 
Service Providers: 211 (52.84%) 
Application Providers: 10 (2.94%) 
Device Providers: 3 (0.71%) 
Consumers: 52 (12.95%)32  
Each Comment Coded for Commenter’s 
Position: For Unbundling, Against 
Unbundling 
Total Comments: 404 
Each Comment Coded for Commenter’s 
Position: VoIP Regulation, No VoIP 
Regulation 
 
 
Table 8: Conceptual Analysis Setup to Study Pre vs. Post-Internet Regulatory Environments 
 
A different statistical sampling technique is used for each NPRM to draw the most 
representative sample. For the 1996 NPRM, a stratified sample is taken based upon the 
proportion of comments from each link in the value chain in the parent population. 
Stratified sample provides the best estimate of the stakeholder position across the value 
chain in the population. The sampled comments are then read to deduce the commenter’s 
position on the issue of unbundling.  
 
For the 2004 NPRM, the stratified sampling is not the best technique to use 
because the NPRM covers five areas of regulation (reviewed in Table 4), and comments 
often focus narrowly on one or more of issues, whereas our interest is in the meta-
question: whether or not to regulate VoIP. Therefore, here we sample on the basis of two 
existing concepts—forbearance and ancillary jurisdiction—defined by the FCC that 
directly speak to this meta-question.33 “Forbearance” refers to FCC’s ability to forbear 
from applying Title II (or common carrier) obligation to VoIP. Whereas “Ancillary 
Jurisdiction” refers to FCC’s ability to apply ancillary regulation to VoIP despite its 
classification as Title I (“information service”). We first look for comments that use the 
terms “forbear” and “ancillary” to find that 404 of the 2053 comments use these terms. 
We then read the comments to see the commenter’s position on VoIP regulation.   
2.6 Two Models to Assess Regulation in the Modular Age  
How must the regulator respond to the modular age? This is the question that motivates 
the two models presented in this section. The first model (Regulatory Compliance Model) 
examines the behavior of system-level regulatory compliance as the modular technology 
and industry disrupts the integrated. The second model (Competition in 
                                                 
32 These proportions are  
33 In conceptual analysis, a concept is chosen for examination, and the analysis involves quantifying and 
tallying its presence Krippendorff, K. (1980). Content analysis : an introduction to its methodology. 
Beverly Hills, Sage Publications. 
 The focus here is on looking at the occurrence of selected terms within a text or texts, although the 
terms may be implicit as well as explicit. 
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Telecommunications Model) examines the behavior of competition as a function of the 
various forces, including regulation. To start with, both models are kept minimally 
endogenous. They will be made fully endogenous in Chapter 3, which leads a more in-
depth discussion of the uncertainty. The complete model is documented in Appendix B. 
 
The models use coupled-differential equations with feedback. In a simple 
definition, “feedback is a closed path connecting in sequence the parts of a system in 
interaction.” (Wiener 1948)  The existence of feedback, directly or otherwise, has been in 
human consciousness for a long time (Richardson 1991)34. But feedback got recognized 
as a major organizing principle for systems when Norbert Weiner considered Cybernetics 
to include: “systems with dynamics in which circular process of a feedback nature played 
an important part.”35 With Weiner’s work, systems thinkers recognized that feedback and 
its dynamics were isomorphic across a variety of system—technical, human, or socio-
technical—but a sustained contribution to using feedback across social sciences came 
from Jay Forrester and his students (Hughes 2000). Forrester asserted, such “feedback 
processes govern all growth, fluctuation, and decay…[They] are the organizing structure 
around which system dynamic models are constructed.” (Forrester 1999)  
 
There are two classes of feedback. “One class of feedback system – balancing 
(negative) feedback – seeks a goal and responds as a consequence of failing to achieve 
the goal.” In balancing structures a change is countered, so either a growth or a decline is 
countered. “A second class of feedback system – reinforcing (positive) feedback – 
generates growth processes where in action builds a result that generates still greater 
action.” (Forrester 1971)In reinforcing structures a change is amplified, so a growth leads 
to further growth and a decline to further decline. Both types of feedback are present in 
the two models presented below.  
2.6.1 Regulatory Compliance Model 
 
Modeled here is a competition between two firms – an incumbent and an entrant.  Each 
firm is assumed to represent a typical firm in their industry. So the incumbent is vertically 
integrated in technology architecture and the ownership; whereas the entrant is modular 
in both. Using a single firm to represent the industry does challenge us cognitively, since 
we must imagine the single firm to represent a cluster of firms when the industry is 
modular. But such a conceptual leap is worthwhile for several reasons. First, because 
using a single firm excludes from the model the dynamics of competition among modular 
firms, thereby greatly extending our ability to closely understand the competition between 
a modular and an integrated industry. Second, including the dynamics of multiple 
modular firms does not alter or enrich the insights for the issues we are interested in.  
 
                                                 
34 Richardson in his work Feedback Thought in Social Science and Systems Theory traces great many 
theories to demonstrate that many eminent scientists dating back to ancient Greece were feedback thinkers 
and great many social theories are essentially feedback thoughts. 
35 Interestingly, Wiener’s Cybernetics often gets confused with feedback control. In reality, his text goes in 
to many other areas related to control and communication.  
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In these models (and throughout this research), several properties, such as 
regulatory compliance and competition, are conceived as emergent behaviors of the 
system. The modern definition of emergent behavior reads as “behaviors of a system that 
are discovered (i.e., properties that were there but latent), those that emerge 
spontaneously over time or space, and those that arise in response to behavior of other 
systems and environments.” ((ESD) 2004) 
 
2.6.1.1 Formulations 
 
Regulatory Compliance 
The regulatory compliance, referred to as Actual Compliance, Zi, represents the number 
of consumers of the firm i who currently use a service compliant with regulation. The 
Actual Compliance for a firm grows it as develops and deploys compliance mechanisms, 
and falls if the firm’s compliance mechanism becomes obsolete as the technology or the 
regulatory requirements change. Compliance mechanisms themselves may involve 
developing and deploying technology or other processes such as contracts, protocols, etc.  
 
Equation 1: Actual Compliance 
ࢊࢆ࢏
ࢊ࢚ ൌ ࢄ࢏ െ ࢅ࢏ 
 
     Where i = 1 (incumbent), 2 (entrant) 
 
Where Xi is the Compliance Mechanism Deployment and Yi is the Compliance 
Mechanism Obsolescence. And i can assume values 1 (for the incumbent) or 2 (for the 
entrant). 
 
Required Compliance 
The compliance mechanisms are developed and deployed in order to fill a gap between 
the Required Compliance, Zi*, as required by the regulator, and the Actual Compliance. 
The “gap” could be positive when, for instance, a technology gets burdened with new 
regulation, but it can also be negative if the technology is deregulated. Figure 5 showed 
how such a process of closing the gap between the required and actual compliance levels 
occurred for universal service, public safety, and law enforcement regulations. For 
example, in the case of universal service the required compliance level is to make 
telephone service available to all (100%) households, and actual compliance has been at 
90% or higher since 1970. Structurally, this process of closing the compliance gap is a 
balancing feedback structure. 
 
Equation 2: Required Compliance 
௜ܺ ൌ  ሺ௓೔
כି ௓೔ሻ
ఛ೔ೣ
כ ܱܲܲ,  ܼ௜כ ൐ ܼ௜ 
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௜ܻ ൌ  ሺ௓೔
כି ௓೔ሻ
ఛ೔೤
כ ܱܲܲ ,  ܼ௜כ ൏  ܼ௜ 
 
POP is the Potential Market, the meaning of which changes depending upon the 
regulation in question. For universal service, for instance, POP may be in number of 
households, but for emergency calling it may be in the total population. τx is the Time to 
Comply, or the time it takes to meet the required compliance level, and τy is the Time to 
Obsolescence, or the time taken for the loss of compliance. One might imagine that τx 
may be far greater than τy. Such a formulation allows us to more generally think about 
compliance and obsolescence as dynamically changing properties of a regulated system 
regardless of the exact regulation being fulfilled. 
 
Required vs. Achievable Compliance 
In the integral age, it was possible for the industry to achieve the required level of 
compliance, as only a few operators controlled the industry, and each operator was 
vertically integrated and individually controlled the total functionality necessary to 
deliver a service. In the modular age, it is questionable whether industry as a whole can 
achieve the required level of compliance. The central reason for the lower achievable 
compliance in the modular age is the changing nature of consensus among the 
stakeholders, which we will explore further in the Results section below. 
 
Hence, the formulation for Compliance Mechanism Deployment and Compliance 
Mechanism Obsolescence (Equation 2) must include Achievable Compliance, Z’i. 
 
Equation 3: Required and Achievable Compliance 
௜ܺ ൌ  ሾெூே ሺ௓೔
כ,௓೔ᇲሻି ௓೔ሿ
ఛ೔ೣ
כ ܱܲܲ,  ܼ௜כ ൐ ܼ௜ 
 
௜ܻ ൌ  ሾெூே ሺ௓೔
כ,௓೔ᇲሻି ௓೔ሿ
ఛ೔೤
כ ܱܲܲ ,  ܼ௜כ ൏  ܼ௜ 
 
In the integrated industry the required compliance is achievable (ܼ௜כ ൌ  ܼ௜ᇱሻ. By contrast, 
in the modular industry the required compliance may not be achieved (ܼ௜ᇱ  ൑  ܼ௜כሻ.  
 
Average Utilized Compliance 
As modular industry competes with the integrated industry, the regulatory compliance an 
average consumer experiences, Average Utilized Compliance, Θ, is an emergent behavior 
that is mediated by several factors. First, the two industries may be regulated differently 
(different required compliance). Next, they may have different achievable compliance. 
Finally, they may have different Market Shares, Si. Hence, Average Utilized Compliance 
is the market share weighted sum of the Actual Compliance. 
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Equation 4: Average Utilized Compliance 
߆ ൌ  ෍ ܼ௜ כ  ௜ܵ
௜
 
 
 
2.6.2 Competition in Telecommunications Model 
 
Adoption 
The adoption of communication services occur as the population goes from being 
Potential Market, POP, to Potential Adopters, O, to be divided into Adopters of each 
firm, Ni. The number of people who will eventually choose to use communication 
service, N*, is the equilibrium demand and is a function of the minimum price available, 
Pmin  (Sterman 2000). 
 
Equation 5: Market Size 
ܰכ ൌ ܯܫܰ ሺܱܲܲ, ܱܲܲ௥ כ ܯܣܺ ቀ0, 1 ൅ ఙ൫௉೘೔೙ି ௉ೝ൯௉ை௉ೝ ቁሻ , 
 
Where σ is the slope of the demand curve, Pmin is the lowest price available in the market, 
and Pr is the reference price which N* becomes the reference population POPr. For the 
ease of calibration demand curve slope is calculated from the elasticity of demand, εd, at 
the reference point (POPr, Pr). 
 
Equation 6: Slope of the Demand Curve 
ߪ ൌ  െ ߝௗ ሺܱܲܲ
௥
ܲ௥ ሻ 
 
The number of potential adopters, O, is the difference between the number of people who 
will ever adapt, N*, and those who have currently adopted. 
Equation 7: Potential Adopters 
ܱ ൌ  ܰכ െ  ෍ ௜ܰ
௜
 
 
The number of adopters each firm has, Ni, at any time results from a balance of three 
decisions by consumers – Adoption, Di, into the market; Exit, Ei, from the market; or 
Switching, Fi, to other service.   
 
Equation 8: Adopters 
௜ܰ ൌ  ܦ௜ െ  ሺܧ௜ ൅ ܨ௜ሻ 
 
Each adopter is assumed to purchases only one service. Cognitively, this assumption may 
contradict the consumer behavior in the communications market, where each consumer 
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often purchases both the PSTN as well as the Internet service. In that sense, the resulting 
market shares for the two firms ought to be understood as fraction of communication 
each consumer does using one or the other service.  
 
The adoption occurs according to the standard Bass diffusion model (Norton and 
Bass; Bass, Krishnan et al. 1994), modified to include initial adoption and adoption from 
switching.  
 
Equation 9: Adoption 
ܦ௜ ൌ ௜ܱ ቀߙ ൅ ఉே೔௉ை௉ቁ ൅ ௜ܵ஺  ∑ ௜ܵ௜ ,  When ௜ܱ ൐ 0 
 
The first term of Equation 9 represents the initial adoption. The initial adoption takes 
place due to the impact of external influences represented as Advertising, and the Word of 
Mouth (WOM) that depends upon the sociability of the population. Here, α captures the 
strength of external influences such as advertising, and β is the strength of social factors 
such as WOM. The second term of Equation 9 captures adoption due to switching. The 
firm’s Market Share of Product Attractiveness, ௜ܵ஺, determines how many of the total 
consumers who decide to switch (∑ ௜ܵ) at a given time would adopt firm i’s service.  
 
Adopters select from incumbent’s or entrant’s product based on their Product 
Attractiveness, Ai. The product attractiveness is a function of four attributes of each 
service: the installed base of adopters, Ni; Price, Pi; Quality (Primary Performance), Qi; 
and Innovation (Ancillary Performance), Ii. The consumer choice is formulated using a 
standard logit choice model ((Sterman, Henderson et al. 2007), (Wooldridge 2006)). 
Equation 10: Market Share of Product Attractiveness 
௜ܵ஺ ൌ  ܣ௜ ෍ ܣ௝
௝
൘  
 
Equation 11: Product Attractiveness 
ܣ௜ ൌ exp ൬ߝ௡ ௜ܰܰ௥൰ exp ൬െߝ௣
௜ܲ
ܲ௥൰ exp ൬ߝ௤
ܳ௜
ܳ௥൰ exp ൬ߝ௜
ܫ௜
ܫ௥൰ 
 
Where, εn, εp, εq, and εi are the sensitivities of attractiveness to the installed base, price, 
quality, and innovation, respectively. Notice that the increase in price reduces the 
attractiveness of service, while the increase in other attributes increases product 
attractiveness. Also, Nr, Pr, Qr, and Ir are the reference values which ensure that when the 
value of the attribute goes below (in the case of price), or goes above (in the case of other 
attributes) the reference value, the attribute begins to affect the product attractiveness 
more heavily. Also, dividing attributes by their reference values make the sensitivities ε 
comparable dimensionless quantities.  
 
The term exp ሺߝ௡ ௜ܰ ܰ௥⁄ ) represents direct network effects. Direct network effects 
are present if “adoption by different consumers is complementary, so that each 
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consumer’s adoption payoff, and his incentive to adopt, increases as more others adopt” 
(Fisher and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics. 1990). 
 
Some fraction of consumers may switch to other firm’s service based on the 
switching costs. A product or service “has classic switching costs if a buyer will purchase 
it repeatedly and will find it costly to switch from one seller to another. Switching costs 
arise due to the product characteristics or due to contracts” (Fisher and Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. Dept. of Economics. 1990).  
 
Equation 12: Switching 
௜ܵ ൌ  ሺ1 െ ߛ௜ሻ ௜ܰ 
 
Where, γi captures the switching cost of the service, and its value is negatively correlated 
with the switching costs, so the higher the firm’s switching cost the lower the number of 
consumers switching away from it.  
 
The Market Share, Si, of each firm is firm’s share of the total adopters.  
Equation 13: Market Share 
௜ܵ ൌ  ௜ܰ ෍ ௜ܰ
௝
൘  
 
Finally, adopters exit the market when the price rises. There is inverse relationship 
between the loss of consumers and the market share of attractiveness. So, the less 
attractive the service, the more consumers the firm loses when the market shrinks. 
 
Equation 14: Market Exit 
ܧ௜ ൌ  ௜ܱ ሺ1 െ  ௜ܵ஺ሻ ,    When ௜ܱ ൏ 0 
 
   
Finally, the Price is set equal to the Total Cost, Ci, which is a sum of the Fixed Cost (ܥ௜௙), 
Marginal Cost (ܥ௜௩), and Compliance Cost (ܥ௜௭). As we are not interested in studying the 
profits firms make, in this model the profit margin is excluded from the pricing strategy. 
Hence, the market share is the basis for understanding the competition. 
 
Equation 15: Price 
௜ܲ ൌ  ܥ௜ ൌ  ܥ௜௙ ൅  ܥ௜௩ ൅ ܥ௜௭ 
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2.7 Results and Discussion 
2.7.1 Model Base Behaviors 
 
Regulatory Compliance Model 
The Regulatory Compliance Model behaves as expected with respect to the required, 
achievable, and actual level of compliance. Figure 7 illustrates how deploying 
compliance mechanisms closes the gap between the actual and the required or achievable 
compliance. Figure 7(a) illustrates a case when the achievable compliance is equal to that 
required. By contrast, Figure 7(b) illustrates the case when achievable and required 
compliance are not equal, in which case the actual compliance rises to the lower of the 
two levels. The regulator determines the level of compliance required, whereas the level 
of achievable compliance is determined by several factors that we will discuss through 
the remainder of this paper (and the thesis).   
 
The model is run for 30 years. This duration is based upon the regulatory and 
competitive timeframes recently experienced. In recent regulation, emergency calling 
(E911) was introduced in 1976 and has taken approximately 30 years to achieve >90% 
compliance.  Similarly, in recent competition, the wireless technology has taken 
approximately 30 years to diffuse. The actual compliance is formulated as a first-order 
exponential smooth, bearing in mind that the lower levels of compliance may be easier to 
achieve, but achieving higher levels gets increasingly difficult (for example, it is easier to 
make the denser urban areas compliant before the remote areas). Appendix C provides 
instructions on all model outputs presented in this thesis. 
 
 
 
(a) Required Compliance = Achievable 
Compliance 
(b) Achievable Compliance < Required 
Compliance 
Figure 7: Required, Achievable, and Actual Compliance 
 
As regulation may be incremental (i.e., partial, delayed, or both), Figure 8 shows the 
model behavior under partial or delayed regulation. Figure 8(a) illustrates the behavior of 
actual regulatory compliance under partial regulation (i.e., when the regulatory scope 
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permanently excludes certain firms or technologies) Figure 8(b) shows the behavior of 
actual regulatory compliance under delayed regulation (i.e., when the regulatory scope 
temporarily excludes certain types of firms or technologies but includes them later). 
 
  
(a) Partial Regulation (b) Delayed Regulation 
Figure 8: Partial or Delayed Regulation 
Competition in Telecommunications Model 
The Competition in Telecommunications Model also behaves as expected. It allows us to 
understand the various aspects of competition between the two firms. Figure 9 shows the 
competitive outcome when the model is set up for the modular entrant to disrupt the 
integrated incumbent. At time 0, the incumbent owns the entire market. The entrant 
enters the market at year 5. The model parameters are set such that the disruption occurs 
over 18 years.  
 
 
Figure 9: Disruption Base Case - Entrant Disrupts Incumbent 
To achieve the base behavior in Figure 9, several attributes of each service (innovation, 
quality, and price) and the market (switching costs, and network effect) are initialized as 
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follows. It has been identified that in a typical scenario of disruption, the entrant has 
lower price, lower quality (primary performance), but higher innovation (ancillary 
performance) as compared to the incumbent (Christensen 1997). The setup mimics these 
conditions. For the market, a small fraction (5% a month) of consumers is allowed to 
consider switching away from their current service. Based upon the attractiveness of each 
service, a consumer considering switching may or may not ultimately switch in a given 
time period. The network effects are present and affect both services; in other words, 
services interoperate only minimally, and so they enjoy some level of network effects 
from their respective installed base. The quality, innovation, and switching costs are 
exogenous and remain constant through the simulation. Hence, among all factors 
affecting the adoption, the network effect (installed base) is the only one that introduces 
nonlinearity.  
2.7.2 Regulators Mental Model Focused on Efficiency, Not Objective 
Earlier in this paper, we have discussed that FCC’s actions subsequent to the 2004 IP-
Enabled Services NPRM indicate that the social and economic objectives raised clearly 
remain relevant. However, qualitative analysis of this NPRM, the regulatory actions so 
far, and some unstructured interviews indicate that the FCC’s present mental model is 
largely focused on the efficiency of implementing regulation rather than on understanding 
or achieving the objectives at the societal level. Moreover, from the organizational point 
of view, no one at the FCC is responsible for understanding the whole system.  
 
The FCC’s present mental model can be deduced from a set of assumptions stated 
in the 2004 NPRM that undergird much of the regulatory actions for the Internet services. 
These assumptions can be viewed as a set of constraints within which the desired 
regulatory outcome must be achieved.  
 
First, the FCC clearly desires to extend the existing statutory framework onto the new 
technologies, as indicated by the statements like the following that state that the FCC 
hopes to: 
“Consider IP-enabled services within a legal framework comprised of statutory 
provisions and jurisdictional precedent, prior Commission orders, ongoing 
Commission proceedings and state actions relating to IP-enabled services.” 
Appropriate Legal and Regulatory Framework section of IP-Enabled Services 
NPRM 
 
“Find statutory classification that is consistent with the past.” 
Appropriate Legal and Regulatory Framework section of IP-Enabled Services 
NPRM 
 
Second, the FCC clearly desires to regulate IP-Enabled Services narrowly and 
incrementally (partial or delayed) as necessary, as understood from statements such as the 
following: 
 
“Requirements must be tailored as narrowly as possible, to ensure that it does not 
draw into its reach more services than necessary.” 
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Appropriate Legal and Regulatory Framework section of IP-Enabled Services 
NPRM 
 
“Achieve [narrow regulation] by dividing IP-enabled services into different 
categories and regulate incrementally as necessary.”  
Appropriate Legal and Regulatory Framework section of IP-Enabled Services 
NPRM 
 
“Find appropriate jurisdictional basis or bases and jurisdictional distinctions 
between the various classes of IP-enabled services.” 
Appropriate Legal and Regulatory Framework section of IP-Enabled Services 
NPRM 
 
Much of this thinking focuses on how to design obligations rather than whether they will 
achieve the objective. As discussed earlier, the FCC has also operationalized this vision 
through the incremental regulation of IP-Enabled Services for the social objectives such 
as emergency calling, CALEA, and disability access. Also, the inclusion of Internet-
based technologies in the so called “comprehensive reforms” for economic objectives, 
such as interconnection charges and universal service, can also be argued as reactive, and 
in response to the growing complains from firms providing Internet and other 
technologies (2008). Thus far, we cannot site a single FCC proceeding that undertakes 
regulation across all technology modes – wireline, wireless, and broadband – in order to 
achieve the objective at the societal level.  
The reason the FCC has not considered the implications of the paradigm shift 
from the integral to modular age more holistically may have to do with the organization 
of the FCC as an agency and the authority it has been given. Although, the purpose of 
this paper is not to pursue this hypothesis, some preliminary inferences can be drawn. 
Figure 10 shows the FCC’s current organization chart. At the top level, “the FCC is 
directed by five Commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate 
for 5-year terms, except when filling an unexpired term. The President designates one of 
the Commissioners to serve as Chairperson.” At the operational level, “[t]he Commission 
staff is organized by function. The Bureaus’ responsibilities include: processing 
applications for licenses and other filings; analyzing complaints; conducting 
investigations; developing and implementing regulatory programs; and taking part in 
hearings. [The] Offices provide support services.” The bureaus, which are organized into 
technology-specific silos such as wireline, wireless, media, and so no, determine the 
FCC’s fragmented perspective of the system. Taking a closer look reveals that each 
bureau has its own technology division, and is further fragmented into issue or sub-
technology specific responsibilities. As a result of its organization, there is no entity at 
the FCC today that is systematically assigned responsibility to understand the whole 
telecommunications system.   
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Figure 10: FCC Organization Chart (July 2009)36 
  
The entity within the FCC that comes the closest to having the systems 
perspective is the Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis (OSP), as it is 
“responsible for working with the Chairman, Commissioners, Bureaus and Offices to 
develop a strategic plan identifying short and long term policy objectives for the 
agency…[and] is responsible for monitoring the state of the communications industry to 
identify trends, issues and overall industry health, and produces staff working papers. The 
Office acts as expert consultants to the Commission in areas of economic, business and 
market analysis and other subjects that cut across traditional lines such as the Internet. 
The Office also reviews legal trends and developments not necessarily related to current 
FCC proceedings, such as intellectual property law, Internet and e-commerce issues.” 
                                                 
36 http://www.fcc.gov/fccorgchart.html 
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However, several unstructured interviews reveal that there is no one responsible for 
looking at the whole system, as indicated by the following quotes:  
“No one here is looking at the systems view.”  
Interview with Dr. Mark Bykowski, Economist, OSP, FCC, on December 8th, 
2007.  
 
“Broad models are more relevant to EU than US. EU uses an overarching model 
and than works down (or at least it seems so). US works on case-by-case basis, 
there is little attempt to have over-arching principles.” 
Interview with Dr. Evan Kwerel, Economist, OSP, FCC, on December 8th, 2007.  
 
2.7.3 Case Research Results: Techtronic Shifts in the Center of Gravity of 
Control 
 
The question of first order with the case research is whether the comparison of the two 
proceedings validates the shift from the integral to the modular age as observed in Table 
1. The content analysis results presented in this section validate that the major changes in 
technology and industry structure that we identified indeed reflect in the regulatory 
record. Furthermore, the analysis illuminates several tectonic shifts in the center of 
gravity of control in the communications value chain that can have grave implications for 
the future regulation.  
 
2.7.3.1 Stakeholder Interests: From Concentrated to Dispersed 
 
Figure 11 demonstrates the shift in the center of gravity of control from concentrated on a 
part of the communications value chain in 1996 to dispersed among corporations and 
consumers across the communications value chain in 2004. Shown here is the fraction of 
comments contributed by each link in the value chain in 1996 vs. 2004. Figure 11 
validates that the shift from integrated to a modular industry structure (and thereby the 
control), as observed in Table 1 and depicted in Figure 2, does indeed reflect in the 
regulatory proceedings.  
 
For the 1996 Telecommunications Act, more than 80% of comments came from 
the access or service providers, so the stakeholder interest was highly concentrated. In 
fact, here, the concentration of interest was even more than it seems because the 
distinction between the access and service provider was made in the analysis only 
because of the issue central to the Act. The majority of comments in the 1996 
Telecommunications Act were on the issue of whether to unbundle the local loop. From 
the perspective of this issue, Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs) that owned the 
local loops are considered access providers in this analysis. However, for all practical 
purposes, the access providers also provided service. A negligibly small fraction of 
comments from equipment, application and service providers in 1996 is a reflection of 
vertically-integrated service providers who often also served these parts of the value 
chain. By contrast, for the 2004 IP-Enabled Services NPRM the comments, the interests 
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are dispersed across the value chain, including the consumers, and more independently 
identifiable.  
 
Since many firms today are invested in serving more than one function in the 
value chain, the analysis classifies them according to their central tendency. For example, 
though the incumbent service providers such as AT&T and Verizon have invested in 
applications and devices, they are classified as service providers in this analysis. In all 
cases where there maybe ambiguity about how to classify a commenter, they are 
classified on the basis of the position in the value chain they represent in their filed 
comments, or their organization’s mission statement. Once classified, the commenter’s 
classification is held constant through the analysis.  
 
The absence of concentrated interest in the communications value chain of the 
modular age challenges the current enforcement mechanism of command and control 
because it complicates the determination of who to command and where to control. 
Furthermore, the shift in control from being concentrated to dispersed represents 
increasing interdependence in the communications value chain for delivering services as 
well as regulatory compliance. From the functionality perspective, the interoperability 
among dispersed, competition interests is often achieved by technical standards, but such 
standards neither exist for guaranteeing the interoperability necessary for achieving the 
regulatory compliance, nor are they being facilitated by the regulator today.  
 
 
Figure 11: Stakeholder Interest - From Concentrated to Dispersed Across the Value Chain 
 
2.7.3.2 Stakeholder Interests: From the Network Core to the Edge 
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Figure 12 shows the shift in the center of gravity of control from the network core in 
1996 to the edge of the network in 2004. It depicts the percentage change in the fraction 
of comments from each value chain position between 1996 and 2004. Figure 12 validates 
that the technological shift of functional control from inside the network core to its edges, 
as observed in Table 1 and Table 2, does indeed reflect in the regulatory proceedings.  
 
The analysis shows that between 1996 and 2004, the stakeholder interest among 
the links of the value chain provisioning the network core has diminished, whereas that 
among the links provisioning the edge of the network has ballooned.  
 
The shift from the network core to the edge has important implications for 
regulation. First, it shows the growing misalignment between who bears the regulatory 
obligations versus where lies the functional control and activity. The obligations of 
traditional regulations were exclusively core-centric and were born by the service 
providers, but the functional control and activity has now moved into the applications and 
devices that currently remain unregulated. Also, the comments from edge-base players, 
such as the application and device providers, represent independent and powerful 
interests with opinions that are often in direct opposition to interests in the other parts of 
the value chain.  
 
 
Figure 12: Stakeholder Interest – Diminishes Inside the Network Core and Swells at the Network 
Edge 
2.7.3.3 Communications Value Chain: From Higher to Lower Consensus on 
Regulatory Issues 
Figure 13 shows the results of conceptual analysis. It demonstrates that when analyzed 
from the perspective of stakeholder positions on the regulatory issues, the 
communications value chain has gone from higher consensus across the communications 
value chain on regulatory issues in 1996 to lower in 2004. The insight about this shift 
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from higher to lower consensus was not observed in Table 1, but has emerged from the 
case research, as informed by the process of building and parameterizing the two models. 
Figure 13 shows how the stakeholder opinion is divided across the central question in 
each NPRM. The juxtaposition of Figure 13(a) and (b) shows that the communications 
value chain had a single divide across the value chain, whereas the value chain today has 
multiple factions.  
 
The central question for the 1996 Telecommunications Act was whether or not to 
unbundle local loops. The comments in response showed that the central division then 
was between access providers and service providers. The application, end-device 
providers, and the major equipment providers sided with their most important customer – 
the service provider. Only a few, small equipment manufacturing firms who supplied to 
rural, local carriers sided with the access providers to protect their exclusive relationship.     
 
By contrast, the response to 2004 IP-Enabled Services is different. The central 
issue of that NPRM was whether or not to regulate IP-Enabled Services. The analysis 
shows that there are multiple factions along the communications value chain who are in 
disagreement. The application and device providers are against VoIP regulation because 
they provide many of the new services such as PC-to-Phone and PC-to-PC based VoIP, 
which are currently unregulated. They either argue for no regulation because the 
regulatory compliance is difficult to develop given the Internet architecture, or they argue 
that nascent providers like them should not be burdened with regulation. The service 
providers are in favor of VoIP regulation because their networks are compliant with 
regulation, and lobbying for the regulation of their competitors protects their competitive 
advantage due to regulatory compliance. The access providers are mixed in their response 
because many incumbent access providers have diversified into building broadband 
networks. These broadband providers are against VoIP regulation (particularly, social 
regulation such as emergency calling and wiretapping), whereas those not invested in 
broadband are in favor of regulating VoIP in order to protect their competitive advantage. 
The consumers, largely rural, are in favor of VoIP regulation to ensure they continue to 
get served. An interesting observation here is that each faction in the value chain is 
surrounded by factions with an opposing interest, but all links must continue to 
interoperate to provide competitive service.  
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(a) Position on Unbundling for the 
1996 Act NPRM (error <5%) 
(b) Position on VoIP Regulation for the 
IP-Enabled Services NPRM (error 
<5%) 
Figure 13: From a Single Dominant Interest to Multiple Factions 
The shift from higher to lower consensus over regulatory issues has multiple 
implications. First, the combination of lower consensus with higher interdependence 
(discussed earlier) has historically meant higher coordination costs and longer time taken 
to comply with regulation ((Hounshell 1984), (Levinson 2006)). As a result, we 
conjecture in this model that increasing modularity may sharply increase the 
coordination cost, limiting the achievable compliance in modular structures. The exact 
nature of the relationship between modularity and the time to comply or coordination cost 
are not well understood, still a very long time required to build consensus and a very high 
coordination costs in a highly modular industry can be inferred from the many historical 
cases, where modular industries have fought long-drawn battles over developing common 
standards.  
 
Next, the combination of lower consensus with high flexibility offered by the 
Internet architecture also challenges the sustainability narrowly construed regulatory 
obligations or enforcement mechanisms, since in the new environment new types of 
services may arise to create regulatory arbitrage.  
2.7.4 Model Results: Challenges for Compliance and Competition 
The model analysis shows that the nature of modular forces and the dynamic complexity 
of the paradigm challenge the regulatory thinking on both compliance and competition. 
This section discusses the findings.  
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2.7.4.1 The Lack of Consensus May Prevent the Modular Structure from Achieving 
Required Compliance 
  
In an ideal world, the entrant’s disruption of the incumbent may drop the average 
compliance (achieving the objective) temporarily, but ultimately; the entrant firms 
develop compliance mechanism to meet regulatory objectives at the necessary level. 
Given the nature of the tectonic shifts discussed above, when a modular structure disrupts 
an integrated one, the average utilized compliance may not achieve the required level of 
due to inordinate coordination costs and time necessary to comply in a highly modular 
structure. Although, the exact measure of the coordination cost is difficult to derive, its 
presence introduces uncertainty and changes the level of Achievable Compliance and 
Time to Comply. As a result, the Average Utilized Compliance can be far less than 
required, as shown in Figure 14, which shows the output of a set of sensitivity tests on the 
model.  
 
 
Figure 14: Sensitivity - Average Utilized Compliance with Different Consensus 
This analysis shows that lower consensus around regulatory issues, and the resulting 
increase in both coordination costs and time to comply, can be an impediment to 
achieving the desired regulatory compliance in the first place. However, as argued earlier, 
the current enforcement mechanisms do not focus on building consensus, reducing 
coordination costs, nor time required to comply with regulation.  
 
2.7.4.2 Partial Regulation May Provide Inadequate Compliance and Perverse 
Incentives 
 
To understand the impact of partial regulation, we must first understand the nature of 
Average Utilized Compliance, meaning the fraction of communication occurring over 
compliant networks. Figure 15 shows an example of how the Average Utilized 
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Compliance is determined by two factors: regulation and competition. To simplify the 
analysis, this example is deliberately kept static. Suppose the regulator imposes 
regulation on 100% of the incumbent firms, but regulates only certain types (50%) of 
entrant firms. Now, imagine the following two competitive equilibriums. First, where the 
incumbent keeps 80% of the market and the entrant keeps 20%. Second, where the 
equilibrium is the opposite, the incumbent keeps 20% and the entrant wins 80%. As per 
Equation 4, the Average Utilized Compliance in the two cases is starkly different. In the 
first case, 90% of communication occurs on compliant service (see Figure 15(a)), where 
as only 50% of communication is compliant in the second (see Figure 15(b)). This 
example shows that when multiple technologies compete, even though there may be no 
change in the required level of compliance, the effective compliance level can be far 
lower than that expected.  
 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 15: Interpreting Average Utilized Compliance 
 
The dynamically changing market share has implications at multiple levels. At one level, 
if we assume that the firm’s characteristics do not change over time (which is what our 
current model formulation assumes since the service, market, and industry attributes 
remain exogenous, and constant through the simulation), the dynamics of competition has 
two simple implications. First, as shown in Figure 16(a), when the regulatory scope 
excludes an entire technological mode, there is a loss of utilized compliance if the 
unregulated mode disrupts the regulated ones. An example of this situation in the recent 
regulatory history is the case of wireless E911, where the emergency calling regulation 
excluded wireless operators until the year 2000, when wireless communication had 
already penetrated 50% of the US market. Second, as shown in Figure 16(b), when the 
regulatory scope includes every technology mode, but excludes certain types of 
technology providers, the utilized regulatory compliance can be far lower than that 
required or measured.  
 
To understand the example in Figure 16(b), consider a case when a fully 
compliant incumbent providing one mode of technology gets disrupted by a set of 
entrants providing another mode of technology. Further, only certain types of entrants are 
regulated. Now, if the entrant firms fully disrupt the incumbents, and equally divide the 
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market share among them, the resulting utilized compliance can be far lower than 
necessary. The reason is that even though entrants who are regulated deploy compliance 
mechanisms to close the gap between the required and actual compliance, some of the 
market share remains with the entrants who are unregulated. Such is the case of 
emergency calling regulations today, which includes all modes of voice communication 
(PSTN, Wireless, and VoIP), but excludes some wireless technologies such as push-to-
talk, and some VoIP technologies such as peer-to-peer. Starting in year 2009, the VoIP 
providers who interconnect with the PSTN are required to report their compliance level 
for emergency calling to the FCC. As a result, from the perspective of the compliance 
level required and measured by the FCC, there may appear to be a high level of 
regulatory compliance, but a large percentage of consumers may be utilizing non-
compliant networks such as peer-to-peer VoIP, which the FCC neither regulates nor 
measures the compliance of. Hence, in both cases, partial regulation may lead to 
inadequate Average Utilized Compliance. 
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(b) 
60% 
Regulated 
Mode 
Disrupts 
Figure 16: Partial Regulation Provides Inadequate Compliance 
 
At another level, the dynamically changing market share represents the perverse 
incentives present in the environment that has even broader implications in the modular 
age. First, because of the flexibility the hourglass architecture of Internet (depicted in 
Figure 4) offers, we cannot really assume that the firm’s characteristics remain constant 
over time.37 The firms naturally morph to fit the competitive landscape, and partial 
regulations in a modular environment provide even further incentives for doing so. 
Hence, even when the incumbent is not disrupted, to take advantage of the partial 
regulation, they may offer services that are currently unregulated. Hence, the utilized 
compliance may be lower than what appears, even though the market shares do not 
change.  
 
Next, with the architecture of the Internet, firms can offer services without 
requiring the consumer or the service provider to stay within a geographical area. This 
flexibility can spur a “competition in laxity” (Murphy 2002) between nation-states trying 
to lure both consumers and firms with less regulation. Hence critical regulatory 
objectives such as public safety and law enforcement require capability and coordination 
among nation states, not just among industry players. 
 
Finally, thinking back at the hierarchical view of the telecommunications system, 
presented in Figure 6, the implications of partial regulation appear even graver. When the 
utilized compliance is lower than what is adequate at the societal level, because the 
regulatory scope excluded some providers, the burden of meeting compliance naturally 
falls on other subsystems. For example, if telecommunications providers do not aid 
                                                 
37 We will relax this assumption in the next paper when we study uncertainty further. 
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public safety or law enforcement adequately, some other, maybe labor-intensive, services 
will have to substitute for them, and so on. 
 
2.7.4.3 The Dynamic Complexity Obscures the Timing of Delayed Regulation 
 
The dynamic complexity that surrounds the disruption scenario makes it difficult to 
implement delayed regulation. Suppose there is no uncertainty about the service, market, 
or industry, and the omniscient regulator knows the rate at which the entrant would 
disrupt the incumbent, Figure 17 shows that even in such a scenario, a minor difference 
in the timing of regulation can completely alter the competitive outcome. In practice, 
however, regulators do not possess such fine grained control over the regulatory 
proceedings, as visible from the number of extensions filed and granted against any major 
FCC proceedings (Furchtgott-Roth 2006). Furthermore, many factors that mediate the 
occurrence and the rate of disruption obscure the management of delayed regulation even 
further, so such an assumption of omniscience itself is idealistic.  
 
 
Figure 17: Dynamic Complexity Obscures the Timing of Delayed Regulation 
 
Figure 18 shows how the uncertainty about the attributes of service such as innovation, 
quality, and price introduce a high degree of dynamic complexity. In each simulation the 
entrant’s attribute is varied while keeping the incumbent’s attributes unchanged. The 
outcome is intuitive in that an increase in quality or innovation, or a decrease in price of 
the entrant’s service lets it disrupt the incumbent more rapidly.  
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(a) 
Innovation 
 
(b) 
Quality 
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(c ) 
Price 
Figure 18: The Impact of Product or Service Characteristics on the Competitive Outcome 
Figure 19 shows how the uncertainty about the attributes of market such as switching 
costs and network effects too introduce a high degree of dynamic complexity. Figure 
19(a) shows that an increase in switching cost for the entrant’s consumers leads to more 
rapid disruption. Figure 19(b) shows that the level of network effect has the potential to 
determine whether the disruption occurs in the first place. Very strong network effect 
could prevent disruption, mid-range network effects lead to winner-takes-all (WTA) 
outcome, and the absence of network effect leads to an equilibrium that is not WTA.  
 
 
(a) 
Switching Cost 
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(b) 
Network Effect
Figure 19: The Impact of Market Characteristics on Competitive Outcome 
Together, Figure 18 and Figure 19 make two points. First, that many competing factors 
mediate the occurrence as well as the rate of disruption.  Second, consumers, firms, and 
technologists could strategically manipulate these parameters to change the competitive 
outcome. To understand this dynamics complexity well, each of this parameter must be 
made endogenous, either structurally or behaviorally, which is a topic covered in Paper 2. 
Understanding this outcome in addition to the above discussion on how the rate of 
disruption itself is mediated by a number of factors illuminates that the far higher 
dynamic complexity of the modular age renders impractical any hope that decisions 
related to the timing of regulation can be effectively made in this the new environment.  
2.8 Conclusions 
2.8.1 Objectives: Relevant, but Must be Pursued at the Societal Level 
 
In this paper, we have shown that the five objectives, three social objectives (law 
enforcement, public safety, and equal opportunity objectives) and two economic 
objectives (competition and economic development), that were traditionally served by the 
regulation of voice communications remain relevant. However, they must first be debated 
from the societal perspective.    
 
The debate about the regulatory objectives is currently stuck at the level of which 
technologies or industries (wired, wireless, internet telephony, etc.) ought to fulfill them. 
This is inappropriate. For example, public safety is a societal objective that has generated 
emergency calling (E911) obligations for the telecommunications system. The PSTN 
providers have been burdened with the emergency calling obligations since 1976. 
However, ever since wireless telephony and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) became 
viable competitors to the PSTN, the regulatory process has engaged in a debate as to 
whether and when to extend the emergency calling obligations to these new entrants. The 
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answer ought to be clear, but it hasn’t been because the public safety debate has been 
pursued at the level of technologies. At the societal level, the telecommunications system 
is one of many subsystems that facilitate public safety. If the telecommunications system 
as a whole shirks its duty to aid public safety because some technologies are not 
regulated, other subsystems—maybe non-technical ones—will  have to pick up the slack. 
But this fact has not been recognized.  
 
Successfully refocusing the FCC’s mental model on societal objectives before 
considering the efficiency of implementing obligations may take reorganizing the agency 
so that it can understand the implications of the modular age for the whole 
telecommunications system.  
2.8.2 Obligations: Incremental Regulation Must be Abandoned 
 
This paper argues that incremental regulation is futile and must be abandoned in the 
modular age. Limiting regulatory scope in a modular architecture leads to inadequate 
compliance and creates perverse incentives at two levels. At the industry level, it 
provides incentives to the regulated firms to flee to the unregulated technology segments. 
At the global level, it ignites competition in laxity between nation-states trying to lure 
both consumers and firms with less regulation.  
  
As for the timing of incremental regulation, the far higher dynamic complexity of 
the modular age obscures the timing-related decisions. First, the regulator struggles to 
determine if the regulation is too-early or too-late, because many more competing factors 
now mediate the rate of technology and industry disruption, which makes it difficult to 
predict how rapidly an unregulated segment might erode the existing regulatory 
compliance. Next, the regulator cannot be sure of the outcome post-regulation, because 
the modular age offers far higher flexibility to consumers, firms, and technologists to 
strategically manipulate the competitive outcome, the dynamics of which the regulator 
currently does not understand. So, to understand the scope or timing of regulation, the 
dynamic complexity of the modular age must be well understood. The next chapter 
focuses on further understanding the dynamic complexity. 
2.8.3 Enforcement Mechanisms: Must be Conscious of the Dynamic 
Complexity of the Modular Age 
The enforcement mechanism for traditional telecommunications regulation has been 
command-and-control. This mechanism worked because in the integral age the industrial 
interests were concentrated, which made it possible for the regulator to know who to 
command and where to exert control. The regulatory fights were easier to identify and 
address then. Also, as a firm possessed full functional control over a service, it could 
easily develop and deploy compliance mechanisms post-regulation. The modular age 
completely changes the rules of the game.  
 
The modular forces blunt the mechanisms of command-and-control. First, the 
regulator finds it difficult to determine where a command-and-control mechanism ought 
to focus, because the post-Internet era has multiple, equally capable interest groups that 
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lack consensus over critical regulatory objectives. Next, the command-and-control 
mechanisms are completely ill-suited for building consensus around regulatory issues, 
which is imperative for meeting critical societal objectives, as the lack of consensus 
inflicts a very high coordination cost that could prevent meeting regulatory objectives 
altogether. Essentially, the modular structure shifts the center of gravity of control from a 
single dominant interest to multiple, from the center of the network to its edges, and from 
a single divide to multiple factions. This is a tectonic shift that demands completely 
different enforcement mechanisms. 
2.9 From Herding Sheep to Herding Cats 
Metaphorically, this is a tale of three animals – elephant, sheep, and cats. From the time 
the FCC was established (in 1934) until the break up of AT&T, the telecommunications 
regulator was a keeper of an elephant (AT&T). The elephant was monolithic and slow, 
but powerful and demanding because it faced no competition. It had negotiated with its 
keeper a suitable confinement in the form of the 1934 Telecommunications Act. With the 
break up of AT&T, the regulator became a shepherd herding a few sheep (the Baby 
Bells). The sheep were inherently less competitive, less innovative, and docile. They 
worked by consensus. To control a herd of sheep, the shepherd needed just a crook and a 
little guidance that came in the form the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its 
enforcement. But the transition from an integral age to a modular age transforms the 
regulator’s role from that of a shepherd who herded a few sheep to one who must now 
herd many cats. The cats are fiercely competitive, highly innovative, and agile. Most 
importantly, however, the cats lack consensus and are highly independent. To control cats 
requires a completely new mindset – maybe a net around them, or a set of incentives such 
as the mice, or something else. Neither the elephant’s confinement, nor the crook used for 
the sheep will work for the cats. In other words, the effective control mechanisms for 
these species are radically different. Similar is the case of regulation in the integral versus 
the modular age: the effective control mechanisms for the two environments are starkly 
different. 
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Chapter 3: ANTICIPATING UNCERTAINTY IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION, COMPETITION, 
AND INNOVATION 
 
Decision making under the constant threat of disruption is a difficult task whether you are 
a policymaker, manager, consumer, or technologist. 38 Difficulties arise from the 
bewildering array of uncertainties that surround the disruption phenomenon. This chapter 
examines: How can regulators and managers improve decisions taken amidst uncertainty 
that surrounds the disruption of an integrated technology and industry by a modular 
one? The chapter investigates these uncertainties from the perspective of dynamic 
complexity in feedback systems. Whereas the inquiry in chapters 2 and 4 are more of 
interest to regulators, the analysis in this paper ought to interest managers and regulators 
alike. 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In 1997, in his work leading up to the best-selling book The Innovator’s Dilemma, 
(Christensen 1997) Clayton Christensen made critical observations about the conditions 
under which established firms lose market to an entrant with what he called disruptive 
technology. In the years to follow, this work became highly influential in managerial 
decision-making. In the process, however, as it happens with many influential theories, 
disruptive technology became a buzz word, being “thrown around” in contexts that often 
go far beyond the claims Christensen originally made.  
 
Christensen’s original arguments, as summarized from the more academic 
references (Christensen 1992; Christensen 1992; Christensen and Rosenbloom 1995; 
Christensen, Suárez et al. 1996) rather than the more popular paperbacks (Christensen 
1997; Christensen and Raynor 2003), were that understanding when an entrant might 
have an advantage over the incumbent requires understanding of three interlocking 
forces: technological capability (incremental versus radical, or architectural versus 
component innovations (Henderson and Clark 1990)); organizational dynamics 
(capability enhancing versus capability destroying innovations (Anderson and Tushman 
1990)); and the third force – value network – the context within which the firm identifies 
and responds to customers’ needs, procures inputs and reacts to competitors (Christensen 
and Rosenbloom 1995). Further, he argued that firm’s competitive strategy, and 
particularly its past choices of markets to serve, determines its perceptions of economic 
value in new technology, and in turn shapes the rewards it will expect to obtain through 
innovation. 
 
                                                 
38 A note to the reader: This chapter is targeted for either the Journal of Industrial and Corporate Change, or 
the Journal of Innovation and Product Management. Therefore, it may give a flavor appropriate to those 
journals. Additionally, this chapter also serves as a placeholder for some insights that are relevant but do 
not fit elsewhere in the dissertation. As a result, occasional thoughts might appear to be drifting from the 
central inquiry of this chapter.   
    
80 
 
Christensen’s work documented several industries that were disrupted 
successfully, including  disk drive industry where giants like IBM were the victims, 
excavator manufacturing industry where the hydraulic excavators wiped out the entire 
population of mechanical excavator manufacturers, and steel manufacturing where mini 
steel mills disrupted vertically integrated steel mills (Christensen 1997).  
 
The above pattern Christensen identified is simple to understand and quite 
pervasive in many industries. What is misleading, however, is the loose and opportunistic 
use of the term “disruptive technology” by the popular media and experts alike. As a case 
research in the beginning of this chapter involving tens of technologies will demonstrate, 
technologies that media prematurely declared as “disruptive technology” has often failed 
to disrupt the existing industrial order. 
 
Should such an over zealous use of the phrase “disruptive technology” bother us? 
On one hand, the threat of disruption makes incumbents paranoid about losing the 
market, while making new entrants hopeful of inventing the next disruptive technology. 
Arguably, such hopes and fears create more competition in the market place. On the other 
hand, however, incorrectly calling every technology disruptive, could lead to inefficient 
strategic decisions by managers and policymakers. 
 
Every time a new technology appears on the horizon, policymakers and managers 
wrestle with the question of how to understand the threat of disruption, even though the 
two may have different concerns. Regulators may be concerned with fulfilling social and 
economic objectives (described in chapter 2, or similar ones depending upon the area of 
regulation). While the managers, depending upon who they represent, incumbents or 
entrants, may be concerned with how to survive disruption or how to create one, 
respectively. This research will show that media and experts alike systematically 
misperceive the threat of disruption. The technologies they proclaim as disruptive do not 
often displace incumbent technologies, and where they do, incumbents—not the 
entrants—remain dominant in the new technology paradigm.  
 
To understand why such is the case, we investigate two specific questions in this 
chapter.  First, does every potentially disruptive technology cause technology disruption? 
Second, does technology disruption always mean industry disruption? Technology 
disruption occurs when a set of technologies displace a previous set of technologies to 
serve the same function. For example, in telephone switching, the first wave of 
technology disruption occurred when electromechanical switches replaced human-
operator based switches and the second wave came when transistor-based switches 
replaced the electromechanical ones. Industry disruption occurs when a new set of 
industry structure (or players) displaces the incumbent industry structure (or players). The 
computer industry offers a well-known example, where a vertical industry structure has 
been replaced with a horizontal one. Here, there is technology disruption such as personal 
computers displacing mainframes, but also industry disruption where Intel and Microsoft 
displaced giants like IBM.    
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Like founding the analysis of technology disruption on Christensen’s early 
insights, we found our analysis of industry disruption on Charles Fine’s early insights on 
industry disruption. In 1998, Charles Fine, in his work Clock Speed: Winning Industry 
Control in the Age of Temporary Advantage, presented the dynamics of how 
industry/product structure evolves from integral to modular, and back. With an 
illustration called the double helix, 39 Fine argued that, “When the industry structure is 
vertical and the product architecture is integral, the forces of disintegration push toward a 
horizontal and modular configuration. The forces include: 1. The relentless entry of niche 
competitors hoping to pick off discrete industry segments; 2. the challenge of keeping 
ahead of the competition across the many dimensions of technology and market required 
by an integral system; and 3. The bureaucratic and organizational rigidities that often 
settle upon large, established companies.” On the other hand, said Fine, “when an 
industry has horizontal[/modular] structure, another set of forces push toward more 
vertical integration and integral product architectures. These forces include: 1. Technical 
advances in one subsystem can make that the scarce commodity in the chain, giving 
market power to its owners; 2. Market power in one subsystem encourage bundling with 
other subsystems to increase control and add more value; [and] 3. Market power in one 
subsystem encourages engineering integration with other subsystems to develop 
proprietary integral solutions.” Reproduced in Figure 20 is Fine-Whitney’s illustration of 
the forces of double helix. 
 
 
Figure 20: The Double Helix 
The double helix more generally describes the long wave of industry structure going from 
integral to modular, and back. It does not mandate that this evolution from one form of 
industry structure to another involve technology disruption (new technology displacing 
                                                 
39 Pp. 49 of Fine, C. H. (1998). Clockspeed : winning industry control in the age of temporary advantage. 
Reading, Mass., Perseus Books. 
   
This work first appeared in an unpublished paper Whitney, D. E. and C. H. Fine (1996). Is the make-buy 
decision process a core competence. 
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the old). Hence, the investigation of the conditions under which technology disruption 
translates to industry disruption is a special case of the double helix framework. 
 
Broadly, the research in this chapter is a study on the impact of the various 
uncertainties—market, technological, organizational, regulatory, or that of the industry 
structure—at two levels. First, at a theoretical level, we discuss the conditions under 
which a disruption may or may not take place, thereby discussing the assumptions and 
limits of two disruption theories; namely: Clayton Christensen’s work on technology 
disruption, and Charles Fine’s work on industry disruption and clockspeed. Second, at a 
practical level, we expose several popular beliefs about disruption that turn out to be 
myths once the uncertainties involved are understood better. Finally, we discuss the 
challenges of anticipation and measurement during disruption. 
 
The research in this chapter calls for broadening the agenda for research around 
disruption phenomena. Our investigation here must not be misconstrued as a 
contradiction of Christensen or Fine’s work. In fact, we start with their observations as 
the bases for our model. The idea here is to embed his work in a broader context, so as to 
build upon it, hoping that such an exercise will expand our understanding of the 
conditions for industry disruption. 
 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. We begin the case research 
that surveys the popular media’s usage of the phrase “disruptive technology.” We show 
that in two fast clock speed industries – computers and telecommunications – the 
technologies media proclaimed as disruptive eventually failed to disrupt the industry 
structure. To study the reasons for such an outcome, in the following section we develop 
a systems model of regulation, competition and innovation in telecommunications. In the 
results section we analyze the model behavior under market, technology, organizational 
and regulatory uncertainty. With this analysis, in the conclusion section, we discuss limits 
to technology and industry discussion, myths surrounding the disruption phenomena. 
Finally, we will discuss anticipation under uncertainty and the difficulties with observing 
and measuring some parameters.  
 
3.2 Research Method  
3.2.1 Research Method Overview   
 
The research starts with a qualitative case study to investigate the following question: do 
potentially disruptive technologies, proclaimed by the media, always displace the existing 
industrial order? The case research uses a combination of content analysis and industrial 
statistics. First, we analyze several important media publications to enumerate 
technologies they proclaimed as “disruptive technology” in the period between 1997, 
when the term was coined by Clayton Christensen, and August 2008. Next, with the help 
of the Global Industry Classification Standards, we tie these technologies to the industries 
they were expected to disrupt. Finally, we study the industrial order of the industries 
threatened with disruption for the years 2001 and 2007. The analysis shows that in the 
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communications industry alone, where changes ought to be easier to visualize because of 
its rapid rate of change, a potentially disruptive technology often does not succeed (i.e., 
no technology disruption). Further, it finds that technology disruption does not always 
mean industry disruption; in other words, in some cases, a new technology may disrupt 
the old, but the industrial order does not change because the leaders of the old technology 
continue to lead the new market. To understand what factors explain such variation in the 
outcome, the research then turns to a dynamic model that more broadly captures the 
uncertainties involved.  
 
The single, dynamic model in this paper situates the two models discussed in 
Paper 1 in the appropriate theories, and makes the parameters in those models 
endogenous. First, to model the dynamics of technology disruption, several parameters of 
the simple diffusion model, such as quality, innovation, price, and resources of the firms, 
are made endogenous. Next, to explain the dynamics of industry disruption, the industry-
level modularity is made endogenous, which allows for understanding the level of 
organizational rigidity, dimensional complexity, and functional control the firms 
experience as one industry disrupts another. Finally, the dynamics of regulation are added 
to explain how the cost and resources required for regulatory compliance affects 
competition during technology and industry disruption; and conversely, how the 
disruption affects the level of regulatory compliance, and the time necessary to achieve it. 
The scope of this model is limited to a scenario where a modular technology and industry 
disrupts an integrated technology and industry, which is sufficient for studying the 
Internet’s disruption of traditional technologies. Careful judgment is required to port the 
lessons of this paper to other scenarios of disruption. 
 
Before detailing the case research or the model, we discuss how our research 
approach continues to rest upon the principles of systems.   
3.2.2 Telecommunications System as a System of Systems 
In chapter 2, we used the hierarchical decomposition to show how the behavior of the 
telecommunication system emerges as a result of the interaction of regulatory, corporate 
strategy, industry structure, consumer preference, and technology dynamics. We now 
extend this hierarchy to comprehensively understand uncertainty in telecommunications 
system. The extended hierarchical decomposition shown in Figure 21 forms the 
underpinning of how the two models of chapter 2 are made endogenous in this chapter, 
forming a single, dynamic model of telecommunications to study uncertainty.  
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Figure 21: Extended Hierarchy behind the Endogenous Model 
 
In this model, the regulators regulate by determining the scope and timing of regulation, 
and enforce those regulations. The corporations (or firms) work to comply with 
regulation, but they mainly focus on developing and selling products. They decide how 
much resource to allocate to quality versus innovation. The industry structure consisting 
of these firms either integrates or modularizes. Although, not shown here, these industry 
structure changes come about as a result of firms deciding to consolidate or outsource, 
respectively. Consumers make four decisions: to adopt, exit, switch from one service to 
another, or innovate. The consumer innovation may or many not circumvent regulation. 
The technology itself develops incrementally, within an industry, or radically, typically 
when an entrant disrupts an incumbent.  
With such a model, we can study five types of uncertainty: regulatory, market, 
organizational, industry, and technological uncertainty. Uncertainty arises because of the 
actions of regulators, firms, consumers, or because of the nature of technology. The 
uncertainty in industry structure also results from these factors. The regulatory 
uncertainty arises because firms are uncertain about the regulatory action. In the previous 
chapter, we discussed the scope and timing related uncertainty. In this chapter, we will 
study the impact of antitrust regulation, which more directly affects the resulting industry 
structure. The market uncertainty arises from the actions of firms and consumers. On the 
supply side, firm’s decision to affect switching costs and network effect, or to 
integrate/modularize introduces uncertainty. On the demand side, the consumers’ 
preference for quality, innovation, price, and compatibility introduces the uncertainty. 
The organizational uncertainty arises because of how agile or sluggish a firm may be in 
allocating resources to quality vs. innovation. In a single industry, modular industry 
structure makes firms more agile than when the industry structure is integrated. But 
across different industries, firms may be more or less agile depending upon the nature of 
product or service at hand. The industry uncertainty arises from the actions of firms, 
regulators, and the nature of technology. Factors such as technological architecture’s 
influence on firm’s ability to integrate or modularize, or antitrust regulation’s influence 
on firm’s accumulation of market power introduces variation in the rate at which the 
industry structure becomes integral or modular. Finally, technological uncertainty arises 
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from inherent architectural differences across different technologies that lead to 
inherently different ability to attain quality levels, innovation levels, and cost structures. 
The central concern of this chapter is: how each type of uncertainty affects our current 
understanding of disruption.      
3.2.3 Application of Systems Theory 
Metaphorically, the dynamics studied here may be thought of as interlocking gears, as 
shown in Figure 22. The intuition here is that a change in one subsystem leads to changes 
in other subsystems and in the system as a whole. To study the uncertainty, we first 
analyze the subsystem-level behavior using analysis. We then synthesize the 
understanding into a systems level behavior. This chapter studies subsystem level 
behavior, and the next chapter studies the emergent behavior in the whole system. 
  
 
Figure 22: Gear Model and Near Decomposability 
From a theoretical perspective, the central issue with using both analysis and 
synthesis to study emergent behavior is the arguable irreducibility of the higher order 
behavior of the whole into the lower order behaviors of the parts. Systems thinkers opine 
differently on this topic. For example, for systems biologists, emergent properties seem 
highly-irreducible, whereas for systems engineers they seem at least weakly reducible. To 
justify our use of both analysis and synthesis, such that the lessons learned with the 
analysis at subsystem-level can indeed be used to facilitate the understanding of the 
emergent behavior synthesized for the whole system, we rely upon Herbert Simon’s key 
insight that resolves the dilemma of irreducibility by arguing that emergence can have a 
stronger or weaker interpretation (chapter 8, The Architecture of Complexity: Hierarchic 
Systems in (Simon 1981)).  
 
According to Simon, “Applied to living systems,” emergence makes a “strong 
claim that the putting together of their parts will not produce them or account for their 
character and behaviors,” which he referred to as stronger interpretation of emergence. 
“Applied to non-human systems,” by contrast, “emergence simply means that the parts of 
a complex system have mutual relations that do not exist for the parts in isolation,” which 
he called the weaker interpretation of emergence. “By adopting this weak interpretation,” 
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Simon said, “we can adhere to reductionism in principle even though it is not easy (often 
not even computationally feasible) to infer rigorously the properties of the whole from 
the knowledge of the properties of the parts.” Simon’s weak interpretation of emergence 
is what allows us to use analysis (reductionism) in socio-technical system, but also build 
theories of the higher-level emergent behavior by using synthesis.  
 
Further, our hierarchical decomposition of the telecommunications system heavily 
relies upon Simon’s theory of near decomposability, which he summed up the theory of 
near decomposability with “two prepositions: (1) in a nearly decomposable system the 
short-run behavior of each of the component subsystems is approximately independent of 
the short-run behavior of the other components; (2) in the long run the behavior of any 
one of the components depends in only an aggregate way on the behavior of the other 
components.” 
 
The theory of near decomposability should be understood in conjunction with 
Simon’s weaker interpretation of emergence. The first preposition of the near 
decomposability theory allows us to, in principle, use analysis (or reductionism) in the 
short run to study subsystem-level behavior separately even though ultimately we may be 
interested in system-level emergent behavior. The second preposition of the near 
decomposability theory, in principle, allows us to infer rigorously the behavior of the 
whole in the long run from the knowledge of the behavior of the parts in aggregate. The 
study of uncertainty at subsystem level of this chapter, and the study of emergent 
behavior of the next chapter rest upon the foundation of the notion of weak emergence 
and the theory of near decomposability, as proposed by Simon.  
3.3 Case Research: Misperceptions of Technology Disruptions 
Let us first examine how many of the media-proclaimed “disruptive technologies” go on 
to displace the existing industrial order. For this examination, we analyze the contents of 
popular media for technologies that were declared as disruptive technologies subsequent 
to Christensen’s best selling book The Innovator’s Dilemma. Table 9 shows the 
technologies the New York Times40 identified as “disruptive technology” anytime before 
March 2008.   
 
Potentially Disruptive 
Technology 
Industry41 Source 
Organic LED Electronic Equipment 
Manufacturers 
(Eisenberg 1999) 
Nano science in chip 
manufacturing Semiconductor Equipment 
(Markoff 1999) 
Open Source Software Computers: Systems Software (Lohr 2000; Lohr 
                                                 
40 We have restricted our analysis to New York Times (NYT) because the analysis of additional sources 
such as The Wall Street Journal and Business Week has a great overlap with NYT in technologies they 
declared as disruptive.   
41 We have used the industry classification provided by The Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS), a collaboration between Standard & Poor’s and Morgan Stanley Capital International, to classify 
the potentially disruptive technologies.  
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2000) 
Online Book Stores Retail, Internet Services (Gould 2000) 
e-Port (Internet-based 
Advertising) Advertising, Internet Services 
(Kane 2000) 
Digital Photography Photographic Products (Legomsky 2000) 
Gigabit Ethernet Communications Equipment (Markoff 2000) 
Online Investment Firms 
Investment Banking and 
Brokerage 
(McGEEHAN and 
Hakim 2000) 
Online Journals Publishing (Nagourney 2001) 
WiFi Mesh Networks 
Wireless Telecommunications 
Services 
(Markoff 2002) 
Segway Scooter Automobile Manufacturer (Riordan 2002) 
Alternative Energy - Solar, 
Biomass, Wind, Hydrogen 
Oil and Gas Exploration and 
Services, Electrical Utilities 
(Cortese 2003) 
P2P Service Providers Telecommunications Service (Fallows 2004) 
P2P File Sharing Movies and Home Entertainment (Varian 2005) 
Online Shopping Retail (Lohr 2005) 
Online Book Content Publishing (Peck 2006) 
Online Commodity Futures 
Exchange Commodity Futures Exchange 
(Bajaj 2006) 
YouTube (Political Advertising) Advertising (Carr 2006) 
YouTube (Video Content 
Distribution) 
Movies and Entertainment, 
Publishing 
(Carr 2006) 
Paint Films Auto Parts and Equipment (Brooke 2007) 
Advertising using Social 
Networks Advertising 
(Stelter 2008) 
Table 9 Technology identified as “disruptive technology” in popular media (The New York Times) 
Just a glance at Table 9 lists several technologies that represent significant innovations; 
for example, open source software, digital photography, online shopping, and P2P file 
sharing. These are technological paradigms that have come to stay. However, the 
question we are interested in is: have these technologies displaced the existing industrial 
order?  
 
To answer the above question, we first restrict our analysis to two fast clock speed 
industries – computers and telecommunications industries. We make such a choice 
consciously, as in these industries the change is rapid and provides better opportunity to 
study changes in the industry structure in a short period of time. Going forward, in this 
chapter we will study three potentially disruptive technologies: Open Source Software 
(Computer Systems Software Industry), WiFi Mesh Networks (Wireless 
Telecommunications Services Industry) and peer-to-peer (P2P) Service Providers 
(Telecommunications Service Industry). An example of P2P service is P2P VoIP such as 
Skype, Yahoo Messenger, etc., which is of central interest to this dissertation.  
 
In Christensen’s case of disruptive technologies, the disruption occurs when the 
entrant’s technology has lower price and lower primary performance, but a great promise 
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of ancillary performance in the future (Christensen 1997) when compared to the 
incumbent’s technology. The primary performance refers to the features of the 
incumbent’s technology that the customers care the most about. It can be thought of as 
the product/service quality. The ancillary performance refers to the additional benefits the 
new technology is likely to offer. It can be thought of as the product/service innovation. 
For example, in the case of VoIP, quality and reliability of a voice call can be considered 
the primary performance (or quality); whereas the integration of voice, video, and text 
that the P2P VoIP services offer can be considered ancillary performance (or innovation). 
Table 10 summarizes Christensen’s conditions for disruptive technology.  
 
Firm Price Primary 
Performance 
(Quality) 
Ancillary Performance 
(Future Innovation) 
Incumbent High High Low 
Entrant Low Low High 
Table 10 Christensen’s conditions for disruptive technology 
 
 
We must first ask the question: do technologies we propose to study fit Christensen’s 
conditions listed in Table 10? For an entrant technology to fit Christensen’s conditions it 
must have lower price, lower primary performance and higher future ancillary 
performance when compared to the incumbent. Table 11 shows that all the other three 
technologies we consider fit Christensen’s conditions. 
  
    
89 
 
 
Potentially 
Disruptive 
Technology  
(Table 9 column 1) 
Price 
compared to 
Incumbent   
Primary 
Performance 
compared to 
Incumbent 
Ancillary 
Performance 
(future) 
compared to 
Incumbent 
Open Source Software 
(Low) 
Many open 
source software 
are free 
(Low) 
Initially, most open 
source softwares have 
poor reliability and 
ease of use. They also 
have more bugs. 
(High) 
Open source 
software has quick 
turnaround on bug 
fixing and allows 
users to modify the 
code to their needs 
WiFi Mesh Networks 
(Low) 
Cheaper to 
build and 
operate than 
wireless 
networks 
(Low) 
Lower mobility than 
wireless networks 
(High) 
- Better speed in 
most places 
compared to 
wireless networks 
- Ability to switch 
between wireless 
and wired 
networks 
P2P Service Providers 
(Low) 
Many P2P 
Services such as 
Skype, IM are 
free 
(Low) 
Less reliability and 
ease of use compared 
to telephony or 
television 
(High) 
- Voice, Text, 
Video convergence 
- File sharing  
Table 11 Potentially disruptive technologies in computers or telecommunications industry and their 
fit with Christensen’s conditions  
 
We now come to our main question: do technologies that fit Christensen’s conditions 
(listed in Table 11) displace the existing industrial order? To investigate this question, we 
compare the industrial order pertinent to each potentially disruptive technology from the 
year 2000 with that in 2007. One might question the choice of the two years; particularly 
from the perspective that the WiFi Mesh Network and P2P Service Providers did not 
quite commercially exist in the year 2000. We would argue that the ideas did exist in 
other shapes or forms then, only that today they have acquired new names. Table 12 
shows the analysis. 
 
Potentially 
Disruptive 
Technology 
Industrial Order in 
2000 
Industrial Order in 
2007 
Key Observations 
Open Source 
Software 
Top Software 
Suppliers (S&P 2000) 
1. Microsoft 
2. IBM 
Top Software 
Suppliers  
(S&P 2007) 
1. Microsoft 
No industry 
disruption 
 Microsoft Windows 
controlled 90% of 
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3. Computer 
Associates Int’l 
4. Oracle 
5. HP 
6. SAP 
7. Sun 
Microsystems 
8. Unisys 
9. Compaq 
Computers 
10. Novell 
2. IBM 
3. Oracle 
4. SAP 
5. Symantec 
6. HP 
7. EMC 
8. CA 
9. Adobe 
10. Fujitsu 
 
the operating 
systems market in 
2000 and continues 
to do so in 2007 
 Open source 
operating systems 
such as Linux still 
holds low single 
digit penetration 
worldwide (S&P 
2007) 
WiFi Mesh 
Networks 
Top Mobile Operators 
(S&P 2000) 
1. Verizon 
2. SBC/Bellsouth 
3. Others 
4. AT&T 
Wireless 
5. Sprint PCS 
6. Nextel 
7. AllTel 
8. VoiceStream 
Wireless 
Top Mobile Operators 
(S&P 2007) 
1. AT&T (after 
Bellsouth 
acquisition) 
2. Verizon 
Wireless 
3. Sprint Nextel 
4. T-Mobile 
5. Alltel 
6. US Cellular 
7. Leap Wireless 
8. Dobson 
Communicatio
ns 
No industry 
disruption 
 US has 65000 WiFi 
Hotspots 
 Incumbents like 
AT&T and T-
Mobile own 20000 
Hotspots (1/3rd of 
the US total) 
 Handset 
Incumbents like 
Nokia, Samsung, 
Panasonic and (in 
the US) an entrant 
Apple Inc. lead the 
Wireless/WiFi dual 
phone market (S&P 
2007) 
P2P Service 
Providers 
Long Distance Call 
Providers (S&P 2000) 
1. AT&T 
2. WorldCom 
3. Others 
4. Sprint 
Leading Broadband 
Providers (S&P 2007) 
1. AT&T 
2. Comcast 
3. Verizon 
4. Time Warner 
5. Charter 
6. Qwest 
7. Cablevision 
8. Embarq 
9. Windstream 
10. Insight 
Major industry 
changes 
Early to predict 
disruption 
 Telecommunication
s Access and 
Service has 
undergone a rapid 
change in the 
industry structure 
 The change is more 
broadly affected by 
the increasing 
processing speed 
and the Internet 
penetration 
 Incumbents such as 
    
91 
 
AT&T and Verizon 
are still big; some 
through mergers and 
acquisitions 
 The P2P Service 
itself is successful 
in some economies 
like Japan/Korea, 
but slow in others 
Table 12 Potentially Disruptive Technologies and the Industrial Order 
 
Table 12 shows that Open Source Software and WiFi Mesh Networks have failed to 
displace the existing industrial order so far. In the case of Open Source Software, the 
paradigm has steadily gained market share, but the total market it captures is rather small. 
More curiously, in the case of WiFi Mesh Networks the incumbents of wireless 
telecommunications service, such as AT&T and T-mobile, have emerged as leaders in the 
new technology market. Finally, the case of P2P Service Providers is still open. Many 
forces are at play here. First, there is the shift from the traditional telephone and 
television networks to the more Internet-based services using cable or digital subscriber 
line (DSL) broadband. Then, there is the ever increasing computing power and the rise of 
the World Wide Web. The industrial order in this case is changing rapidly, but its early to 
say if the incumbents are losing. 
 
So, what preserves the industrial order despite the technological breakthrough in 
the above cases? We contend that there are five types of uncertainties at work: regulatory, 
market, organizational, industrial, and technological. To help us understand the effects of 
these factors, in the following section we present a systems model of regulation, 
competition and innovation in telecommunications.  
3.4 A Systems Model of Regulation, Competition, and 
Innovation in Telecommunications 
 
We present the systems model by organizing it along the two theories of disruption, or 
equivalently, along clusters of subsystems to make it most intuitive. Deeper 
understanding of subsystem-level behavior will impart richer analysis of the different 
types of uncertainty, undertaken later in this chapter. Deeper understanding of the system 
as a whole will make accessible the emergent behavior, discussed mostly in the next 
chapter.  
 
3.4.1 The Dynamics of Technology Disruption (Consumer-Firm Dynamics) 
 
In the previous chapter, we introduced Regulatory Compliance Model and Competition in 
Telecommunications Model. Both models were kept minimally endogenous. In the 
Regulatory Compliance Model, closing the compliance gap was made endogenous, but 
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factors that affect achieving the compliance, such as time to develop and deploy 
compliance mechanisms, achievable level of compliance, etc., were left exogenous. In 
Competition in Telecommunications Model, the adoption process was endogenous, but 
the product/service attribute that affect adoption, such as the price, quality, and 
innovation, were left exogenous. A virtue of such minimally endogenous models is that 
they allow for examining the outcome under all possible combinations of the values of 
the exogenous parameters. But their drawback is that there is no sense of what drives the 
exogenous parameters, so we cannot say which scenario of uncertainty (i.e., combination 
of parameter values) are most likely to arise and for how long each may persist. To 
overcome this drawback, we will now make the various parameters endogenous. 
 
Equation 11 of chapter 2 showed that consumer choice depends upon 
product/service attractiveness, which is driven by four attributes: compatibility, price, 
primary performance (quality), ancillary performance (innovation). We made a conscious 
choice to include price, primary, and ancillary performance in this formulation, as such a 
model would let us explore the observations Christensen made about technology 
disruption (see Table 10). Compatibility (or Network Effect) was added to the product 
attractiveness formulation because it is so often present in the market for communications 
goods and services that excluding it would leave any model of communications industry 
underspecified.  
 
Christensen’s framework, which was qualitative, focuses on the context within which the 
firm identifies and responds to customers’ needs, procures inputs and reacts to 
competitors. The only factor that is endogenous in his framework is firm’s competitive 
strategy, particularly its past choices of markets to serve, which determines its 
perceptions of economic value in new technology or innovation. In this chapter, we build 
upon this endogenous notion of competitive strategy, but go beyond it by making price, 
primary performance, and ancillary performance endogenous.42 For making these 
parameters endogenous, we rely on theories where possible; where theories are not 
developed, we base the formulations on unstructured interviews conducted with 
managers working for incumbents or entrants in the communications market. The 
formulations below illuminate several factors beyond firm’s competitive strategy, such as 
changing regulation, architecture of technology, and industry structure that affect these 
attributes in the model below. 
 
Endogenous Price 
Equation 15 in chapter 2 showed that price, P, in this model is set equal to cost, C, 
disregarding margins and profit. We decided to not include the profit margin in this 
formulation because, as observed by Christensen, in a scenario of disruption, the 
important factor determining how entrants and incumbents can price their service is the 
fundamental difference in their cost structures. As such, the formulation for pricing 
strategy itself can be quite involved when growth and decline of market share of a single 
firm is studied (Paich and Sterman 1993; Sterman, Henderson et al. 2007). All of this 
complexity is avoided here.  
                                                 
42 Remember, compatibility was already made endogenous in chapter 2 to formulate network effects. 
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The price is made endogenous by two formulations: economies of scale formulation that 
affects the marginal cost, Cv, and firm’s decision to make vs. outsource functionality 
formulation that affects the fixed cost, Cf. For simplicity, each piece of the cost function 
adjusts in a piecewise linear fashion. Equation 16 introduces these two factors into the 
price equation.  
 
Equation 16: Endogenous Price 
௜ܲ ൌ  ܥ௜ ൌ  ሺܥ௠௜௡௙ ெ೔ெ೘ೌೣ ൅  ܥ௠௔௫
௙ ሺ1 െ ெ೔ெ೘ೌೣ)) +  ሺܥ௠௜௡௩
ௌ೔
ௌ೘ೌೣ ൅  ܥ௠௔௫௩ ሺ1 െ
ௌ೔
ௌ೘ೌೣ)) + ܥ௜௭ 
 
Firm’s fixed cost varies between the minimum value when the firm is fully 
modular,ܥ௠௜௡௙ , and its maximum value when the firm is fully vertically integrated,ܥ௠௔௫௙ , 
based on firm’s modularity, Mi, as compared to the maximum modularity, Mmax, the 
architecture permits. Firm’s variable cost varies between the minimum value, ܥ௠௜௡௩ , and 
the maximum value, ܥ௠௔௫௩ , based on the economies of scale. If the firm dominates the 
market ( ௜ܵ  ൎ  ܵ௠௔௫), the variable marginal cost is closer to the minimum value because 
of the economies of scale; whereas when the firm’s installed base is small ( ௜ܵ ا ܵ௠௔௫), 
the firm benefits little from the scale and the marginal cost is closer to the maximum. We 
will make the last component of this equation, Compliance Cost, ܥ௜௭, endogenous later in 
the section on the dynamics of regulation. 
 
Endogenous Quality and Innovation 
 
The level of innovation (ancillary performance), Ii, of each firm’s service depends only 
upon three factors: its maximum architectural limit, ܫ௜௠௔௫, the attention/resources the firm 
devotes to it, ܴ௜௜, and the time necessary for it to improve/deteriorate, ߬௜௜. Similarly, the 
level of quality (primary performance), Qi, of each firm’s service depends only on three 
factors: its maximum architectural limit, ܳ௜௠௔௫, the attention/resources the firm devotes to 
it, ܴ௜௤, and the time necessary for it to improve/deteriorate quality, ߬௜௤. Equation 17 
juxtaposes the identical formulations for innovation and quality; although; we shall see 
next that the two differ in how they are made endogenous.  
 
Equation 17: Innovation and Quality 
݀ܫ௜
݀ݐ ൌ  ܫ௜
௚ െ  ܫ௜௟ ݀ܳ௜݀ݐ ൌ ܳ௜
௚ െ  ܳ௜௟ 
Where, ܫ௜௚= Innovation gain, and  
ܫ௜௟= Innovation loss.  
Where, ܳ௜௚= Quality gain, and  
ܳ௜௟= Quality loss.  
ܫ௜௚ ൌ  ܴ௜௜ ൫ூ೔
೘ೌೣି ூ೔൯
ఛ೔೔
 , (ܫ௜௠௔௫ ൐  ܫ௜ሻ ܳ௜௚ ൌ ܴ௜௤ ൫ொ೔
೘ೌೣି ொ೔൯
ఛ೔೜
 , (ܳ௜௠௔௫ ൐  ܳ௜ሻ 
ܫ௜௟ ൌ  ൫ூ೔ି ூ೔
೘ೌೣ൯
ఛ೔೔
 , (ܫ௜ ൐  ܫ௜௠௔௫ሻ ܳ௜௟ ൌ ൫ொ೔ି ொ೔
೘ೌೣ൯
ఛ೔೜
 , (ܳ௜ ൐ ܳ௜௠௔௫ሻ 
ܫ௜௚ ൌ  ܫ௜௟ ൌ 0 , ሺܫ௜ ൌ  ܫ௜௠௔௫ሻ ܳ௜௚ ൌ ܳ௜௟ ൌ 0 , ሺܳ௜ ൌ ܳ௜௠௔௫ሻ 
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Making Innovation and quality endogenous will require understanding what drives the 
resources allocated, maximum limit, and time to change each parameter. We begin with 
resources.  
 
Resource Allocation  
Each firm has a total attention, Ai, that gets divided into attention to innovation, ܣ௜௜, 
quality, ܣ௜௤, and compliance, ܣ௜௭. Similarly, each firm has a total resources, Ri, gets 
divided into attention to innovation, ܴ௜௜, quality, ܴ௜௤, and compliance, ܴ௜௭. Such a resource 
formulation is motivated by research in strategic management (Gary 2005). Here, both 
firms (industries) are assumed to be endowed with equal total attention/resources. Such 
an assumption means that both firms have the necessary resources for product 
development; the only decision they make is which aspect of the service – innovation, 
quality, or compliance – must they focus on. In reality, more dominant firms or industries 
control more resources and the competition for resources exists not in a single but across 
all industries. Hence such an assumption weakens the lessons we can draw about the 
exploitation of market power to an extent.   
  
Equation 18: Attention and Resources 
ܣ௜ ൌ  ܣ௜௜ ൅  ܣ௜௤ ൅  ܣ௜௭ 
ܴ௜ ൌ  ܴ௜௜ ൅  ܴ௜௤ ൅  ܴ௜௭ 
 
Attention here simply specifies the amount of resources a firm intends to allocate towards 
achieving a particular attribute. Separating attention (or intended resource allocation) 
from the actual resource allocation lets us introduce firm’s agility in refocusing resources 
when necessary (discussed later). Firm’s attention and resources are formulated as 
follows.    
 
The formulation for how firms diversify resources between innovation and quality in a 
dynamic setting, in an industry where disruption has already occurred, and at the level of 
abstraction necessary for our model, does not exist in the literature. Therefore, we must 
derive a behavioral formulation for attention/resource allocation from unstructured 
interviews. Such a formulation is akin to behavioral game theory model, where 
incumbent and entrant firms play a dynamic game of incomplete information for multiple 
rounds (Gibbons and National Bureau of Economic Research. 1996). 
 
Figure 23 shows how firms allocate resources when threatened with a potential 
disruption, as deduced from several interview quotes. When there is no threat of 
disruption and the competition is well understood, established firms primarily focus on 
quality, and the focus on innovation adoption is low.  The established firms focus on 
innovation only with the entry of non-traditional entrants. Moreover, they often rely on 
expected growth of the entrant technology’s market share to determine how much 
attention to pay to innovation (ancillary performance). Such behavior can be deduced 
from the following quote from a senior manager working for a large incumbent: 
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“Incumbent cares about ancillary performance only with: the entry of the non-traditional 
competitor, and the growth of its market share.” Director, CTO Organization, Incumbent A43 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Resource Allocation under the Threat of Disruption 
  
 
The formulation for incumbent’s (dominant firm’s) attention to innovation, ܣଵ௜ , is 
therefore: 
 
Equation 19: Attention to Innovation 
ܣଵ௜ ൌ ݂ሺܧሺܵଶሻሻ 
 
     Where,  
     ܧሺܵଶሻ is the Entrant’s (competitor’s) Expected 
Market Share 
     f = function for Effect of Entrant’s Market Share on 
Incumbent’s Attention to Innovation (Ancillary Performance).  
 
The convex curve in Figure 23 shows the shape of ܣଵ௜ .  
 
Entrant’s Expected Market Share, E(S2), is formulated using a standard trend function as 
in (Sterman 2000) pp. 634. The Effect of Entrant’s Market share on Incumbent’s 
Attention to Ancillary Performance, function f, can be deduced from quotes such as the 
following: 
 
                                                 
43 As requested by some interviewees, we have replaced their exact identities with more generic Incumbent 
A, Entrant A, etc., because of the strategic nature of the information in this part of the research.  
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“First [when the entrant enters] the question is whether this is a price game or a performance 
game. Then, you realize the future is [in] ancillary [services].” Chief Strategist and Architect, 
Incumbent B 
 
Such a quote exhibits risk aversion on the part of established firm when responding to 
potential disruptions. Equation 20 shows the formulation or function f, where λ is the 
coefficient of risk aversion, the greater the λ the more is the risk aversion.   
Equation 20: The Effect of Entrant's Market Share on Incumbent's Attention to Innovation 
݂ሺݔሻ ൌ  ݁ିఒ ሺଵି ௫ሻ 
 
Note that since the total attention, Ai, is constant and fixed, knowing attention to 
innovation takes us one step closer to knowing attention to quality, ܣ௜௤, as per Equation 
18.  
 
To complete the discussion of attention to innovation and quality, we must also discuss 
how firms diversify resources in the reverse direction (i.e., from innovation to quality). 
This is shown in Figure 23 with a concave curve, which can be best understood by 
following it from the top-right corner. The top-right corner can be imagined as 
representing an entrant who is fully focused on innovation at the time of the market entry 
and attempting to disrupt the incumbent who has full market share. Such a starting 
position is consistent with the following quote: 
 
“After the prototype phase, majority of the attention is on developing new features 
(ancillary performance) and a little on scale and reliability (primary performance).” CTO, 
Entrant A 
 
As the entrant gains market share, its consumers expect it to focus on what they perceive 
as entrant’s core product or service. Entrant’s shift in focus from innovative prototyping 
to serving the mass market with quality also exhibits some risk aversion, and hence the 
concavity in the curve that exhibits this behavior (see Figure 23). 
 
The attention firm pays to innovation or quality translates into actual resource 
allocation after the Resource Reorientation Time, ߬௜௥. This reality is deduced from the 
following quotes: 
 
“First you have to write a report, then convince the leadership [about the reallocation], and then 
the people who will work on it (the new idea).” Director, CTO Organization, Incumbent A 
 
“You have to redeploy your best people. Your best people are steeped into the old paradigm. 
Ideally, you want them to lead the new one too, so you have to take them along. This takes time.” 
Chief Strategist and Architect, Incumbent B 
 
 
Equation 21: Resources to Innovation 
ܴ݀௜௜
݀ݐ ൌ ܴ௜
௚ െ ܴ௜௟ 
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Where, ܴ௜௚= Resource to innovation gain, and 
ܴ௜௟= Resource to innovation loss. 
ܴ௜௚ ൌ
ቀ஺೔೔ି ோ೔೔ቁ
ఛ೔ೝ
 , (ܣ௜௜ ൐ ܴ௜௜ሻ 
ܴ௜௟ ൌ
ቀோ೔೔ି ஺೔೔ቁ
ఛ೔ೝ
 , (ܴ௜௜ ൐ ܣ௜௜ሻ 
ܴ௜௚ ൌ ܴ௜௟ ൌ 0 , ሺܴ௜௜ ൌ ܣ௜௜ሻ 
 
If we make Resource Reorientation Time, ߬௜௥, endogenous in Equation 21, we will have 
made endogenous resources to innovation (and thereby to quality). However, as we know 
from Equation 17, making resources endogenous is only the first of three steps in making 
innovation endogenous as the ultimate level of innovation/quality depends not only upon 
resources allocated to achieve it, but also on their architectural limit, and the time 
necessary it to improve/deteriorate. All of these factors, including ߬௜௥, depends upon 
industry dynamics (precisely, on double helix), which we tackle next. 
 
3.4.2 The Dynamics of Industry Disruption (Technology-Firm-Industry 
Dynamics) 
 
We will now make endogenous the industry structure (represented by modularity) and its 
impact. Formulations in this section are based upon the double helix. To quickly recap, 
the double helix argues that when the industry structure is vertical the forces of 
disintegration push toward a horizontal and modular configuration. The forces include::  
1. Niche Competition: The relentless entry of niche competitors hoping to pick off 
discrete industry segments; 
2. Organizational Rigidity: The challenge of keeping ahead of the competition 
across the many dimensions of technology and market required by an integral 
system; and 
3. Dimensional Complexity: The bureaucratic and organizational rigidities that 
often settle upon large, established companies. 
 
On the other hand, it argues that when an industry has horizontal/modular structure, 
another set of forces push toward more vertical integration and integral product 
architectures. These forces include:  
4. Market Power: Technical advances in one subsystem can make that the scarce 
commodity in the chain, giving market power to its owners;  
5. Industry Integration: Market power in one subsystem encourage bundling with 
other subsystems to increase control and add more value; and  
6. Technological Integration: Market power in one subsystem encourages 
engineering integration with other subsystems to develop proprietary integral 
solutions.  
 
We will now use these insights to make the industry structure endogenous.  
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Endogenous Modularity 
Modularity increases as the interfaces standardize and decreases as they become 
proprietary.  
 
Equation 22: Modularity 
݀ܯ௜
݀ݐ ൌ  ܯ௜
௚ െ ܯ௜௟ 
 
ܯ௜௚ is modularity gain, which occurs with interface standardization and firms outsourcing 
functionality. As stated in argument 1 of the double helix above, such interface 
standardization increases as the relentless entry of niche competitors pick off discrete 
industry segments.  
 
Equation 23: Interface Standardization and Functional Outsourcing 
ܯ௜௚ ൌ  ߙ௦ ݃ሺ ௜ܵିሻ 
 
     Where, 
     ߙ௦ = Maximum Fractional Rate of Interface 
Standardization, and 
     g = Effect of competitor’s market share on interface 
standardization.   
      
αs is exogenous, and depends upon the rate at which factors such as architecture and 
sometimes regulation permits industries to become modular. Equation 33 shows the 
formulation or function g, where ߤ is the coefficient of interface standardization, the 
more conducive the architecture for standardizing interfaces the higher is ߤ, and vice 
versa.  
Equation 24: The Effect of Competitor's Market Share on Interface Standardization 
݃ሺݔሻ ൌ  ݁ିఓ ሺଵି ௫ሻ 
 
The interface standardization rate increases towards αs and is convex in competitor’s 
market share. 
 
Similar formulation is used for the loss of modularity, ܯ௜௟, where, according to arguments 
4, 5, and 6 of the double helix, rising market share reduces modularity by pushing the 
architecture and industry structure to become more integral. The set of equations in 
Equation 25 show the formulation. Notice that the loss of modularity depends upon firms 
own market power (unlike the modularity gain, which depended upon competitor’s 
market power).  
 
Equation 25: Interfaces becoming Proprietary and Functional Integration 
ܯ௜௟ ൌ  ߙ௣ ݄ሺ ௜ܵሻ 
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Where, 
     ߙ௣ = Maximum Fractional Rate of Making 
Interfaces Proprietary, and 
     h = Effect of firm’s own market share on making 
interfaces proprietary.   
 
݄ሺݔሻ ൌ  ݁ିఔ ሺଵି ௫ሻ 
 
Where,  
  ߥ is the coefficient of making interfaces proprietary 
 
Antitrust regulation plays an important part in determining the amount of market power 
accumulation that occurs within a single firm or a collection of them. So, regulation 
influences both αp, which is exogenous, and ߥ. In regulatory regimes with more 
restrictions on the accumulation of market power the values of αp and ߥ are low, and vice 
versa.    
 
In this model, a single attribute—modularity—describes the state of each industry 
structure. Modularity represents the level of integration/modularization in both 
technology and industry structure for that service. Importantly, this model only applies to 
cases where the modularity of technology and industry structure are positively correlated. 
  
Organizational Rigidity’s and its Impact on Resource Allocation 
 
Argument 3 of the double helix identified that firms in vertically integrated industries 
become bureaucratic and experience organizational rigidities. We use this insight to make 
the resource reorientation time, ߬௜௥, endogenous.  
Equation 26: Endogenous Resource Reorientation Time 
߬௜௥ ൌ  ߬௠௜௡௥ ܯ௜ܯ௠௔௫ ൅  ߬௠௔௫
௥ ሺ1 െ ܯ௜ܯ௠௔௫ሻ 
  
The formulation in Equation 26 models that since firms in the most modular structure 
experiences the lowest organizational rigidity, such firms are agile and take the least 
amount of time to reorient resources, ߬௠௜௡௥ . Conversely, firms in the most integrated 
structure become rigid. Such firms lose the ability to refocus priorities quickly and 
experience longest resource reorientation times, ߬௠௔௫௥ . With Equation 26 and Equation 
21, we have made endogenous the resource part of the innovation and quality equation 
(Equation 17). The formulation here is kept linear; although, in reality, resource 
reorientation time may be more non-linear in modularity. Specifically, more modular 
structures may be even more agile and more integrated structures even more rigid.  
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Dimensional Complexity and its Impact on Innovation and Quality 
Argument 2 of the double helix identified that firms in vertically integrated industries 
struggle to keep ahead of the competition because of the dimensional complexity across 
the many technologies and market. We use this insight to endogenously determine the 
architectural limits on innovation, ܫ௜௠௔௫, and quality, ܳ௜௠௔௫.  
Equation 27: Endogenous Architectural Limits on Innovation and Quality 
ܫ௜௠௔௫ ൌ  ܫ௠௔௫ ܯ௜ܯ௠௔௫ ൅ ܫ
௠௜௡ሺ1 െ ܯ௜ܯ௠௔௫ሻ 
ܳ௜௠௜௡ ൌ  ܳ௠௜௡ ܯ௜ܯ௠௔௫ ൅ ܳ
௠௔௫ ൬1 െ ܯ௜ܯ௠௔௫൰ 
 
Imax and Qmax are architectural upper bounds of innovation and quality, respectively; 
whereas Imin and Qmin are architectural lower bounds of innovation and quality, 
respectively. We assume that both incumbent and entrant industry are ultimately capable 
achieving the same level of quality and innovation, given the right conditions. In other 
words, since in this model, like in real life, incumbents ultimately have the right to 
cannibalize their old product architecture and divert attention/resources to the architecture 
that is more like that of the entrant, despite the delay involved in doing so, some 
incumbents can ultimately attain the same level of innovation as entrants. Similarly, 
entrants are allowed to ultimately attain the level of quality the incumbents offer.     
  
The formulation in Equation 27 models the following scenario: when the industry 
structure integrates (modularity reduces), firms in such industries can achieve higher 
quality because of higher functional control, but they struggle to innovate because of 
growing dimensional complexity. Conversely, as the industry structure becomes modular, 
firms in such industries can achieve higher innovation because they focus on fewer 
modules and so they are dealing with lower dimensional complexity, but the system level 
quality suffers because of lower system-level functional control.  
 
With Equation 27, we have made endogenous the architecture limits part of the 
innovation and quality equation (Equation 17). This formulation is also kept linear to 
simplify analysis.  
 
Functional Control and its Impact on Innovation and Quality 
We use the dimensional complexity insight (Argument 2) of the double helix further to 
make the time necessary to improve/deteriorate performance, ߬௜௜, and quality, ߬௜௤.  
Equation 28: Endogenous Time Necessary to Improve/Deteriorate Innovation/Quality 
߬௜௜ ൌ  ߬௠௜௡௜ ܯ௜ܯ௠௔௫ ൅ ߬௠௔௫
௜ ሺ1 െ ܯ௜ܯ௠௔௫ሻ 
߬௜௤ ൌ  ߬௠௔௫௤
ܯ௜
ܯ௠௔௫ ൅ ߬௠௜௡
௤ ሺ1 െ ܯ௜ܯ௠௔௫ሻ 
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߬௠௜௡௜  and ߬௠௜௡௤  specify the minimum time necessary to improve innovation and quality 
their maximum achievable values, respectively; whereas ߬௠௔௫௜  and ߬௠௔௫௤  specify the 
minimum time necessary to improve innovation and quality to their maximum achievable 
values, respectively. It is easier to think about these times in terms of the time to improve 
innovation/quality rather than to deteriorate it. However, the same constants are used for 
the gain as well as loss of innovation/quality.    
  
The formulation in Equation 28 models behavior where quality can be improved 
in a shorter time in an integrated structure because of the functional control but the 
innovation takes longer. Conversely, improving innovation takes shorter when the 
industry structure is modular but the quality takes longer to improve. The formulation 
here is also kept linear to simplify the analysis. With Equation 28, we have made 
endogenous the only remaining parameter determining innovation and quality 
formulation in Equation 17.  
 
Next, we will connect—to recall chapter 2—the Competition in 
Telecommunications Model to the Regulation Model, which will allow us to make cost 
(price) and resources fully endogenous, as we will formulate the Compliance Cost, ܥ௜௭, in 
the endogenous price equation (Equation 16), and Resources to Regulation, ܴ௜௭, in the 
endogenous resources equation (Equation 18). 
 
3.4.3 The Consensus Conjecture (Regulation-Firm-Industry Dynamics) 
 
The relationship between industry structure and the ability to comply with regulation as 
well as the cost of doing so is not well understood. However, based on the case research 
in chapter 2, which showed a shift from higher to lower consensus over regulatory issues, 
we conjecture in this model that increasing modularity may sharply increase the 
coordination cost and time to comply, limiting the achievable compliance in modular 
structures. The exact nature of the relationship between modularity and the time to 
comply or coordination cost are not well understood, still a very long time required to 
build consensus and a very high coordination costs in a highly modular industry can be 
inferred from the many historical cases, where modular industries have fought long-
drawn battles over developing common standards (Hounshell 1984; Levinson 2006). 44 
The formulations below rest upon this conjecture. In the next chapter we will discuss the 
implications of this conjecture further. 
 
Time to Comply and Achievable Compliance 
We begin by assuming that the desired level of compliance is possible to achieve under 
integrated technology and industry structure. The level of regulatory compliance in 
PSTN has demonstrated this point (see Figure 5). As discussed in chapter 2, for recent 
regulations such as E911, it has taken us approximately 30 years to be fully compliant. 
                                                 
44 For more details on historical cases see footnote 81. 
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We can think of this duration as minimum time to comply, ߬௠௜௡௫ . The industry-level time 
to comply, ߬௜௫, can then be formulated as in Equation 29. 
 
Equation 29: Time to Comply 
߬௜௫ ൌ  ఛ೘೔೙
ೣ
ቀଵି ௘ష഑ሺಾ೘ೌೣష ಾ೔ሻቁ  , ߪ ൒ 1 
Here, σ is the coefficient of effort required to build consensus, which takes a value such 
that the time for an industry to comply with regulation is convex in modularity. The 
formulation renders an inordinately long time necessary to comply in a fully modular 
industry, indicating the impossibility of achieving high compliance in a very modular 
structures.  
 
Achievable compliance is formulated as in Equation 30. This formulation shows that as 
the modularity of the industry structure increases, the achievable compliance falls from 
that achievable in an integrated industry structure, Zmax, in a convex fashion, until it 
reaches the minimum achievable compliance, ܼ௠௜௡ᇱ . 45 
 
Equation 30: Achievable Compliance 
ܼ௜ᇱ ൌ  ܼ௠௔௫ ൫1 െ ݁ିఙሺெ೘ೌೣି ெ೔ሻ൯,  ܼ௠௜௡ᇱ  ൑  ܼ௜ᇱ  ൑  ܼ௠௔௫  
 
Equation 29 and Equation 30 complete the formulation for how competition and industry 
structure affect the regulatory compliance (see Equation 3 and Equation 1). We will now 
formulate the other half, i.e., how regulation affects competition with the help 
Compliance Cost, ܥ௜௭, and Resources to Regulation, ܴ௜௭.  
 
Compliance Cost and Resources to Regulation 
We make several assumptions to simplify formulations for compliance cost, and 
resources to regulation. As for the cost, we assume that regulated firms pass the 
compliance cost on to their consumers. As for the resources, we assume that regulated 
firms (and not regulators) always provide the resources necessary for regulatory 
compliance. Moreover, we assume that a regulated firm devotes a finite maximum 
amount of resources, ܴ௠௔௫௭ , to regulatory compliance, thereby limiting the maximum 
compliance cost to ܥ௠௔௫௭ .  
 
Equation 31shows the formulation for Compliance Cost, ܥ௜௭. It shows that when the 
industry is fully integrated, the cost of compliance reaches a minimum, ܥ௠௜௡௭ , as the 
functional control is high and little coordination is required between firms for achieving 
compliance.46 Moreover, vertically integrated firms also enjoy the economies of scale in 
                                                 
45 This formulation can be simplified by letting the achievable compliance go to zero. However, we assume 
that some minimum compliance, which may be far lower than that required and, may still be achievable in 
a fully modular structure.  As indicated by the formulation for time to comply, such low achievable 
compliance may also take a very long time to achieve in a fully modular structure.  
46 In reality, Compliance Cost may be thought of as having three components: Fixed Cost of Deployment, 
Marginal Cost of Maintenance, and Marginal Cost of Coordination. Since the fixed and marginal cost are 
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deploying regulatory mechanisms. As the modularity of the industry structure increases, 
the compliance cost approaches its maximum value in a convex fashion.  
 
Equation 31: Compliance Cost 
ܥ௜௭ ൌ  ܥ௠௔௫௭  ݁ିఙሺெ೘ೌೣି ெ೔ሻ , ܥ௠௜௡௭  ൑  ܥ௜௭  ൑  ܥ௠௔௫௭  
 
 
With Equation 31, not only can we make the cost, hence the price, fully endogenous (see 
Equation 16). Together with innovation and quality, the endogenously generated price 
makes the product/service attractiveness fully endogenous (see Equation 11).  
 
Equation 32 shows the formulation for resources to regulation, ܴ௜௭. It shows that when the 
industry is fully integrated, the minimum resources need to be allocated to regulation 
since the vertically integrated firms have the necessary functional control to achieve 
regulation. As the modularity of the industry structure increases, resource allocate to 
regulation approach the maximum value in a convex fashion.  
 
Equation 32: Resources to Regulation 
ܴ௜௭ ൌ  ܴ௠௔௫௭  ݁ିఙሺெ೘ೌೣି ெ೔ሻ, ܴ௠௜௡௭  ൑  ܴ௜௭  ൑  ܴ௠௔௫௭  
 
With Equation 32, we can not only make resources fully endogenous (see Equation 18), 
but knowing resources to regulation as well as resources to innovation (Equation 21) now 
makes it possible to deduce resources to quality, ܴ௜௤. 
 
We now have a fully endogenous model systems model of regulation, innovation, and 
competition in telecommunication. In the sections to follow, we will first calibrate the 
model with PSTN data and VoIP forecasts to provide a form of validation. We will then 
study its behavior under different types of uncertainty.   
3.4.4 Model Calibration 
 
Figure 24 the outcome of an exercise where the fully endogenous systems model is 
calibrated against PSTN data since 1935. The figure illustrates a good fit between the 
data and the model outcome. The business cycle in PSTN data, represented by overshoots 
and dips, are not present in the model outcome because there is no capacity formulation 
in the model. Omitting capacity formulation is a conscious choice we have made for two 
reasons. First, this research concerns disruptive trends that occur over a long period and 
not on individual business cycles. Second, in the communications industry today, firms 
                                                                                                                                                 
present for both incumbent as well as the entrant industry, we have considered only the coordination cost, 
which in our view is really the key differentiating factor between an integrated and a modular industry.  
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are less paranoid about building capacity as compared to which innovative trends to 
pursue and what might disrupt them.47  
 
Figure 24: Calibration with PSTN Data 
 
In the above calibration against PSTN data, there was no entrant. So, the calibration 
algorithm modifies only those factors that affect adoption such as advertizing, word of 
mouth, and network effect. By contrast, Figure 25 shows the outcome of model 
calibration against a VoIP forecast, where the calibration algorithm also varies 
parameters affecting firm’s product attractiveness to calibrate two industries (PSTN and 
VoIP) in competition. 
 
 
                                                 
47 Capacity concerns do exist from the perspective of “net neutrality,” so if we were to study that issue with 
such a model, adding capacity would be worth considering.  
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Figure 25: Calibration with VoIP Forecast 
The outcome of VoIP calibration shows a strikingly disappointing reality. From the 
analysis of three different forecasts (only one of which is shown here), it shows that all 
commercially available VoIP forecasts today are wrong!  We can say this because after 
running more than 3000 different combinations of parameter values, the calibration 
algorithm consistently shows that the a good fit with commercial VoIP forecast is 
achieved only when a constant fraction of switching is allowed from incumbent to the 
entrant, setting all other effects to zero. Meaning, all commercial forecast models have no 
uncertainty such as firm’s response to disruption, changes in industry structure, etc. Such 
assumption is completely fictional! While disappointing in a way, such outcome endorses 
the importance of studying uncertainty, the main thrust of this chapter, even further.48  
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Multiple Disruptions Base Behavior 
Results in chapter 2 showed how a model of competitive dynamics, where most of the 
product/service attribute are exogenous, generates a pattern for a modular technology and 
industry disrupting an integrated one. In this chapter, we must begin the analysis of the 
endogenous model developed in this chapter with a question: Can a pattern of modular 
industry disrupting an integrated one be simulated with the fully endogenous model? 
Figure 26 shows that such a model is capable of generating not just a single, but multiple 
subsequent disruptions. Hence, such a model may even be used for studying industries 
such as telephone switching where there are multiple waves of disruption.  
  
                                                 
48 Please follow Appendix D for understanding model validation beyond this calibration exercise. 
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Figure 26: Endogenously Generated Multiple Disruptions 
 
The simulation in Figure 26 is set up such that the modular entrant enters at year 5 and is 
regulated at year 10. The incumbent disrupted is fully integrated and compliant with 
regulation. Initially, the product attributes are set up such that the entrant has lower price, 
lower quality (primary performance), and higher innovation (ancillary performance) as 
compared to the incumbent, as per Christensen Conditions (see Table 10).  
 
Such a model generates multiple disruptions because it makes endogenous the industry 
dynamics (the dynamics of double helix). The double helix dynamics can be understood 
by following Figure 27.  To start with, multiple disruptions depicted above forms the 
backdrop here (see lines 1 and 2). Before the entrant’s market entry (year 5), the 
incumbent represents a firm in a highly integrated industry (see line3 showing near zero 
modularity, so a highly integrated structure).  As expected, at the time of market entry, 
the entrant offers a service that is highly attractive on the innovation dimension (line 5), 
but weak on the quality dimension (line 6). Entrant also offers somewhat attractive price 
(line 7), but currently enjoys no benefits of network effect (line 8) because it has a small 
installed base.  
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Figure 27: Multiple Disruptions and the Dynamics of Double Helix 
 
As modular niche entrants gain market share (line 2), the incumbents begin to 
disintegrate in order to become less organizationally rigid and shed dimensional 
complexity (i.e., their modularity increases, line 3). As entrants gain market power, 
however, they integrate at the level in terms of control and architecture (i.e., their 
modularity reduces, line 4). The functional control gained from integration facilitates 
entrants to attain higher quality. And entrants’ growing installed base requires them to 
focus on quality. Jointly, these factors lead to higher quality service from entrants (line 
6). The opposite are the dynamics of innovation. With integration, entrant’s 
product/service grows in scope and dimensional complexity, which limits their ability to 
innovate. Moreover, the focus on quality leaves them with fewer resources to innovate. 
These factors begin to reduce the innovativeness of the entrant’s service (line 5). With 
increasing market share, entrants initially enjoy economies of scale, so their already 
lower price becomes even more attractive (line 7). However, with integration, their fixed 
costs grow, increasing price. An additional blow to entrant’s price advantage 
(attractiveness) comes with regulation (at year 10).  With higher installed base, entrants 
also enjoy the benefits of network effects they did not have before (line 8). At the onset 
of the second disruption, the originally modular entrants look much like the incumbents 
they had disrupted several years back – highly integrated, with high quality, but low 
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innovation adoption and less attractive price – setting stage for the next wave of 
disruption. 
3.5.2 Analysis of Uncertainty 
 
We can now turn to different types of uncertainty that blur this pristine vision of 
successful disruption.  
 
3.5.2.1 Market Uncertainty 
 
As stated earlier, market uncertainty arises from the actions of firms and consumers. On 
the supply side, we study uncertainty that arises from firm’s decision to affect network 
effect (by determining who to interoperate with) and switching costs. On the demand 
side, we study the uncertainty introduced because of how consumer value quality, 
innovation, price, and service compatibility. 
 
Network Effect 
To recap, direct network effects are present if adoption by different users is 
complementary, so that each user’s adoption payoff, and his incentive to adopt, increases 
as more others adopt (Fisher and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of 
Economics. 1990). Figure 28 shows the highest market share the entrant achieves during 
a simulation49 for different levels of network effect. This plot is produced by aggregating 
the outcomes of many runs with different levels of network effect.  
 
Figure 28 shows that strong network effects can prevent technology disruption. It shows a 
sudden phase shift in the entrant’s maximum market share, max %S2, as a function of the 
level of network effect, illuminating two regions: (1) a region of weak network effect 
where the entrant disrupts, and (2) a region of strong network effect where there is no 
disruption and the incumbent retains the market. More importantly, it shows that strong 
network effect produces a winner takes all (WTA) outcome. When the network effect is 
strong, it has higher influence on product attractiveness as compared to other factors such 
as price, quality, innovation or switching costs. As a result, strong network effect helps 
the incumbent retain its entire market share. Conversely, when the network effects are 
weak, factors such as lower price and higher innovation give entrant the advantage and 
the WTA outcome is less likely. At a theoretical level, these insights have been known to 
information economists (Chapter 31, Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with 
Switching Costs and Network Effects, by Joseph Ferrell and Paul Klemperer in 
(Armstrong and Porter 2007)); however, the results here are generated in a fully 
endogenous framework, and are posited in the context of a modular force disrupting and 
integrated one.  
 
 
                                                 
49 Note that we do not study here the equilibrium market share because the model we have built is a 
disequilibrium model. Hence, the only meaningful parameter to study is the highest market share a firm 
achieves.  
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Figure 28: Network Effect Phase Plot 
 
Switching Cost 
A product/service has classic switching costs if a buyer will purchase it repeatedly and 
will find it costly to switch from one seller to another. Switching costs arise due to the 
product characteristics or due to contracts (Fisher and Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. Dept. of Economics. 1990). Figure 29 shows how switching costs affect the 
time of disruption; precisely, when entrant’s market share overtakes of the market share 
of the incumbent. This plot is produced by aggregating the outcomes of many runs, where 
the switching cost for the incumbent’s service is different from that of for the entrant.   
 
Figure 29 shows that when incumbents can affect switching behavior, bigger difference 
between incumbent’s and entrant’s switching costs (incumbent’s being higher) delays 
technology disruption and makes industry disruption less likely. Such an outcome may be 
intuitive, but it has profound implications for both competition and regulation. As for 
competition, if the disincentives induced by higher switching costs make it less attractive 
for consumers to switch away from the incumbent; they stymie entrant’s growth and 
delay disruption by entrant’s technology even though in the new technological paradigm 
might ultimately win. More importantly, such ability to throttle the rate of disruption 
gives incumbents the time to compete strategically, giving rise to two possibilities. First, 
some incumbents may now become leaders in the new technology through altering their 
product/service, so there may be no industry disruption. Second, the technological 
solution, which emerges through such a drawn out phase of competition, may be of an 
intermediate form that combines some innovations of the entrant’s service, while 
retaining some, often undesirable, characteristics of the incumbent’s service.   
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Figure 29: Relative Switching Cost vs. Time of Disruption 
  
As for regulation, switching costs are important to understand for several reasons. First, 
markets with lower switching costs are more competitive and fair. In communications 
markets where there are geographical restrictions (e.g., high cost, low population density 
areas) or where incumbents otherwise possess market power, they will create switching 
cost disadvantages for the entrants. Second, since switching costs can change the timing 
of disruption, they interact with the timing of delayed regulation. In chapter 2 we argued 
that the timing of delayed regulation is tricky (see Figure 17). The ever changing 
switching costs further complicate delayed regulation.  
 
Consumer Choice 
Figure 30 shows maximum market share the entrant attains during a simulation, max 
%S2, as a function of how sensitive are the consumers to innovation, quality, price, and 
compatibility, varied individually. Each line on the plot is a result of aggregating the 
outcomes of many runs, where the sensitivity of attractiveness to that attribute (e.g. 
sensitivity of attractiveness to innovation, εi) is varied while keeping other sensitivities 
constant. The plot shows limits to technological disruption, and can be interpreted as 
follows.  
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Figure 30: Four Stacked Phase Plots to show Maximum Entrant Market Share when Consumer 
Prefers Compatibility, Innovation, Quality, and Price 
A value of 1 on the x-axis corresponds to the values of sensitivities set such that they 
render equal maximum effect of all four attributes—innovation, quality, price, and 
compatibility—on the resulting product attractiveness. 50 Traveling to the right of 1, 
consumer’s sensitivity to the given attribute increases, and traveling to the left it 
decreases. Value of 2, and 3 on the x-axis correspond to a market where an average 
consumer prefers that attribute (e.g., innovation) twice or thrice as much as other 
attributes, respectively. In other words, a larger fraction of the potential market finds a 
given attribute attractive. A value of 0 on the x-axis corresponds to a market where 
consumers are indifferent to the attribute. On the y-axis, a high value of max %S2 
corresponds to technological disruption, and lower values (especially, less than 50%) 
correspond to no technological disruption.  
 
 The graphs demonstrate that technology disruption is less likely in markets where 
consumers prefer quality and compatibility over innovation and low price. Conversely, 
technological disruption is more likely in price-sensitive markets willing to take risk by 
adopting innovative services despite their poorer quality and compatibility compared to 
those offered by their competitors.  
 
3.5.2.2 Technological Uncertainty 
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Technological uncertainty arises from inherent architectural differences across different 
technologies that lead to different ability to attain quality levels, innovation levels, and 
cost structures. Just like the above analysis of market uncertainty, technological 
uncertainty can also be studied with numerous permutations of in achievable quality and 
innovation levels. However, since the inherent differences in quality or innovation of any 
two products/services are so difficult to understand and argue for, the analysis in this 
section is limited to those technological uncertainties that are of practical importance.  
 
The results in this section show that excepting the cases where competing technologies 
have completely different physical limits, for example electro-mechanical switches and 
transistor switches, differences perceived in competing technologies can be mythical 
because technological uncertainties are often poorly understood.  
 
Disruptor Cannot Offer Quality Myth 
Technology incumbents often believe that entrants can never catch up with their 
product/service quality. When confronted with a question: why is incumbent’s initial 
response to potential disruption slow? Incumbents typically respond by saying, “we 
initially believed entrants have just entered a very complex space, and they would not 
attain high quality (reliability and stability) for a long time to come.”51  
 
We simulate the entrant’s lack of functional control by assigning a large value (4 times 
the normal value) to Entrant’s Time to Acquire Primary Performance, ߬ଶ௤. Such a setting 
simulates a scenario where the entrant inherently lacks functional control and takes 
longer to develop quality. Figure 31 shows that even with such a disadvantage, the 
entrant may disrupt and retain high control over the market for a long time (see lines 1 
and 3). The incumbents may survive but only after massive restructuring. In other words, 
incumbents fully divert their resources (charts for resource allocation not shown here) to 
entrant-like innovations in order to survive. Hence, the experiment in Figure 31 argues 
that Incumbent’s belief that entrants cannot catch up on the quality dimension is a myth.  
 
Why should experienced managers representing incumbents then believe that entrants 
will not catch up on quality? To investigate this question, we look for conditions under 
which incumbents can retain market share given the slow to catch up entrant. Through 
model analysis, we find that incumbents retain market share without sustaining much 
damage only when industry structure dynamics are considered exogenous (see lines 2 and 
4). Hence, the myth about entrant’s inability to catch up on quality dimension arises 
because of the misperceptions of feedback. Evidence for such misperceptions of feedback 
in managerial decision making in general is already present from systematic 
experimentation in management science (Sterman 1989). 
 
                                                 
51 From Author’s interview with Chief Strategist and Architect, Incumbent B. 
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Figure 31: Entrant’s Functional Control and Likelihood of Industry Disruption 
 
Entrant Inherently Superior Myth 
Many analysts come to a premature conclusion that entrant’s technology is far superior to 
the currently dominant incumbent technology it is competing with. They prematurely 
conclude that incumbent is inherently incapable of competing on the innovation 
dimension because of their dimensional complexity.  
 
We simulate the incumbent’s disproportionately high dimensional complexity by 
assigning a large value (4 times the normal value) to Incumbent’s Time to Acquire 
Ancillary Performance, ߬ଵ௜ . Such a setting simulates a scenario where the incumbent is 
inherently so dimensionally complex that it takes longer to develop innovation. Figure 32 
shows that even with such a disadvantage, the incumbent stands a better chance at 
making a come back (see lines 1 and 3) than a complete impossibility of that happening 
that the analysts predicted (see lines 2 and 4). The experiment in Figure 32 argues that 
analyst’s belief that every entrant technology is inherently superior and incumbents can 
never successfully respond to them may be a myth.   
 
Why do analysts believe for one technology after another that the entrants are superior 
and the incumbents will inevitably be disrupted? To investigate this question, we look for 
conditions under which entrants can retain market share given the dimensionally complex 
incumbent. Through model analysis, we find that entrants retain market share without 
much competition from incumbents when industry structure dynamics are considered 
exogenous (see the outer set of market share curves in Figure 32). Hence, the myth about 
entrant’s superiority also arises because of the misperceptions of feedback.  
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Figure 32: Incumbent's Dimensional Complexity and the Likelihood of Disruption 
 
3.5.2.3 Organizational Uncertainty 
 
The organizational uncertainty arises because of how agile or sluggish a firm may be in 
reallocating resources to quality vs. innovation. As such, in a given industry, firms in a 
modular industry structure more agile than those in an integrated structure. But across 
different industries, firms may be more or less agile depending upon the nature of product 
or service at hand. 
 
Agility is Everything Myth 
Corporate leaders often believe that firm’s agility in responding to the challenges of the 
market place is what sets the successful firms apart from the unsuccessful ones. With 
such a belief, organizations often get focused on responding rapidly as opposed to 
strategically given the dynamic complexities.  
 
We simulate the higher agility of the incumbent by assigning a small value (1/4th 
the normal value) to Incumbent’s Resource Reorientation Time, ߬ଵ௥. Such a setting 
simulates a scenario where the vertically integrated incumbents are inherently more agile 
than the entrants if the entrants also were vertically integrated. Figure 33 shows that even 
with such an advantage, the incumbent may struggle to compete (see lines 1 and 3). 
Firm’s agility alone can salvage the incumbent only in a limited case when architectural 
limits do not apply to quality and innovation, and incumbents can withstand pressure 
from niche competition without having to make structural changes (see lines 2 and 4). 
Such an idealized scenario does not exist in practice. The experiment in Figure 33 argues 
that corporate leader’s belief that agility is everything in order to succeed may be a myth.  
 
Such a myth may also arise from the misperceptions of feedback in a complex 
environment. Intuitively, it appears that the more rapid the firm’s response to the new 
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priorities (i.e., the lower the firm’s organizational rigidity) the better it will be able to 
complete. However, the model analysis shows that surviving disruption requires 
balancing the loss of one set of competency while acquiring the new ones. Specifically, 
for incumbents it means balancing the los of quality with adoption of new innovations.  
 
 
Figure 33: Incumbent’s Agility and Likelihood of Disruption 
 
3.5.3.4 Regulatory Uncertainty 
 
The regulatory uncertainty arises because firms are uncertain about the regulatory action. 
In chapter 2 we discussed how regulatory costs and resources can pose entry barriers for 
entrants. Naturally, when such is the case neither technology nor industry disruption is 
very likely. In this chapter, we discus the uncertainty in antitrust regulation, the area of 
regulation that directly affects how integrated or modular the industry will ultimately be.  
 
We simulate the level of antitrust regulation and its impact on industry structure by 
running three simulations, each with a different value for Maximum Fractional Rate of 
Making Interfaces Proprietary, αp. In the first simulation, αp is set to simulate an 
environment of low to no antitrust regulation (αp = 0.1, the industry structure can fully 
consolidate in a span of 1-3 years), where firms can gain market power and industry can 
consolidate rapidly. In the second simulation, αp is set to simulate an environment of 
narrow antitrust regulation (αp = 0.01, industry can consolidate in a span of 10-12 years), 
where there are restrictions for a single firm to accumulate market share in a single 
industry. In the third simulation, αp set to simulate an environment of comprehensive 
antitrust regulation (αp = 0.001, industry can consolidate in a span of 100 years), where 
there are higher restrictions on accumulating market power for a single firm or a 
collection of them, and within a single industry or across several industries. 
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Figure 34: Regulatory Uncertainty and the Clockspeed 
Figure 34 shows the results. It shows that antitrust regulation changes the industry 
clockspeed. In other words, whereas it does not prevent technology or industry 
disruption, antitrust regulation does affect how often industries and consumers experience 
the shockwaves of the accumulation of market power. As shown in Figure 35, the 
average firm is small when antitrust regulations are more comprehensive and vice versa.     
 
 
Figure 35: Entrant Firms Remain More Modular with higher Antitrust Regulation 
 
Such a simulation of the levels of antitrust is not hypothetical. Both policies are 
construed broadly. The narrow antitrust regulation scenario corresponds to the nature of 
antitrust regulation in the United States, which concerns itself with the conduct of a 
single firm abusing market power or when multiple firms are involved in a merger. In 
either case, Horizontal Merger Guidelines sets forth the methodology that the 
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enforcement agencies will apply in analyzing horizontal mergers (mergers between 
participants in the same industry).52  
 
The scenario of comprehensive regulation is akin to the New Regulatory 
Framework for ICT under the European Union (EU), which states that, “[a]n undertaking 
shall be deemed to have significant market power if, either individually or jointly with 
others, it enjoys a position equivalent to dominance, that is to say a position of economic 
strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of 
competitors, customers and ultimately consumers.” 53  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Combining the case analysis and the simulation results above shows that media and 
experts alike routinely misperceive the possibility of disruption. Not every potentially 
disruptive technology leads to technology disruption. And not every technology 
disruption results in industry disruption. The misperceptions of disruptive technologies 
arise when we fail to understand the dynamic complexity that arises from the stochastic 
nature of forces involved, or strategic behaviors of the different actors. In the discussion 
below, we first synthesize the results and discuss if they are valid for the cases we have 
considered in this chapter. Thereafter, we discus what to anticipate about the behavior of 
the various parameters that determine the dynamics of competition and regulation, and 
the difficulties involved in observing and measuring some of the parameters.  
3.6.1 Limits to Disruption 
 
Figure 36 summarizes the limits to technology and industry disruption as discovered 
through the analysis above.   
 
                                                 
52 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 
41557 (April 2, 1992, as revised April 8, 1997), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm. 
53 Per Article 14, at 2, of the Directive 2002/20.EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 
March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services 
(Framework Directive), Official Journal of the European Communities, L 108, April 24, 2002. 
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Figure 36: Limits to Technology and Industry Disruption 
Technology disruption is least likely, meaning entrant technology fails to displace the 
incumbent technology, under two sets of conditions. First, technology disruption is less 
likely when the incumbent’s product or service enjoys strong network effects. In the cases 
we considered above, incumbent operating systems benefit from strong indirect network 
effects due to software applications that run on them. The wireless and wireline 
telecommunications have network effects due to calling plans such as free in-network 
calling, over and above the direct network effects from building an access network. 
Entrants of P2P Service are creating strong network effects of their own by offering 
buddy lists such as the one on Skype or IM. A classic strategy for entrants to neutralize 
the incumbent’s network effect advantage is to make their product interoperate with the 
incumbent’s product.  
 
Second, technology disruption is less likely in markets where consumers prefer service 
quality and its compatibility with other products or services more than the innovation or 
attractive low price the service offers.  The cases we have considered in this chapter 
confirm this observation. In the systems software market, open source software has not 
displaced the Microsoft’s Windows operating systems because a large fraction of desktop 
and laptop operating systems users care more for compatibility than all other attributes.54 
In the wireless telecommunications service market, wireless technologies such as WiFi 
has penetrated far more in price-sensitive economies (Wireless Competition Bureau 
2009) and population segments (e.g., younger consumers) who are less risk averse and 
love innovation. The same dilemma is present in the telecommunications service, where 
younger and price-sensitive populations have adopted P2P service such as VoIP far more 
                                                 
54 By contrast, when it comes to server operating systems, not analyzed in this research, developers prefer 
quality (reliability and control they have over the operating system) far more than other attributes. So in 
server market, open source software, with its higher quality, has disrupted Windows operating system.  
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than older population who prefer PSTN service that has higher quality and compatibility 
(Wireline Competition Bureau 2008). 
 
Industry disruption is least likely, meaning a new technology displaces the old but 
the entrant firms do not displace the incumbent firms, under three conditions. First, 
industry disruption is less likely despite technology disruption when incumbents can 
significantly affect the switching behavior through a variety of strategies. It may be 
obvious to state that higher switching costs lead to longer retention of the consumer. 
However, it is important to understand that a longer customer retention time gives the 
firm the time to reorient its resources for reacting to competition. The dynamics of 
retaining consumers by increasing switching costs seems to be quite well understood. 
Operating systems manufacturers bundle application software to increase switching costs 
(Cusumano and Yoffie 2000). Wireless operators subsidize handsets and sign multi-year 
contracts with customers. Cable or broadcast television operators tie up with content 
providers to offer programming – all in order to increase switching costs. On the entrant 
side, the most common strategy seen is to offer the service for free, at least initially, to 
compensate the consumers moving over from the incumbent for the switching costs they 
bear. For example, services like skype and IM are offered for free.    
 
Second, an industry disruption is less likely when incumbents are able to innovate while 
maintaining certain quality. Incumbents are typically stacked against natural barriers to 
rapid innovation such as rigidity of their organization and high dimensional complexity 
of their product. Yet, there are examples of incumbents radically restructuring their 
products in order to innovate while offering lower than before but acceptable quality to 
their consumers. Among the cases we have considered in this chapter, incumbent 
equipment providers in the telecommunications services market such as Nortel, Lucent, 
etc. have responded to the threat of disruption by VoIP with both product cannibalization 
and business restructuring. Many of them, though much less powerful than they used to 
be, are still in the equipment manufacturing market (Bensinger 2008).  
 
Third, an industry disruption is less likely when entrant struggle to offer quality due to 
lack of functional control or market power. Being able to offer system-level quality is 
easier when a firm has system-level functional control. Such a system-level functional 
control is present when a firm owns critical functional components involved in delivering 
a service, or when the interfaces are standardized and a modular firm can reliably assert 
control over the end-to-end service to offer quality. Modular entrants in nascent markets 
often lack such control. Moreover, in a situation where they cannot accumulate market 
power because of competitive or regulatory reasons, they may lack the ability to deliver 
the necessary quality, either by developing it on their own or by contracting with other 
firms for it. Among the cases we have considered, such a barrier to quality can be 
observed in the wireless telecommunications service market. In the United States, 
wireless telecommunications service market is heavily operator-controlled, and modular 
entrants such as handset vendors or WiFi/WiMax operators struggle to offer high quality 
new services that do not benefit operators who have must of the functional control.  
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3.6.2 Three Popular Disruption Myths 
 
Misperceptions of feedback arise in complex systems due to numerous cognitive and 
other bounds on human rationality identified by the psychology of individual choice 
(Kahneman, Slovic et al. 1982; Simon 1982). Such misperceptions often produce 
systematic errors and biases. Systematic experimentation has shown that insensitivity to 
feedbacks in their decision environment can lead to poor managerial decisions (Sterman 
1989). In this chapter we uncovered three myths that arise due to the misperceptions of 
feedback, each of which may be understood as a type II error as summarized in Figure 
37. 
 
The first myth, Incumbent’s belief that disruptors cannot offer quality so there 
will be no technology disruption, arises naturally for incumbents who may have struggled 
for years to build quality into their products through numerous interactions with a wide 
variety of consumers. Moreover, when potentially disruptive entrants are modular, it may 
appear that they will never have the system-level functional control necessary for 
developing system-level quality. 
 
When the managers do not correctly perceive the impact of firm’s decision on the 
industry structure and vice versa, they may fail to anticipate that entrants, who lacked 
functional control necessary for attaining high quality and who focused largely on 
innovation at the time of market entry, may take several actions to change this situation 
once it has pressure from their growing consumer base to improve quality. First, with 
experience they may alter their product/service architecture to integrate adjacent modules 
and have more functional control. Additionally, they may acquire firms experienced in 
competing on the quality dimension. In this sense, mergers and acquisitions must be 
viewed broadly in that they not only increase control over functionality, but they increase 
control over the market by widening the consumer base, and most importantly, they bring 
to the entrants the knowhow for developing quality as workers transfer from incumbent 
to entrant firms. Generations of technologies, be it the automobile, bicycle 
manufacturing, or others, history suggests that it is this transfer of knowhow that leads to 
the next disruption when it may be least expected (Hounshell 1984). Among the cases we 
have considered in this chapter, VoIP is certainly a case where the entrants have caught 
up with the incumbents on the quality dimension faster than incumbent’s expectation.  
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Figure 37: Three Popular Disruption Myths 
 
The second myth, analyst’s belief that every entrant technology is inherently superior so 
there is sure to be technology and industry disruption, may arise for several reasons. 
First, assuming that their interests are not aligned with the interests of the entrant firms, 
analysts may have a romantic vision of disruption from the successful disruptions they 
might have experienced in the past. When radical innovation that alleviate the 
fundamental constraints of the incumbent technology do appear, technology disruption 
becomes highly probable. For example, when electro-mechanical switches alleviated the 
fundamental constraint—the human operator—of the operator-based switches, there was 
an absolute technology disruption. Similarly, when transistor-based switches alleviated 
the fundamental constraint—the contact loss—of the electro-mechanical switch, there 
was again a technology disruption. But was there any industry disruption in these case? 
No! For instance, in the US, a single monopolist, AT&T, pioneered all three switching 
technologies.  
 
 The second reason for analyst’s misperception may be their belief that incumbents 
are inherently incapable of competing on the innovation dimension because of their 
dimensional complexity. Analysts disregarding the dynamic complexity of disruption 
may fail to anticipate that the dimensionally complex incumbents may take several, at 
times drastic, actions to respond to the threat of disruption. The incumbents under 
competitive pressure may cannibalize their product and completely reinvent their 
architecture. In this case, there will be technology disruption, but some incumbents may 
emerge as market leaders in the new industry. Alternatively, incumbents may standardize 
product interfaces, spinoff parts of their businesses or outsource the work to niche, 
specialized competitors.  As discussed earlier, Nortel, Lucent, etc. have responded to the 
threat of disruption by VoIP with both product cannibalization and business restructuring. 
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manufacturing market. But as our calibration exercise above showed, analyst models 
today completely disregard any such uncertainty. 
 
The third myth, corporate leader’s belief that a highly agile firm will survive 
disruption, may arise because they get focused on the speed with which the organization 
responds as opposed to understanding other factors that determine the competitive 
outcome. Successful strategic behavior in the face of potential disruption takes far greater 
understanding of the dynamic complexity. With such understanding, firms realize that 
depending upon the consumer segmentation and the clockspeed of technology; they need 
to slow down response along some dimensions while intensifying it along others in order 
to succeed. 
 
In case of modular entrants disrupting the integrated incumbents, incumbents may 
believe that rapidly reorient resources to innovation is what may save them. But the focus 
ought to be on balancing the quality-capability and innovation-capability. Quality-
capability is determined by not just the maximum quality that can be attained, but the 
time it takes to attain it. When disruption occurs incumbents suffer initially because they 
cannot innovate, but in the due course, they also suffer because focusing on innovation 
begins to weaken the appeal of their product/services on the quality dimension. One 
might feel that such an observation may simply be an artifact of the modeling assumption 
that the resources a firm has are constant. However, in a competitive environment, no 
firm can assume infinite resources, so the attending to one takes attention away from 
another is a reality. Hence, for the incumbent, the game is not simply that of how quickly 
they reorient resources to innovation, but also how they maintain the quality-capability 
which may be lost because of what they make vs. buy, and how much functional control 
they have to maintain certain desirable quality to meet the expectation of their consumers. 
Make vs. Buy decisions itself is an important area of research which is beyond the scope 
of this thesis (Whitney and Fine 1996). 
3.7 Dynamic Complexity: Anticipation, Observation, and 
Measurement 
The discussion so far focused on how to anticipate the likelihood of disruption in face of 
the various uncertainties. We conclude this chapter with a discussion of what can be 
anticipated about the various parameters that define competitive and regulatory dynamics 
if disruption were to take place. Additionally, we discuss the challenges of observing and 
measuring the parameters where relevant.  
 
3.7.1 Anticipation 
 
Table 13 shows what to anticipate about the parameters that define the competitive 
dynamics. It summarizes the anticipated behavior of each parameter in three different 
phases—in the integral age,55 during disruption, and in the modular age.56 Since 
                                                 
55 In chapter 2, we defined the integral age in telecommunications as a paradigm, where each operator was 
vertically integrated and controlled the total functionality necessary to deliver a service; a few such 
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incumbents and entrants experience different set of forces during disruption, in this phase 
they may differ in their behavior for a given parameter. Since much of Table 13 is self-
explanatory, we take two examples to explain the intended use of the table.  
 
 The dynamics of innovation, for example, may be understood as follows. In the 
integral age, when there is less competition from niche competitors, it can be expected 
that the overall innovation adoption will be low even though the firm might have the 
resources to innovate. In the disruption phase, as niche competition creates pressure to 
adopt innovation, incumbents are forced to pay attention to innovation. The entrants, on 
the other hand, might have increasing pressure to not just innovate but also to deliver 
higher quality. In the modular age, entrants that disrupted and incumbents that survived 
disruption have high innovation capacity, but also pressure to maintain certain quality to 
stay competitive. A closer look reveals that innovation-specific dynamics form a 
balancing structure.57 Whereas the introduction of entrant’s innovative service is what 
causes disruption, the increasing market share of the disruptor counter acts innovation in 
the post-disruption phase.   
 
Take another example; the product/service quality is usually high in the integral 
age, as it gets perfected over a long time. With disruption, incumbents lose some level of 
quality as they must now understand new products/services before then can offer the 
same level of quality. Entrants, on the other hand, have the pressure to improve along the 
quality dimension. In the modular age, the quality of the disruptive technology continues 
to improve. Again, a closer look reveals that quality-specific dynamics form a reinforcing 
structure.58 Whereas quality drops initially with the introduction of the disruptive 
technology, the increasing market share of the disruptors enhances the quality further as 
demanded by the firm’s growing installed base.  
 
 
Parameter 
Competition Dynamics (Firm and Industry-level Forces) 
In Integral Age59     During Disruption60   In Modular Age61 
Innovation Low pressure to adopt innovations  
i Increasing ability 
to innovate and 
pressure for 
innovation 
Higher ability to 
innovate and 
pressure for 
innovation 
                                                                                                                                                 
operators controlled the industry; they faced low competition and were under limited pressure to adopt 
innovation; and consumers had limited choice. 
56 In chapter 2, we defined the modular age as a paradigm, where each firm controls only a subset of the 
total functionality necessary to constitute a service; many modular firms interoperate to deliver a service; 
firms compete fiercely and are under great pressure to innovate; and consumers enjoy a far greater choice 
due to the multi-modal competition among multiple technologies. 
57 In balancing structures a change in one direction is countered by forces in the opposite direction, so 
either a growth or a decline is countered. 
58 In reinforcing structures a change is amplified, so a growth leads to further growth and a decline to 
further decline. 
59 See footnote 54. 
60 The use of letter, i, indicates to the forces incumbents experience; whereas, e, indicates the forces 
experienced by entrants 
61 See footnote 55. 
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adoption adoption 
 
e High ability to 
innovate, but 
increasing pressure 
to divert focus to 
quality   
Quality 
High quality 
developed over a 
long time 
 
i High ability to 
offer quality, but 
increasing pressure 
to divert focus to 
innovation  Improving quality 
 
e Increasing ability 
to develop quality 
and market 
pressure to do so  
Fixed Costs High but largely amortized 
 i Dropping with outsourcing  Lower and 
pertinent to the 
modules owned  
e Increasing with 
integration of the 
adjacent modules  
Marginal Costs Low due to economies of scale 
 
i Increasing due to 
reducing 
economies of scale  Low at module-
level, high at 
systems-level  
e Decreasing at 
module level with 
increasing 
economies of scale  
Network Effect 
Contract 
dependent among 
incumbents, but 
high for new 
entrants 
 
 
Dependent upon 
interoperability 
between 
incumbents and 
entrants 
 
Contract 
dependent 
amongst matured 
entrants and 
incumbents who 
survived, but high 
for new entrants 
Switching Costs Product/service, contract dependent  
 Product/service, 
contract dependent  
Product/service, 
contract dependent 
Industry 
Structure 
Vertically 
integrated (in 
present research) 
 
i Pressure to 
disintegrate in the 
early phase of 
disruption  
Modular, 
horizontally 
concentrated with 
incentives for 
integration (in 
present research)  
e Incentives to 
integrate in the 
later phase of 
disruption  
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Organizational 
Form 
Integrated, slow to 
respond, and with 
dimensionally 
complex 
product/services 
 
i Adapting to 
competition 
through 
organizational 
restructuring, and 
product/service 
outsourcing  
Constantly 
adjusting 
horizontal scale 
and vertical scope, 
balancing quality 
and innovation 
 
e Modular, quick to 
adapt, fiercely 
competitive at 
module level  
Table 13: Anticipating the Dynamics of Competition 
Two meta-level observations about the structural dynamics must be made. First, 
structural influences demonstrate why dislodging the incumbent can be so difficult. In the 
communications industry, the incumbent’s large installed base reinforces three of its 
strengths – high quality, low price (due to economies of scale), and high compatibility. 
Hence, a potentially disruptive entrant needs a great innovation with a far better cost 
structure to overcome these forces. Second, the structural forces also explain several 
sources of lock-in. For example, integrated structures have a tendency to remain 
integrated, and modular structures to remain modular. These observations argue that the 
small market share of a modular entrant at the time of entry is not enough reason to 
ignore the entrant as the reinforcing forces may help it grow rapidly. Also, once a 
modular structure disrupts and becomes dominant, it might persist because of the lock-in, 
so the disruption has real consequences. 
 
Table 14 shows what to anticipate about the parameters that define the regulatory 
dynamics. It is laid out and can be understood the same way as Table 13. 
 
Parameter 
Regulatory Dynamics 
In Integral Age     During Disruption   In Modular Age 
Actual 
Compliance 
Close to the 
required level with 
a well-understood 
process of 
achieving it 
 
 
Dependent upon 
compliance levels 
of competing 
services and their 
market shares 
 
Can be inadequate 
compared to the 
required level, with 
the process of 
achieving it poorly-
understood due to 
coordination issues. 
 
Frequently eroding 
due to 
circumvention of 
regulation 
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Achievable 
Compliance 
High due to high 
functional control  
 Dropping due to 
incremental 
regulation, other 
regulatory 
decisions and 
competitive 
pressures  
Low due to the 
effort necessary to 
coordinate and 
many competing 
interests, and 
constant 
circumvention of 
regulation 
Compliance 
Costs 
High but 
amortized 
deployment costs, 
low and regulated 
maintenance and 
coordination 
costs62 
 
i Rising 
coordination costs 
with more 
competing 
interests, dropping 
maintenance costs 
with reducing 
market share  High coordination 
costs that are not 
well-understood 
 
e Lingering 
deployment costs 
with longer times 
to comply, rising 
maintenance costs 
with increasing 
market share, high 
coordination costs 
due to modular 
control  
Fraction of 
Resources to 
Regulation 
Perceived as small 
and under control, 
but often may not 
be 
 
 Rising for both 
incumbents and 
entrants  
Can be large to 
cause smaller firms 
to fail 
Table 14: Anticipating Regulatory Dynamics 
The following meta-level insight emerges by comparing Table 13 and Table 14: 
modularity increases technology clockspeed, reduces regulatory closkspeed and hence 
changes the feasible regions for the regulatory solutions. As Internet-based services 
create greater modularity, technology clockspeed has increased on all three of its 
dimensions –product, process, and organizational. We demonstrated this fact in chapter 2 
(see Table 3). By contrast, our research shows that in a more modular architecture and 
industry structure the regulatory clockspeed reduces. If one considers rendering a 
communications industry that is highly compliant with regulation as the product of 
regulation, such a product will now take longer to deliver and the process producing it 
                                                 
62 Although not shown in the model formulation in this chapter, we experimented with various formulations 
for compliance costs before arriving at a conclusion that coordination cost is the most important component 
of the compliance cost (other components being deployment costs, and maintenance costs) for thinking 
about disruption by modular forces. A fixed deployment cost is likely to be present when there exists a 
compliance pap between the required and actual compliance the firm offers. Firms incur marginal 
maintenance cost of offering regulated service offered to each additional customer. 
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will also be drawn out. The only aspect of regulatory clockspeed that speeds up is the 
clockspeed of the regulatory agency. They must now be more vigilant and adaptable to 
the rapid changes in communications technology and industry. Together, changing 
clockspeeds of technology and regulation create new feasible regions for the regulatory 
solutions in the modular age. Exploring what these solutions is the topic of the next 
chapter. 
 
3.7.2 Observation and Measurement 
 
Many of the parameters and forces discussed in this research are observable but difficult 
to measure. Of course, not being able to measure them does not make them any less 
important. Discussed below are several such parameters.   
 
Network Effect 
Measuring the strength of the network effect accurately is not easy. What is easier is to 
detect the presence or absence of it. Also, it is possible to evaluate the different levels of 
the network effect nominally. 
 
Switching Costs 
As many factors, such as the nature of product/service, competition, contracts between 
the consumer and the supplier, and the culture at large, mediate the ultimate switching 
costs, observing or measuring it can be complicated, except in in some cases such as 
wireless telecommunications services in the United States where switching costs are 
glaringly obvious and they come in the firm of one or two year service contracts. 
 
Fixed and Marginal Costs, Compliance Cost, and Resources to Regulation 
Enormous information asymmetry exists in each of these areas that the firms exploit 
when bargaining with regulators. Much has been written about the efficiency of 
regulatory contracts when such asymmetry exists ((Laffont and Tirole 2000)). Although 
this literature considers technology exogenous to their models, many of the problems of 
information asymmetry discussed there are only exacerbated by a disruption like 
scenario. 
 
Industry Structure and Organizational Form 
Macro shifts in industry structure and organizational forms matters more from the 
regulatory perspective. These changes are observable by monitoring the industry activity. 
Micro shifts in industry structure or organizational form are very difficult to observe. 
These parameters are not quantifiable, and even if there was an attempt made to quantify 
them, the benefits of doing so for the regulators are not clear. Corporate managers do care 
about small and large shifts the industry structure as they are constantly negotiating their 
competitive position, but even they understand the shifts in industry structure more 
qualitatively.  
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Actual Compliance 
Today, compliance in area such as E911, CALEA, and Universal Service is measured 
using a certain matrix (see chapter 2, Figure 5). Chapter 2 discussed how meeting 
regulatory objectives these regulations serve, namely public safety, law enforcement, and 
socio-economic development, in the modular age will require redesigning obligations. 
Hence, the matrix that currently measures compliance too will necessarily need to change 
for the modular age.  
 
Achievable Compliance 
In the integral age, for every new regulation the regulator could assume that the 
corporations had the ability to comply with them. As shown by the case research in 
chapter 2, corporations are divided today in their opinion as to how compliant they can 
be. Hence, the assessment of achievable compliance itself needs a new approach in the 
modular age.  
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Chapter 4: FROM ANIMAL TRAINER TO WILDLIFE 
CONSERVATIONIST: BALANCING REGULATION AND 
INNOVATION IN THE MODULAR AGE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Juxtapose the social and economic objectives served by the existing telecommunications 
regulations, and evaluate what the modular age has done to them from the societal 
perspective, and you shall see a very different role emerging for the regulatory agency in 
the new world. The modular forces naturally promote the economic objectives such as 
competition and innovation, but they derail critical social objectives such as law 
enforcement and public safety. Consequently, in the modular age, the regulator’s new 
role must be to achieve the following vital combination, which defines the first best (FB) 
outcome: the necessary regulatory compliance is achieved, the high innovation and 
competition are preserved, and the reasonable cost of compliance is maintained. This 
paper asks: How can such a balance of regulation, innovation, competition, and cost be 
achieved in the modular age of the Internet? Through a three-stage analysis of existing 
and new policy options, this paper proposes policy levers for achieving such a balance. 
 
The most prominent and broad proposal on how to regulate VoIP has been the layered-
oriented model for regulation. Before the FCC launched its IP-Enabled Services enquiry, 
a number of leading thinkers on telecommunications regulation in the United States spent 
considerable effort thinking about layered regulation. 63 These proposals were founded 
upon the arguments that regulatory separation of wireline telephony regulated under Title 
II of the Telecommunications Act, wireless telephony regulated under Title III, and cable 
services regulated under Title VI would not work in the age of Internet services, which 
can be offered over any access technology. These proposals argued that “the only rational 
way to regulate the Internet industry is to draw lines within the layering hierarchy to 
distinguish between (i) those layers (if any) that should be subject to continued economic 
regulation because there is insufficient competition within them and (ii) those layers that 
should not be subject to such regulation because they are presumptively competitive.”64 
                                                 
63 Kevin Werbach, “A Layered Model for Internet Policy”, Journal on Telecommunications and High  
Technology Law (JTHTL) vol. 1 nbr. 1 (2002); Richard S. Whitt, “A Horizontal Leap Forward:   
Formulating a New Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model”,  
Federal Communications Law Journal vol 56 nbr. 3 (2004); John T. Nakahata, “Regulating Information  
Platforms:  The Challenge of Rewriting Communications Regulation from the Bottom Up”, JTHTL  
(2002); Rob Frieden, “Adjusting the Horizontal and Vertical in Telecommunications Regulation: A  
Comparison of the Traditional and a New Layered Approach”, 55 Fed. Comm. L.J. 207; Douglas C.  
Sicker and Joshua L. Mindel, “Refinements of a Layered Model for Telecommunications Policy”,  
JTHTL (2002); Lawrence Solum, “The Layers Principle:  Internet Architecture and the Law”, available  
on SSRN; and Philip J. Weiser, “Law and Information Platforms”, JTHTL vol. 1 number 1 (2002). 
 
64 As summarized in Chapter 6 of Nuechterlein, J. E. and P. J. Weiser (2005). Digital crossroads : 
American telecommunications policy in the Internet age. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press. 
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The layered approach advocated that there should be no regulation of VoIP services that 
run on top of the physical layer, as long as the provisioning of physical layer itself is 
competitive.  
 
 The layered approach ignored the dynamic issues that arise in the environment 
created by the Internet. Their static frame of analysis failed to anticipate that in an 
environment where firms, consumers, and technologists have a great deal of flexibility, 
such partial regulation would provide perverse incentives for the regulated to move to the 
unregulated services. And significant market power can arise even at the application layer 
(think Google), and just at the physical layer. Such an oversight is a classic demonstration 
of the pitfalls of decision-making in a complex system, where addressing a problem local 
to one part of the system gives rise to other problems elsewhere.  
 
 Today, because of such shortcomings, it is believed that “the layered model 
provides surprisingly little useful guidance to the regulator, and the guidance that it 
provides is often misleading. Moreover, it suffers from several profound defects: (1) a 
regulatory taxonomy that is just as arbitrary, confusing and misleading as the silos that it 
seeks to replace; (2) a fundamental lack of technological neutrality; and (3) an arrogant 
assumption that government can predict with certainty that all telecommunications for all 
time will be based on the model of the Internet. The layered model is a charming idea 
whose time has come – and gone.” (Marcus 2006) 
 
In the early days of the proposal for layered regulation, libertarian George Gilder 
had perceptively argued that the underlying issue the proposal must not ignore is the 
“ever changing trade-offs between integration and modularization…[and] the importance 
of regulation within the ‘core’ of the network as well as the edge. ” Our thesis, developed 
over chapters 2, 3 and 4 of this thesis endorse Gilder’s important insight.  
 
In the contemporary literature, Pierre De Vries’s recent work thematically parallels the 
approach taken in this paper (and more broadly in this thesis). De Vries suggests that the 
“Internet/Web” can be understood as a “complex adaptive social system,” such as a forest 
or other ecosystem. 65 Based on system theory and the experience of ecosystem 
management, he proposes a conceptual framework of four principles for meeting 
regulatory goals that suits the dynamics of the “web”: flexibility (determining ends, not 
prescribing means); delegation (giving markets and civil society the first shot at meeting 
social needs); big picture (taking a broad view of the problem and solution space); and 
diversity (enabling multiple solutions for policy problems by encouraging competition 
and market entry). The central thesis of his work is that the regulatory actions must be 
derived from a set of regulatory goals.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
  
65 Presented at the Technology Policy Research Conference (TPRC), 2008. Available through SSRN, De 
Vries, P. (2008). "Internet Governance as Forestry: Deriving Policy Principles from Managed Complex 
Adaptive Systems." SSRN eLibrary. 
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 De Vries’s work generates a number of interesting questions, but in the absence of 
a dynamic model, it remains at the conceptual level. In his work, De Vries correctly 
identifies the need to go beyond the conceptual model, so that well-tested and actionable 
suggestions can be offered with confidence.  
 
We argue that when using systems principles, it is this transition from a 
conceptual to an actionable framework that is crucial to make. History argues that works 
of many systems thinkers gained traction only after such a transition was made. For 
example, biologists criticized Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s early cry to use systems 
principles for the scientific enquiry (especially biology) until systems biology, through a 
variety of developments, made it possible to act upon some of Bertalanffy’s early 
insights.  
 
To briefly elaborate the point, in his 1968 text, General System Theory, 
Bertalanffy identified the importance of studying emergent phenomena in biological 
system, but his work was criticized as “philosophically and methodologically unsound 
because the alleged ‘irreducibility’ of higher levels of lower ones tended to impede 
analytical research whose success was obvious in various fields.”66 The methodological 
objection to irreducibility did not abate until the recent rise of systems biology, a recent 
field of study that has sustained much interest, which, through advances in experimental 
and computational techniques, observes “new emergent properties that may arise from 
the systemic view used by this discipline in order to understand better the entirety of 
processes that happen in a biological system.” (Kitano 2001) 
 
Hence it is important to go beyond the principles to carry out deeper analysis 
using modeling and other research methods. That is the journey the present research has 
been on (starting with (Vaishnav 2005; Vaishnav and Fine 2006), and now in this 
document).  
4.2 Research Method 
The research in this paper proceeds in three stages. The first stage is motivated by the 
following question: What should be the regulators role in a system where a modular age 
disrupts an integral one? We must begin with such a broad question because of the 
widespread disagreement among stakeholders over whether and how to regulate VoIP 
(already discussed in chapter 2). To answer this question, we analyze regulatory 
compliance, innovation, competition, and compliance cost67 as emergent behaviors of the 
systems model developed through chapters 2 and 3. Naturally, it is legitimate to ask why 
analyze only these four parameters? First, compliance, competition, and innovation have 
                                                 
66 p. 86 of Bertalanffy, L. v. (1968). General system theory; foundations, development, applications. New 
York,, G. Braziller. 
 . Unfortunately, the three criticisms presented here are Bertlanffy’s own summary of the criticisms 
of GST. The original sources of these criticisms are not easy to trace, as he does not refer to them.  
67 Compliance Cost and Coordination Cost are used interchangeably in this paper, since coordination cost is 
the only component of the compliance cost that varies significantly with the modularity of the industry 
structure (as discussed in chapter 3 with our Coordination Cost Conjecture). The other two components of 
compliance cost, namely deployment and maintenance cost, apply both to entrant and incumbent, so they 
are eliminated to keep the analysis tractable.    
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been at the heart of telecommunications policy debates in the United States post the 
AT&T breakup. Additionally, our research argues that compliance cost will be an 
important factor for the regulators to understand in the modular age; although, today there 
is little focus on it.68 The analysis in the first stage of research explains the tradeoffs 
across the various phases of disruption. It illuminates a set of outcomes the regulator 
must aim for at the system level that we define as the first best (FB) outcome.   
 
Defining the FB outcome motivates the question for the second stage of research: 
Whether the FB can be achieved using the currently-known policy levers such as partial 
and delayed regulation? For this investigation, we subject the model to a set of 
optimization exercises. In each exercise, the optimization algorithm selects the best 
possible combination of regulatory scope (partial regulation) and timing (delayed 
regulation) to satisfy the desired objective function – for example, maximizing 
compliance. The optimization exercises are organized in the increasing order of 
complexity of the objective function. Discouragingly, these exercises show that the 
existing policy levers (partial and delayed regulation) cannot achieve the FB. However, 
they illuminate a set of conditions that must be met for achieving the FB outcome.  
 
The inadequacy of the existing policy levers motivates the question for the third stage of 
research: Are there policy levers that are capable of achieving the desired balance, but 
that have not been exploited by the policymakers yet? To investigate this question, we 
carry out policy sensitivity analysis on the systems model, where we look for those 
assumptions that, when changed, enable certain policies to achieve the desired outcome. 
    
We will now discuss each stage of research and its results sequentially.  
4.3 Research Stage I: Emergent Behavior and the Regulator’s 
New Role 
As stated above, we begin by investigating the regulators role in a modular age. For this 
investigation, we study the emergent behavior in the telecommunications system where 
modular entrants disrupt integrated incumbents. In chapter 3, we modeled the dynamics 
of consecutive disruptions. We will now limit our analysis to a single disruption. 
Focusing on a single disruption cycle is sufficient for our analysis in this paper because 
the dynamics repeat in the subsequent ones. To guide our analysis of the emergent 
behavior, we divide the disruption period into sub-phases.  
4.3.1 Phases of Disruption 
 
We divided the dynamics of a single disruption into three periods: pre-disruption, 
disruption, and post-disruption (see Figure 38). The pre-disruption period may be defined 
as the period before the first entrant enters the market. The post-disruption period may be 
                                                 
68 One more parameter—quality—can conceivably added to the list of four parameters studied in this 
paper; however, since a minimum service quality is necessary to succeed in a competitive market, to keep 
the analysis less complicated, the presence of competition is considered sufficient in defining the FB.   
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defined as the period after the last incumbent exits.69 The period in between the two may 
be defined as the disruption period. We further divided the disruption period into two 
phases: disintegration-phase, and integration-phase. To understand these two phases, 
please follow on Figure 38 the line for Average Utilized Modularity, Λ, which represents 
the level of modularity an average consumer experiences. As shown in Equation 33, the Λ 
depends upon the modularity as well as the market share of each industry. 70  
 
In the disintegration phase, competition, within modular firms and between 
modular and integrated firms, creates pressure to disintegrate. Consequently, firms 
standardize interfaces modularizing the architecture, and outsource functionality 
modularizing the industry. By contrast, in the integration phase, modular firms gain 
market power and have incentives to integrate. Consequently, interfaces become 
proprietary integrating the architecture, and mergers and acquisitions integrate the 
industry structure.  
 
  Equation 33: Average Utilized Modularity 
߆ ൌ  ෍ ܯ௜ כ  ௜ܵ
௜
 
 
                                                 
69 The exit of the last incumbent may be thought more broadly as the exit of the last product or service that 
has the characteristics of the incumbent’s dominant offering in the pre-disruption period. In this sense, the 
onset of post-disruption phase may occur not just due to market exit, but also as the incumbents morph into 
entrant-like firms. 
70 An industy’s Utilized Modularity rises if both parameters, its Modularity and Market Share, increase, 
falls if one of them falls, and takes appropriate course (rises, falls, or remains unchanged) if one parameter 
increases and other decreases, depending upon the magnitude of their change. 
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Figure 38: Phases of Disruptions 
The behavior of compliance, innovation, competition, and compliance cost is very 
different across the three periods and two phases. 
4.3.2 Emergent Behavior in Telecommunications System 
 
4.3.2.1 Average Utilized Compliance (Θ) 
 
We know from Equation 4 (reproduced below in Equation 34) that Average Utilized 
Compliance, Θ, is a market share weighted sum of each firm’s (industry’s)71 Actual 
Compliance, Zi. Thus, the effective level of compliance depends not just upon how 
compliant are the firms, but how much their service is utilized.  
Equation 34: Average Utilized Compliance 
߆ ൌ  ෍ ܼ௜ כ  ௜ܵ
௜
 
 
Θ represents the fraction of communications that occur over compliant networks (or 
alternatively, the fraction of an average consumer’s communications that occur over 
networks with end-to-end regulatory compliance). Such a conceptualization is relevant 
because an average user today carries out a fraction of their voice communication over 
the regulated PSTN or wireless networks and the rest over the unregulated options such 
as peer-to-peer VoIP services (e.g., Skype). 
                                                 
71 As discussed while setting up the model, each firm represents a typical firm in that industry.  
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Figure 39: Average Utilized Compliance 
 
In the pre-disruption period, all communications occur over compliant networks (i.e. %Θ 
is 100%) because incumbents own the entire market and their networks are fully 
compliant.72 As the unregulated entrants gain market share, Θ drops, since a fraction of 
communication occurs over their non-compliant networks. Once entrants are regulated, Θ 
begins to rise. Several factors now determine its value at a given point in time. First, the 
required level of regulation of entrants (we assume full compliance is required). And 
second, the resulting modularity of the industry structure, which may be understood 
further as follows. In the disintegration phase, firms experience higher coordination costs 
and take longer to comply with regulation; hence the achievable compliance is low. 
Conversely, in the integration phase, as the industry integrates, firms possess greater 
control and can achieve higher regulatory compliance.      
 
4.3.2.2 Average Utilized Innovation (Π) and Quality (Φ) 
 
Average Utilized Innovation, Π, is a market share weighted sum of each firm’s 
(industry’s) level of innovation, Ii (see Equation 35). Thus, the effective level of 
innovation depends upon not just how much firms innovate, but also how much are those 
innovations marketed by firms and adopted by consumers. Average Utilized Innovation 
represents the level of innovation an average consumer experiences. Equation 35 also 
                                                 
72 In reality, the incumbents are never 100% compliant, but we are using an idealized scenario to simplify 
the analysis.  
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shows the formulation for Average Utilized Quality, Φ. It is the trajectory of these 
parameters (Π and Φ) that is more informative than its level at a given point.73 
 
Equation 35: Average Utilized Innovation (Π) and Average Utilized Quality (Φ) 
ߎ ൌ  ෍ ܫ௜ כ  ௜ܵ
௜
 
 
ߔ ൌ  ෍ ܳ௜ כ  ௜ܵ
௜
 
 
 
 
Figure 40: Average Utilized Innovation and Quality 
In the pre-disruption period, in the absence of the threat of disruption, the incumbents are 
focused on quality and have little pressure to adopt innovation. This was the case of 
AT&T before breakup or even of Baby Bells before they were threatened by wireless or 
broadband access.  As the more innovative but less quality-focused entrants disrupt, two 
distinct phases of dynamics take place. First, in the disintegration phase, innovation, Π, 
increases as consumers adopt the innovative services offered by the entrant, and also 
because the incumbents begin to focus on innovation adoption. We have seen this 
behavior in recent years through the transformation of incumbents such as AT&T, MCI 
                                                 
73 As noted earlier in this chapter, FB definition does not explicitly consider quality because ensuring 
competition ensures a minimal quality. We touch upon the dynamics of quality in Figure 40 to demonstrate 
that certain minimum quality is sustained through the disruption. 
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and Sprint. The quality, Φ, however, suffers on average in the disintegration phase as the 
consumers use a mix of high and low quality services; for example, a mix of PSTN and 
peer-to-peer VoIP.74  
 
By contrast, in the integration phase, those modular firms that gain higher market 
power must now focus on quality as demanded by their large consumer base. Hence, 
quality improves on average, but the innovation suffers. The loss of innovation cannot be 
salvaged by the higher innovation adoption among the erstwhile incumbents (i.e., the 
incumbents of pre-disruption period) because of their smaller market share. Thus, in the 
post-disruption period, the entrants become the new incumbents. They have the incentive 
structure to possess the same characteristics as the erstwhile incumbents – low innovation 
adoption and high quality. This discussion of the integration phase and post-disruption 
period may seem irrelevant, but we have begun to witness such tendencies to rapidly 
integrate among corporations such as Microsoft or Google that now actively compete in 
the communications value chain.  
 
4.3.2.3 Average Utilized Market Power (Competition) 
 
We study Average Utilized Market Power, Ψ, as a proxy for competition. Ψ is formulated 
as the inverse of Average Utilized Modularity, Λ (see Equation 36). Just as for Λ, Ψ too 
depends upon the modularity of each industry structure as well as the market share each 
has. Firms in more modular markets (high Λ) possess less market power (low Ψ), and 
vice versa. 
 
Equation 36: Average Utilized Market Power 
ߖ ൌ  1 െ ෍ ܯ௜ כ ௜ܵ
௜
 
 
Ψ represents the market power an average consumer experiences. A low value of Ψ 
indicates the presence of the benefits of competition; whereas a high value indicates the 
presence of the drawbacks of market power as experienced by an average consumer. 
 
In the pre-disruption period, there is high market power and low competition. We 
have seen this in the period before AT&T’s breakup. During the disruption period, the 
incumbents and entrants alike face greater competitive pressures and possess lower 
market power. We are currently in this phase as IP-Enabled services such as VoIP 
threaten to disrupt PSTN. In the post-disruption period the competition reduces, as the 
incumbents and entrant who survive the disruption begin to exploit their market power. It 
                                                 
74 One might observe that the Average Utilized Innovation, Π, reaches its peak earlier than Average 
Utilized Quality, Φ, reaches its valley. The reason for this behavior is the rate at which resources can be 
reoriented in integrated vs. modular firms. Average innovation rises quickly because when integrated 
incumbent become modular due to disruption, they become less rigid and can reorient resources to 
innovation relatively quickly. By contrast, the average quality reaches its valley slowly because when 
modular firms integrate, they become more rigid and become slower in their ability to reorient resources to 
quality. This difference in the resource reorientation rate determines how quickly the innovation improves 
or quality suffers.   
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is important to note that the market power entrants exploit may come from their market 
leadership in an adjacent industry. For example, the market power Google can leverage in 
offering voice communications service could come from its leadership position in other 
internet services.  
 
Figure 41: Average Utilized Market Power 
4.3.2.4 Average Utilized Compliance Cost 
 
Average Utilized Compliance Cost, Ω, is a market share weighted sum of each firm’s 
(industry’s) Coordination Cost, Ciz, normalized with respect to the Maximum 
Coordination Cost, Czmax .75 Average Utilized Compliance Cost represents the marginal 
or per connection coordination cost a firm faces for complying with regulation. 
 
Equation 37: Average Utilized Compliance Cost 
ߗ ൌ  ෍ ܥ௜
௭
ܥ௠௔௫௭ כ  ௜ܵ௜
 
 
                                                 
75 The normalization helps with optimization exercises that we undertake in research stage II. Since 
compliance cost is only a component of the total cost, C, the normalization scales the compliance cost 
between 0-1, thereby allowing us to compare it with other parameters used in optimization, such as 
Average Utilized Compliance, Average Utilized Innovation, etc. 
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Figure 42: Average Compliance Cost 
 
To explain the behavior of Average Utilized Compliance Cost, we compare the outcome 
of two simulations (see Figure 42). For simulations we have seen so far this paper, 
delayed regulation was used to allow the entrant to disrupt the incumbent. In such a 
scenario, as shown in Figure 42(a), the earliest the entrant could be regulated without 
posing a barrier to its entry was at the beginning of the “integration phase.” As we know, 
in the integration phase, because the industry structure becomes less modular, firms incur 
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lower coordination costs; hence, regulation after this point does not hamper firm’s ability 
to compete.  
 
Figure 42(b) simulates a different scenario to help us understand how Ω would 
have behaved before the integration phase (i.e., in the disintegration phase). In this 
simulation run, we increase the sensitivity of service’s attractiveness to innovation, εi, 
such that consumers value innovation, which is entrant’s natural strength, to a degree 
where they adopt entrant’s service regardless of its regulation (i.e., its high, regulated 
price structure). Figure 42(b) shows that the coordination cost rises in the disintegration 
phase because the structure becomes more modular, before it begins to fall in the 
integration phase. This discussion illuminates an interesting fact: the delayed regulation 
removes the regulatory barrier to entry by avoiding regulation during the period of high 
coordination costs. 
4.3.3 Stage I Results 
We will now discuss the lessons we can learn from the above analysis of the emergent 
behaviors.  
 
4.3.3.1 Tradeoffs across Periods of Disruption 
If we superimpose the emergent behaviors discussed so far (see Figure 44), we can 
summarize the tradeoffs across the different periods of disruption as in Table 15. Just to 
remind the reader, each behavior in Figure 44 is normalized with respect to their 
respective maximum value, so what interests us about them here is not their magnitude 
but their trajectory.  
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Figure 43: Tradeoffs across Disintegration and Integration - Compliance, Cost, Quality vs. 
Innovation and Competition 
 
In the pre-disruption phase, there is the desirable level of regulatory compliance as well 
as service quality, and the cost of compliance is contained. However, integrated firms 
possess high market power so competition and innovation adoption are low. The 
transition from pre-disruption to disruption period reverses this situation, which is 
undesirable. The disruption period ushers the much desired innovation and competition, 
but jeopardizes regulatory compliance as well as service quality, and raises compliance 
cost. And then again, the transition from disruption to post-disruption period reverses the 
situation, bringing back a scenario similar to the pre-disruption period. Specifically, the 
post-disruption period restores the ability to comply with regulation as well as focus on 
quality, and reduces the compliance cost due to higher control, but may do so at the cost 
of innovation and competition.  
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Table 15: Tradeoffs across the Periods of Disruptions 
 
4.3.3.2 Definition of the First Best (FB) Outcome76 
 
If we evaluate the above flip-flop of desirable and undesirable outcomes across different 
periods of disruption from the perspective of two types of regulatory objectives 
(economic and social), introduced in chapter 2, the following role emerges for the 
regulator in the modular age. From the perspective of economic objectives such as 
competition and innovation, disruption promotes both. The regulator must think of ways 
to preserve these benefits in the post-disruption period. From the perspective of social 
objectives such as law enforcement and public safety, disruption can derail them. The 
regulator must think of ways to prevent disruption from compromising them. 
Consequently, the regulator’s new role ought to be to achieve the following vital 
combination across the different periods of disruption, which we define as the first best 
(FB) outcome:  
1. The necessary regulatory compliance is achieved,  
2. The high innovation and competition are preserved, and  
3. The reasonable cost of compliance is maintained. 
 
The two arrows on Table 15 depict the undesirable effect that must be reversed to achieve 
the FB outcome. 
 
Can the FB be achieved using the currently-known policy levers such as partial 
and delayed regulation? This is the question we explore in the next research stage II.  
4.4 Research Stage II: Can the Existing Policy Levers Achieve 
FB? 
In Chapter 2 we demonstrated how little confidence regulators can have in using existing 
policy levers such as partial and delayed regulation given the dynamic complexity of the 
environment of disruption. That analysis was carried out on a model where variables 
related to technology, corporate strategy, and industry structure were exogenous. We will 
now assess the efficacy of partial and delayed regulation in a fully endogenous model. In 
other words, we will assess whether applying the existing policy levers continues to be 
futile when we test them on the system as a whole, considering the interactions within it 
as a black box. With the help of a set of optimization exercises, we will study whether 
these existing levers can be used to achieve the FB outcome.  
 
                                                 
76 The Theory of the Second Best concerns what happens when one or more optimality conditions cannot 
be satisfied in an economic model. Canadian economist Richard Lipsey and Australian-American 
economist Kelvin Lancaster showed in a 1956 paper that if one optimality condition in an economic model 
cannot be satisfied, it is possible that the next-best solution involves changing other variables away from 
the ones that are usually assumed to be optimal. Lipsey, R. G. and K. Lancaster (1956-1957). "The General 
Theory of Second Best." The Review of Economic Studies 24(11): 11-32. 
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4.4.1 Optimization I: Maximize Compliance77 
 
We start with an optimization exercise that has a simple objective function of maximizing 
Percentage Average Utilized Compliance, %Θ, 78 subject to the scope and timing of 
entrant’s regulation. Equation 38 shows the setup. 
Equation 38: Optimization I 
ܕ܉ܠ૙ஸࢆ૛כ ஸ૚
૟૙ ൑ ࢚૛ࢠ  ൑૚ૡ૙
ࢨ 
Where 
ܼଶכ is the required compliance for entrant, and ݐଶ௭ is time of entrant’s regulation79 
 
Figure 44 shows the outcome. It shows that to maximize %Θ, the optimizer regulates the 
entrant fully (required compliance is 100%) at the time of entry (at year 5). Such a 
decision does render maximum compliance since heavy and early regulation poses a 
barrier to entrant’s market entry, so incumbents continue to serve the market, and the 
compliance remains intact at the level offered by incumbents. Quality too remains at a 
level offered by the integrated incumbent. Once again, reminding us of the government-
sanctioned monopoly of the pre-AT&T breakup era. On the down side, however, 
incumbents also possess high market power, and have little competitive pressure to adopt 
innovation.  
 
                                                 
77 Powell optimization method is used here for optimization. The simulation package used, Vensim, carries 
out payoff calculation as follows. At each TIME STEP the values of all the variables are multiplied by the 
weights they have been given, and then they are multiplied by TIME STEP and added to the payoff. (The 
payoff is effectively always integrated using Euler integration.) The optimizer is designed to maximize the 
payoff, so variables for which more is better should be given positive weights and things for which less is 
better should be given negative weights. The weights should be set so that all elements are scaled to be of 
the same order of magnitude. Having done this you can adjust weights up and down to emphasize different 
aspects of the payoff. The payoff value realized is just the weighted combination of the different payoff 
elements integrated over the simulation. If you are interested in looking at the terminal values of a variable 
then in the model use the equation. 
78 The percentage values are calculated to make the parameters more intuitive. They just scale the 
parameter from 0-1 to 0-100.  
79 The time of entrant’s regulation constrained between month 60 (entrant’s market entry time) and 180 (10 
years from entrant’s market entry), just so the simulation package does not pick a value beyond the 
duration of the simulation.  
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Figure 44: Regulation at Entry Optimization - Compliance at Low Cost, but No Innovation and 
Competition (Regulation Creates Barrier to Entry) 
The next optimization exercise is designed to explore how the barrier to entry may be 
reduced to increase competition and innovation.  
 
4.4.2 Optimization II: Balance Compliance, Competition, and Innovation 
 
In this exercise, we set up an optimization to balance Percentage Average Utilized 
Compliance, %Θ, Percentage Average Utilized Market Power, %Ψ, and Percentage 
Average Utilized Innovation, %Π, subject to the scope and timing of entrant’s regulation. 
Equation 39 shows the setup. The weights for compliance and innovation (wΘ and wΠ, 
respectively) take a positive value indicating that the higher the compliance and 
innovation the better it is. The weight for market power, wΨ, takes a negative value 
indicating that the lower the market power the better it is. To indicate a bias against 
barrier to entry, high innovation is preferred more to high compliance (ݓ௽ ൐  ݓ௵), and 
low market power is preferred more to high compliance (|ݓఅ| ൐  ݓ௵). 
Equation 39: Optimization II 
ܕ܉ܠ૙ஸࢆ૛כ ஸ૚
૟૙ ൑ ࢚૛ࢠ  ൑૚ૡ૙
࢝ࢨࢨ െ  ࢝ࢸࢸ ൅  ࢝ࢰࢰ 
|ݓఅ| ൐  ݓ௵ ݓ௽ ൐  ݓ௵ 
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Figure 45: Delayed Regulation Optimization - Innovation and Competition, but less than Required 
Compliance and High Compliance Cost 
Figure 45 shows the outcome. It shows that to balance compliance with innovation and 
competition, the optimizer chooses delayed regulation. In this simulation, the entrant 
enters at year 5 and is regulated at year 8. Entrant is regulated as soon as it matures 
sufficiently to disrupt the incumbent and no later. The regulation may delay disruption 
(see line 2) but does not pose a barrier to entry. During the disintegration, the competition 
(see line 3) and innovation (see line 4) show a gain, which is desirable. However, there 
are also undesirable effects. First, compliance (see line 5) drops below the required level. 
Next, the rising coordination cost in the disintegration phase (see line 6) may lower the 
achievable compliance and pose a barrier to entry for late entrants. Finally, the benefits of 
high innovation and competition, gained during distintegration, are lost in the integration 
phase.  
 
This optimization exercise demonstrates that when looking at the whole system 
(i.e., in a fully endogenous model), delayed regulation may, in theory, help balance 
compliance with innovation and competition, but the coordination cost continue to be an 
issue. Also, delayed regulation does not overcome the drawback of the integration phase 
(i.e., the competition and innovation continue to drop in the post-disruption period).  
 
The next optimization exercise is designed to explore how the coordination cost 
can be lowered without losing innovation and competition in the disintegration phase. 
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4.4.3 Optimization III: Balance Compliance Cost, Innovation, and 
Competition 
 
In this exercise, we set up an optimization to balance Percentage Average Utilized 
Normalized Compliance Cost, %Ω, Percentage Average Utilized Market Power, %Ψ, and 
Percentage Average Utilized Innovation, %Π, subject to the scope and timing of entrant’s 
regulation. Equation 40 shows the setup. The weight for compliance cost, wΩ, takes a 
negative value indicating that the lower the coordination cost the better it is. In this 
optimization, equal preference is given to compliance cost, innovation, and market power 
(|ݓఆ| ൌ  ݓ௽ ൌ |ݓఅ|). 
Equation 40: Optimization III 
ܕ܉ܠ૙ஸࢆ૛כ ஸ૚
૟૙ ൑ ࢚૛ࢠ  ൑૚ૡ૙
࢝ࢰࢰ െ ࢝ࢸࢸ െ  ࢝ࢹࢹ 
|ݓఆ| ൌ  ݓ௽ ൌ |ݓఅ| 
 
Figure 46 shows the outcome. It shows that to balance compliance with innovation and 
competition, the optimizer chooses partial regulation. In fact, it leaves the entrant 
unregulated, using the extreme form of partial regulation. The entrant enters at year 5, 
and since it is not regulated (i.e., no barrier to entry), it goes on to disrupt the incumbent 
(see line 2). During the disintegration phase, the competition (see line 3) and innovation 
(see line 4) retain the desirable gain from optimization exercise II. The coordination cost 
falls with disruption, since the disrupting entrant is not regulated, so has no need to 
coordinate for regulatory compliance. Unfortunately, however, as the entrant is left 
unregulated, there is a complete loss of compliance (see line 5). Also, the benefits of high 
innovation and competition continue to be lost in the integration phase.  
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Figure 46: Partial Regulation - Low Cost, and High Innovation, Competition, but Little Compliance 
This optimization exercise demonstrates that when looking at the whole system, partial 
regulation may, in theory, help balance compliance cost with innovation and competition, 
but does so at the cost of compliance itself. And similar to delayed regulation, partial 
regulation too does not overcome the drawbacks of the post-disruption period.  
 
The next and final optimization exercise is designed to explore what level and 
timing of regulation offers the best balance of all four emergent behaviors – compliance, 
innovation, competition, and compliance cost. 
 
4.4.4 Optimization IV: Balance Compliance, Innovation, Competition, and 
Compliance Cost 
 
In this final exercise, we set up an optimization to balance Percentage Average Utilized 
Compliance, %Θ, Percentage Average Utilized Market Power, %Ψ, and Percentage 
Average Utilized Innovation, %Π, and Percentage Average Utilized Normalized 
Compliance Cost, %Ω, subject to the scope and timing of entrant’s regulation. Equation 
41 shows the setup. The weights for the objective function are set similar to that in 
optimizations II and III.  
Equation 41: Optimization IV 
ܕ܉ܠ૙ஸࢆ૛כ ஸ૚
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ݓ௵  ൏ |ݓఆ| ൌ  ݓ௽ ൌ |ݓఅ| 
 
Figure 47 shows the outcome. It shows that to balance high compliance, with high 
innovation as well as competition, but low compliance cost, the optimizer chooses to do 
both partial and delayed regulation of the entrant. As a result, the entrant enters at year 5 
and disrupts the incumbent (see line 2). Competition (see line 3) and innovation (see line 
4) rise during the disintegration phase of disruption period. The coordination cost falls 
with disruption, since the disrupting entrant is not regulated at the market entry, but 
shoots up as soon as it is regulated. Since delayed regulation occurs with the onset of the 
integration phase, the coordination costs steadily fall to their minimum level (see line 6). 
The compliance level continues to drop below the required level in the disintegration 
phase (see line 5), but recovers in the integration phase. Finally, as seen before, the 
benefits of high innovation and competition continue to be lost in the integration phase.  
 
 
Figure 47: Partial and Delayed Regulation Optimization - Required Compliance, Innovation and 
Competition, but High Cost 
This optimization exercise demonstrates that when looking at the whole system, partial 
regulation and delayed regulation still render lower than required compliance, and do not 
remedy the post-disruption loss of innovation and competition.  
4.4.5 Stage II Results 
4.4.5.1 Existing Policy Levers Cannot Achieve the FB 
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Together, optimization exercises II, III, and IV show that existing policy levers – partial 
and delayed regulation – cannot attain the FB outcome. They may achieve high 
innovation and competition while containing the coordination cost, but the necessary 
level of compliance cannot be ensured, and vice versa. More importantly, the existing 
policy levers offer no remedy for the post-disruption tradeoffs. Through the integration 
phase, the entrants consolidate to become the new incumbents. The consolidation of the 
industry may reduce the effort to build consensus necessary for regulatory compliance, 
but the benefits of the high level of competition and innovation are lost.  
 
Hence the second stage of research above concludes that the existing arrows in 
the regulatory quiver are blunt. They alone cannot achieve the desired outcome. In 
chapter 2, we demonstrated how difficult it is to implement partial or delayed regulation. 
We have now shown that they are also inadequate for achieving the FB outcome.  
 
Despite the disappointing conclusion above, the above analysis does illuminate 
the theoretical conditions that must be met if the compliance, innovation, competition, 
and cost had to be balanced.  
 
4.4.5.2 Conditions for balancing Compliance, Competition, Innovation, and Cost 
 
From the outcome of the optimization exercises, we can derive conditions for balancing 
compliance, competition, innovation, and cost. In going from optimization I to II, we 
learned that if compliance, innovation and competition had to be balanced, the modular 
entrants who are innovative must be allowed to enter, so that either they disrupts the 
incumbents, or they create the competitive pressure for the incumbents to consider 
destructing their less innovative services creatively. 
 
 Next, through optimization II, and III we learned that if we had to avoid partial 
and delayed regulation and still allow weaker entrants to disrupt, the modular structure 
must have the ability to comply with regulation at a low cost. If that is not the case, the 
resulting compliance turns out to be far less than required, or the high coordination cost 
acts as an entry barrier for entrants.  
 
 Finally, through optimization II, III, and IV, we learned that the advantages of 
disruption, such as high competition and innovation, must be preserved in the post-
disruption period. If the industry remains modular, there will be higher competition and 
innovation even in the post-disruption period.  
 
 In summary, the conditions for achieving the desired balance between 
compliance, competition, innovation and cost (i.e. the FB outcome) are as follows:  
1. The modular structure must enter and create competitive pressure,  
2. The modular structure must have the ability to comply with regulations at low 
cost, and  
3. The modular structure must remain modular in the post-disruption period. 
 
The policy analysis in the third stage of research explores which new policy levers must 
be pulled to achieve such an outcome.   
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4.6 Research Stage III: Can any Unexplored Policy Levers 
Achieve the FB? 
Through the stage II of research, we learned that existing policy levers do not work for 
achieving the FB. In stage III of research, we investigate whether there are a set of policy 
levers not yet explored by the regulators that may achieve the desired combination. For 
this investigation, we use Policy Sensitivity Analysis on the systems model. The idea 
behind policy sensitivity analysis is to ask whether changing assumptions makes certain 
policies more or less desirable.80  
4.6.1 Two New Policy Levers that Theoretically Solve the Regulatory 
Puzzle 
 
Our policy sensitivity analysis, detailed in Appendix D, yields two high-leverage policy 
levers that might achieve the FB. These levers are: (1) limiting significant market power 
(SMP) accumulation and (2) building broad-based consensus around regulatory issues in 
a modular industry structure. The first policy lever remains under emphasized by the US 
Telecommunications Regulators, 81 and second one is virtually absent from policy 
debates. Figure 48 is an abstraction explaining the causal structure behind why the two 
policy levers might work. After explaining the causal structure, we will discuss test 
results, demonstrating that the policy levers do work. 
                                                 
80 Precisely, “sensitivity analysis asks whether [our] conclusions change in ways important to [our] purpose 
when assumptions are varied over the plausible range of uncertainty.” Further, “Policy analysis exists when 
a change in assumptions reverses the impacts or desirability of a proposed policy.” (p. 883 of Sterman, J. 
(c2000). Business dynamics: systems thinking and modeling for a complex world. Boston, Irwin/McGraw-
Hill. 
 ) 
81 Limiting market power has always been a major thrust since the creation of the FCC in 1934, but, in the 
United States, interconnection regulations remains the main mechanism for limiting market power, which is 
far narrower than what we will discuss in the conclusion section of this paper. 
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Figure 48: Causal structure explaining the logic behind the two policy levers 
 
Competition and Pressure to Innovate 
When a firm gains more market share (bottom center of Figure 48) its market power 
increases. As firms gain market power the industry becomes less competitive. As 
competition reduces, firms are under less pressure to innovate, which reduces innovation 
adoption. However, a firm adopting less innovation also struggles to keep the market 
share, assuming there is still competition in the market. This is a balancing structure that 
explains how an increase in a firm’s market share leads to less innovation, which in turn 
limits the market share itself (see the Competition and Pressure to Innovate Loop, B1). 
Such a causal structure exists as long as there is competition in the market, and ensures 
there is innovation adoption in the presence of competition.  
 
Capacity to Innovate 
Once again starting with market share; as firms gain market share and market power, they 
have the incentive to increase scope by integrating new products, and to amass scale by 
mergers and acquisitions. Both of these activities lead to further industry consolidation. 
As the industry consolidates the industry structure becomes less modular, on average. 
Less modular structures have lower capacity to innovate because fewer interfaces are 
standardized, so module level innovation is tougher, and integration increases the 
dimensional complexity, so those in control of it too struggle to introduce innovations. 
Such reduction in innovation capacity stifles the innovation adoption, hence adversely 
affecting the firm’s market share. This too is a balancing structure (see Capacity to 
Innovate Loop, B2), that explains how increase in market share could lead to 
consolidation of the industry structure and hence the loss of capacity to innovate, thereby 
limiting the market share itself. There is never a complete loss of innovation capacity, not 
even when the industry structure fully integrates. However, structures B1 and B2 together 
explain that ultimate innovation adoption depends upon not just the capacity to innovate, 
but also the extant pressure to adopt them.     
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Ability to Comply and Coordination Cost 
We saw above that an increase in firm-level market share ultimately results in the 
reduction of the modularity of the industry structure. With reduced modularity, firms 
need lower coordination, as they have less dependence on other firms, on average, when 
complying with regulation.  The reduction in coordination necessary for regulatory 
compliance lowers the compliance cost and enables firms to achieve higher compliance. 
Further, as lower compliance cost lowers the price, the firm’s service becomes more 
attractive and gains market share, forming a reinforcing structure (see Ability to Comply 
and Coordination Cost Loop, R1). This structure explains how increase in market share 
leads to more industry consolidation, which gives each firm more control to comply with 
regulation, and lowers their coordination cost, thereby reducing price and increasing the 
market share even further. When the market share reduces, the cycle reverses, taking us 
to the other end of the spectrum – modular industry structure, high coordination cost, and 
low achievable compliance. Of course, as discussed in chapter 2, even in a fully modular 
industry, some compliance is still achievable, but the level achievable may be far lower 
than required, and the cost and time required to achieve it may be inordinate.  
 
Together, the three structures undergird the tradeoffs discussed in Table 15. An increase 
in industry modularity has the desirable effect of higher competition and innovation 
adoption, but the undesirable effect of lower compliance and higher coordination cost. 
Conversely, a decrease in industry modularity has the desirable effect of higher 
compliance at a lower compliance cost, but has the undesirable loss of competition and 
innovation.  
 
Policy Levers 
At the end of Research Stage II discussion, we setout three conditions for compliance, 
competition, innovation, and compliance cost. We can now use the above causal structure 
to identify policy levers that can help us meet the three conditions. We start with the third 
condition, which states that to balance the four attributes, “the modular structure must 
remain modular in the post-disruption period.” Modularity is lost in the post-disruption 
period because modular firms gain market power and begin to consolidate. Policy lever 1, 
Limiting Significant Market Power (SMP) Accumulation, in a single firm or a collection 
of them, can keep the industry structure modular in the post-disruption period, and 
thereby minimize the undesirable loss of competition and innovation.  The idea is that if 
regulation can limit the rapid and automatic translation of firm’s market power into 
industry consolidation, the market would remain competitive with pressure to adopt 
innovation, and the modular structure will preserve the high capacity to innovate.  
 
However, limiting SMP accumulation alone cannot be the solution to achieving 
the FB because keeping modularity high results in lower compliance because of high 
coordination cost. Hence, as stated in condition two, “the modular structure must have the 
ability to comply with regulations at low cost.” If this can be achieved, we can also meet 
condition one (“the modular structure must enter and create competitive pressure”) 
without using existing policy levers such as partial or delayed regulation, since both 
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policies are aimed at lowering or delaying the impact of compliance cost. This discussion 
suggests that we must find another policy lever that achieves high compliance at low cost 
despite high modularity. Policy lever 2, Building Broad-based Consensus around 
regulatory issues, achieves this outcome.  
 
Modular industries lose the ability to achieve high regulatory compliance because they 
lack consensus around regulatory issues. The lack of consensus imposes a high 
coordination cost, thereby lowering the achievable compliance. The idea behind policy 
lever 2 is that if regulators can build consensus among stakeholders around meeting 
critical regulatory objectives, the effort required for individual firms to build consensus 
for regulatory purposes reduces, thereby reducing their coordination cost and increasing 
their ability to comply with regulation. In the conclusion section, we will elaborate upon 
the ways to build consensus.  
 
The above discussion shows that if both policy levers 1 and 2 are pulled the desired 
outcome (FB) may be achievable. We will now test on the systems model whether the 
two policy levers indeed work.  
4.6.2 Stage III Results 
4.6.2.1 Policy Lever 1: Limiting Significant Market Power 
 
Figure 50-Figure 52 show the use of policy lever 1 with the aim of keeping the industry 
structure modular in the post-disruption period. Each figure shows outputs of three 
simulation runs, each with a different limit on SMP accumulation. Also, in each figure, 
sets of lines 4-5, 6-7, and 8-9 depict incumbent-entrant market share for the three 
simulations, and lines 1-3 show the parameter of interest.   
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Figure 49 shows how imposing higher limits on SMP accumulation renders increasingly 
modular industry structure in the post-disruption period. It shows how policy lever 1 
achieves condition three of keeping the industry structure modular in the post-regulation 
period.  
 
Figure 49: High Modularity under Limited Market Power in Post-disruption Period 
 
We can now ask if the higher modularity in post-disruption period indeed yield higher 
competition and innovation.   
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Figure 50 shows that, as expected, imposing higher limits on SMP accumulation does 
render lower market power (i.e., higher competition) in the post-disruption period. 
 
 
 
Figure 50: High Competition under Limited Market Power in Post-disruption 
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Similarly, as shown in Figure 51, imposing higher limits on SMP accumulation does 
render high innovation in the post-disruption period. 
 
 
Figure 51: High Innovation under Limited Market Power in Post-disruption Period 
 
Figure 50 and Figure 51 show that policy lever 1 facilitates achieving the innovation and 
competition portion of the FB outcome.  As argued with the causal structure, however, 
policy lever 1 alone may not be sufficient for achieving the FB, since the increased 
modularity of the post-disruption period might lower compliance level and raise 
compliance cost. Figure 51 confirms this insight.  
  
Figure 51(a) shows how imposing higher limits on SMP accumulation renders lower 
compliance in the post-disruption period. And Figure 51(b) shows how imposing higher 
limits on SMP accumulation renders high compliance cost in the post-disruption period. 
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(a) 
Compliance 
 
(b) 
Coordination 
Cost 
Figure 52: Lower Compliance and Higher Coordination Cost with Limiting Market Power in Post-
disruption Period 
The illustrations above confirm that limiting SMP accumulation increases competition 
and innovation, but exacerbates the loss of compliance and disproportionate 
coordination cost issues. Therefore, policy lever 1 alone is not sufficient for achieving 
the FB, from the systems perspective. We will not investigate what happens when policy 
levers 1 and 2 are combined. 
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4.6.2.2 Policy Lever 2: Building Broad-based Consensus 
 
Figure 55-Figure 56 show the use of policy lever 1 and 2 with the aim of enabling 
modular structure to have the ability to comply with regulations at low cost. Each figure 
shows outputs of four simulation runs, each with a different relation ship between 
modularity and effort necessary to build consensus. Similar to the previous section, in 
each figure, sets of lines 5-6 and 7-8 depict incumbent-entrant market share for 
simulations 1 and 4, respectively. Lines 1-4 show the parameter of interest.   
 
In the four simulations used, building consensus gets increasingly easy. In other words, in 
simulation 1, effort necessary to build consensus is positive and very convex in 
increasing modularity; meaning, the effort required to build consensus is low when the 
structure is integral, but increases exponentially with modularity. Highly modular 
structures required a very high effort to build consensus. Simulation 2, the relationship is 
less convex. In simulation 3, an increase in effort necessary to build consensus increases 
proportional to the modularity of industry structure and the effort necessary at any point 
is less than that in simulations 1 and 2. Finally, in simulation 4, the relationship between 
the two is convex. So, some structural intervention such as building broad-based 
consensus around regulatory issues, as suggested in policy lever 2, helps contain the 
effort required to build consensus.   
 
 
Figure 53: Relationship between Modularity of the Industry Structure and the Effort Necessary to 
Build Consensus 
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Figure 54 shows how building broad-based consensus around regulatory issues at 
increasingly high levels restores the modular structure’s ability comply with regulation. 
Here, line 1 pertains to lowest consensus (i.e., maximum effort necessary to build 
consensus) and line 4 pertains to highest consensus.  
 
 
Figure 54: Higher Compliance under High Broad-based Consensus 
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Figure 55 shows how building broad-based consensus around regulatory issues at 
increasingly high levels reduces the compliance cost (coordination cost) in a modular 
structure. Here, line 1 pertains to lowest consensus, so maximum coordination cost, and 
line 4 pertains to highest consensus, so lowest coordination cost.  
 
 
Figure 55: Lower Compliance Cost under High Broad-based Consensus 
 
Together, Figure 54 and Figure 55 illustrate that pulling policy levers 1 and 2 meet 
condition two of increasing the ability of a modular structure to comply with regulation at 
low cost.  
 
We must now ensure that the high competition and innovation benefits in the 
post-disruption period, obtained previously by policy lever 1 in the previously, are not 
lost when policy levers 1 and 2 both are pulled.  
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Figure 56 (a) and (b) show that pulling both policy levers 1 and 2, does not disturb the 
high competition and innovation, respectively, that by pulling policy lever 1 alone.  
 
 
(a) 
Market 
Power 
 
(b) 
Innovation
Figure 56: But the Innovation remains high and the market power remains low  
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The illustrations above confirm that the regulator both limits the accumulation of SMP 
and builds broad-based consensus in modular structure, the FB outcome to balance 
compliance, competition, innovation, and compliance cost can be achieved. We are now 
left with checking if the condition one, “the modular structure must enter and create 
competitive pressure,” can be achieved without using partial and delayed regulation. 
An experiment in Figure 57 shows that since the coordination costs that acted as a barrier 
to entry are lowered by consensus building; when the policy levers 1 and 2 are pulled 
together, the FB can be achieved even without having to use partial or delayed 
regulation. The outcome, where the entrant is fully regulated upon entry, is shown in 
Figure 57. 
 
 
Figure 57: Policy Levers 1 and 2 can also Eliminate Incremental Regulation 
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4.7 Conclusion 
We began this paper with the following broad question: How can a desired balance of 
regulation, innovation, competition, and cost be achieved in the modular age of the 
Internet? The question arose from an observation that the onset of the modular age 
naturally promotes economic objectives such as competition and innovation, but derails 
social ones such as law enforcement capability and public safety. Below are conclusions 
we can draw from the journey we have taken through the three research stages. 
4.7.1 The Regulator’s New Role in the Modular Age: Balance Compliance, 
Innovation, Competition, and Compliance Cost 
The first stage of research began with a question: What should be the regulators role in a 
system where a modular age disrupts an integral one? To answer this question, we 
systematically studied emergent behavior in the systems model over three periods of 
disruption: pre-disruption, disruption, and post-disruption period.  
 
The results showed that in each period of disruption, there are desirable and undesirable 
outcomes; also that transition from one period to the next reverses the tradeoffs. 
Evaluating this flip-flop of desirable and undesirable outcomes across different periods of 
disruption from the lens of two types of regulatory objectives (economic and social) 
illuminated that the regulator’s new role ought to be to achieve the following vital 
combination across the different periods of disruption, which we define as the first best 
(FB) outcome:  
1. The necessary regulatory compliance is achieved,  
2. The high innovation and competition are preserved, and  
3. The reasonable cost of compliance is maintained. 
 
4.7.2 Existing Policy Levers are Inadequate for Achieving the FB Outcome 
Defining the FB outcome motivated the question for the second stage of research: 
Whether the FB can be achieved using the currently-known policy levers such as partial 
and delayed regulation? For this investigation, we subjected the model to a set of 
optimization exercises.  
 
The optimization exercises showed that existing policy levers cannot attain the FB 
outcome. In a sequential analysis, described below, it showed that even when both partial 
and delayed regulation are deployed, they may only achieve high innovation and 
competition while containing the coordination cost, but the necessary level of compliance 
cannot be ensured, and vice versa. Also, that the existing policies do not remedy the loss 
of innovation and competition in the post-disruption period. Hence the second stage of 
research concluded that the existing arrows in the regulatory quiver are blunt. They alone 
cannot achieve the desired outcome. 
 
If regulatory compliance was all we cared about as a society, there would be no 
need to allow any other technology such as wireless, VoIP, or others to enter the market. 
PSTN is highly compliant with regulation and can do so at a cost structure that the firms 
and regulators have learned to deal with. However, since competition and innovation in 
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communications industry is critical to stay ahead of competition, particularly in a rapidly 
globalizing world, regulation must not act as a barrier to entry for innovative 
technologies. The intuitive solution for letting innovative technologies enter is to delay 
their regulation. Delayed regulation of innovative technology increases competition and 
innovation in the short term, but compromises regulatory compliance in the long term. 
Such is the case with delayed regulation of either wireless technology or VoIP. The 
rationale behind delayed regulation is to not burden a nascent firm with heavy 
compliance cost until the firm matures. Partial regulation of a nascent industry is another 
way to abate the initial compliance cost. Partial regulation provides the desired short term 
benefit of removing the entry barrier, but it renders even lower compliance, exacerbating 
innovation-compliance tradeoff further in the long run.  
 
Classic works on systems have acknowledged that “social systems usually exhibit 
fundamental conflict between the short-term and long-term consequences of a policy 
change.”(Forrester 1969; Forrester 1973). In fact, these works go as far as to observe that, 
“a social system draws attention to the very points at which an attempt to intervene will 
fail.” Choosing existing policy levers such as partial or delayed regulation exemplify 
these observations.  
4.7.3 Three Conditions for Achieving the FB Outcome 
Through the optimization exercises, we understood that the conditions for achieving the 
desired balance between compliance, competition, innovation and cost (i.e. the FB 
outcome) are as follows:  
1. The modular structure must enter and create competitive pressure,  
2. The modular structure must have the ability to comply with regulations at low 
cost, and  
3. The modular structure must remain modular in the post-disruption period. 
 
The first condition recognizes the fundamental urge to keep the market competitive and 
innovative that has been recognized ever since the formation of the FCC, and accentuated 
with the decision to leave  the Internet (“information service”) unregulated in the 1996 
Telecommunications Act. The Acts of 1934 and 1996, however, were focused on market 
entry from the perspective of curbing the exploitation of monopolistic power. The 
concerns about market entry from the perspective of regulation posing entry barriers has 
also been around for a long time, but the regulator’s position on this issue has changed 
radically. All the way until the breakup of AT&T, the regulators considered 
telecommunications a “natural monopoly,” and devised entry restrictions to protect the 
monopoly. With the Internet, the regulatory sentiments are polar opposite. As stated in 
IP-Enabled Services NPRM of 2004, with Internet-based services, the regulatory 
sentiment is to “facilitate transudation to IP-enabled services.” The first condition agrees 
with this sentiment of allowing market entry, but it does not agree with existing policy 
levers such as partial and delayed regulation for doing so. 
 
Meeting the second condition of achieving high compliance at a low cost has 
fundamental difficulties in a modular structure. As conjectured by this research, 
increasing modularity can sharply increase the effort necessary to build consensus. The 
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exact nature of the relationships between modularity and the time to build consensus or 
coordination cost are not well understood; still, a very long time to build consensus as 
well as a very high coordination cost for doing so in a highly modular industry may 
inferred from the many historical cases where modular industries have fought long-drawn 
battles over developing common standards.82 The case research in chapter 2 has 
                                                 
82 Regulators could look to historical cases in different industries, where a modular,  hourglass-like 
architecture offered burgeoning growth, but led to long drawn battles over standard setting. Produced 
below are some examples of showing how time consuming and costly can the standard setting in a modular 
industry be.   
 
From to be published draft payer by the author of the present research Vaishnav, C. (2009). The Internet: A 
Case of How Government's Involvement and Exit Influences Global Standards. Cambridge, MA. 
  
As David Hounshell showed in his brilliant historical work, From the American system to mass production, 
1800-1932 : the development of manufacturing technology in the United States , a great example of 
hourglass-like standardization at the center is the grain market in Chicago in mid 1800s. The new system of 
grain trade was a case of standardization at the center with the farms producing a variety of grains on one 
side, and the markets in Chicago selling them on the other. Just like the Internet hourglass separated the 
applications from the networks, standardization in grain trade abstracted the nature from the market, and 
transformed the level of productivity and creativity on both sides.  
 
Despite these advantages, by the late 1860s there were widespread agitation throughout Illinois for 
legislation to regulate what many farmers and merchants regarded as a long list of abuses in the Chicago 
marketplace. Central to the dispute was the new grading system that affected both farmers and traders. Both 
doubted the honesty of a small number of grain elevator operators who mixed the grains and hence 
determined the profits and losses of both the parties. Also, the “elevator monopoly” made legal agreement 
with railroad operators to segment Chicago’s grain handling market geographically. The dispute lasted until 
early 1970s, when the state intervened, and “Article 13 and Warehouse Act addressed each of the problems 
that had so concerned farmers, grain traders, and other elevator critics during the 1860s: grading, 
inspection, mixing, counterfeit receipts, public grain supply statistics, and the monopoly linkage between 
railroads and elevators.”  
 
The second example of hourglass-like standardization at the center is the standardization of 
shipping containers in the mid 1900s. The aluminum shipping containers were introduced in America in 
1956. The advent of containers was a case of standardization at the center, with suppliers of products and 
raw materials on one side and buyers on the other. As pointed out by Mark Levinson in his business history 
book, The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World Smaller And The World Economy Bigger, the 
introduction of shipping container transformed markets on both the supply and demand side.  
 
The standardization of shipping containers was also very contentious and required government 
intervention to forge consensus among the various stakeholders nationally and internationally. By the late 
1950s, the transportation world was using containers, but the “container” meant very different things to 
different people. This diversity threatened the large-scale adoption of containerization, since if one 
transportation company’s containers did not fit other’s ships, trucks, or railroads, they will have to maintain 
a fleet of many different containers. 
 
 In the United States, the United States Maritime Administration (Marad) decided in 1958 to put an 
end to this anarchy. Private competition to Marad’s efforts came from the American Standards Association 
(ASA). After a few years of standards war, in 1961, at American urging, the International Standards 
Organization (ISO), which then had thirty-seven nations as members, agreed to study containers. The ISO 
project was meant to establish worldwide guidelines before firms made large financial commitments. By 
1970s, the ISO was prepared to publish the first full draft of its “painstakingly negotiated” standards, “the 
bitter battles among competing economic interests were finally winding down.” 
    
166 
 
reinforced the conjecture by showing how the nature of consensus is changing as the 
modular services disrupt the integrated ones. Thus, meeting the second condition is about 
fundamentally changing the relationship between modularity and the time and 
coordination cost of complying with regulation.  
 
The third condition of keeping the industry structure modular in the post-
disruption period rests upon how easily can firms gain and abuse market power.  The 
American attitude to large corporations has always been somewhat ambivalent – we 
worry about the power that large corporations wield, and yet at the same time we 
appreciate the potential benefits associated with the economies of scale and scope that 
they command.  Also, antitrust regulation in the US evaluates mergers only from the 
viewpoint of horizontal concentration within one industry, and not from the perspective 
of collective market power across multiple upstream and downstream industries. The 
flexibility offered by the modular age provides a fertile ground for firms to abuse market 
power in the environment of such narrow and ambivalent regulatory thinking. Thus, 
meeting the third condition requires fundamental changes to the antitrust regulation in 
America.  
 
Meeting all three conditions simultaneously also has interesting issues. We have 
noted in this paper earlier that because of the structure of cause and effects, there is a 
fundamental tradeoff between conditions 1 (competition and innovation) and 2 
(compliance and cost) in each period of disruption. Where compliance and costs are high 
competition and market power are low, and vice versa. Resolving these tradeoffs requires 
reversing some of the structural influences.  
 
4.7.4 Two Unexplored Policy Levers—Limiting Significant Market Power 
and Building Broad-based Consensus—can Achieve the FB Outcome  
The failure of existing policies in meeting the FB motivated the question for the third 
stage of research: Are there policy levers that are capable of achieving the desired 
balance, but that have not been exploited by the policymakers yet? To investigate this 
question, we carry out Policy Sensitivity Analysis on the systems model, which looked 
for policies that satisfy the three conditions for achieving the FB outcome above in the 
previous section. 
 
 The policy sensitivity analysis showed that a combination of two policy levers – 
Limiting SMP Accumulation and Building Broad-based Consensus around Regulatory 
Issues – can achieve the desired FB combination of high regulatory compliance, with 
high innovation and competition, but at low cost,.  
 
Both policies are construed broadly. As for the first policy of limiting SMP 
accumulation; in the United States, antitrust regulations are used to curtail the 
accumulation of SMP. The antitrust concerns sometimes arise as a result of the conduct 
of a single firm, not because it possesses market power, but when it abuses it. When 
multiple firms are involved in a merger, one of two agencies – either the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), or the Department of Justice (DoJ) – takes the lead in investigating 
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any merger (Marcus 2002). The DoJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines sets forth the 
methodology that these enforcement agencies will apply in analyzing horizontal mergers 
(mergers between participants in the same industry).83  These guidelines provide a 
methodology that is purely economic. For example, a shorthand tool that is often used to 
assess the impact of a prospective merger is the Herfindal-Hirschman Index (HHI).   
“The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the individual market shares of all the 
participants.”84  In a perfectly monopolized market, the HHI would be 10,000; in a 
market with a vast number of tiny competitors, it would approach zero.  The HHI is thus 
a measure of relative concentration.  In a highly concentrated market (HHI greater than 
1,800 after a merger), a merger that results in an increase in the HHI of 100 or more is 
felt ceteris paribus to “potentially raise significant competitive concerns”85. 
 
The spirit of Policy Lever 1 as construed by us is far broader. First, from the 
economic perspective, we construe limiting SMP as limiting market power horizontally 
(in the same industry), vertically (in upstream and downstream markets), and collectively 
(through various agreements across industries). Our thinking here is similar to that in the 
New Regulatory Framework for ICT under the European Union (EU), which states that, 
“[a]n undertaking shall be deemed to have significant market power if, either individually 
or jointly with others, it enjoys a position equivalent to dominance, that is to say a 
position of economic strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers.” 86 As observed by 
Marcus when comparing the EU-US frameworks, this “concept of collective dominance 
has become well established in European case law, [but]  by contrast, collective 
dominance is rarely raised as a concern in the U.S. unless there is actual evidence of 
collusion.” (Marcus 2002) 
 
Further, we advise regulators to evaluate SMP accumulation from the 
technological perspective, too. An evaluation of SMP from the technology perspective is 
critical for successfully managing the dynamic complexity of the Internet age. From the 
technology perspective, the SMP accumulation may be assessed by understanding how 
the accumulation of market power, in a single firm or a collection of them, results in 
standardized or proprietary nature of the product interfaces. A measure as quantitative as 
market share, used for the economic perspective, does not exist today to quantify the 
standardized or proprietary nature of service or product interfaces. Therefore, such an 
assessment will have to rely on independent expert judgment, at least initially. 87  
 
                                                 
83 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 
41557 (April 2, 1992, as revised April 8, 1997), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm. 
84 Ibid. §1.5, “Concentration and Market Shares”. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Per Article 14, at 2, of the Directive 2002/20.EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 
March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services 
(Framework Directive), Official Journal of the European Communities, L 108, April 24, 2002. 
87 Effectively factoring in unbiased expert opinion in scientific or technological matter itself has been a 
conundrum for courts and agencies alike; however, despite the difficulties of doing so, such an 
understanding of interface standardization is important for preserving the highly innovative nature of the 
modular age.   
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As for the second policy lever of building broad-based consensus around regulatory 
issues; excepting a few very recent recommendations in the wireless spectrum allocation 
space (Bykowsky, Olson et al. 2008) that shift the FCC’s position from merely 
adversarial to more cognizant of the highly competitive dynamics of the wireless market, 
much of FCC’s enforcement has used command-and control as its primary mechanism.  
So a recommendation to build broad-based consensus may be received by regulators as 
counter-intuitive to the current thinking at the FCC. 
 
Broad-based consensus is generally built in two ways: by bringing all 
stakeholders to the negotiation table, or via the process of standards. The FCC, today, is 
hesitant to participate in Internet standards work actively.88 Also, they have not actively 
negotiated with players across the entire value chain the possibility of developing 
standard-based approaches to meeting the regulatory needs.  
   
Following up on the recommendation of building broad-based consensus will 
require a radical change in the way the enforcement bureau works. It will require the 
enforcement bureau to acquire a whole new set of capabilities and processes. The 
bureau’s enforcement paradigm has been command-and-control, which only uses fines 
and punishment as the enforcement mechanisms. Till now, the enforcement bureau has 
never included negotiators who systematically build consensus among diverse interests, 
nor have they participated in standard body meetings. To be able to follow upon on 
policy lever 2, it may need to acquire both of these skills.  
4.8 From Animal Trainer to a Wildlife Conservationist 
Metaphorically, we began this research in chapter 2 by arguing that the modular age has 
transformed the regulator’s role from that of a shepherd herding sheep to one trying to 
control cats.  This chapter suggests ways by which the regulator can hope to control cats. 
By way of the remedies suggested in this chapter, we argue that in the modular age, the 
role of the regulatory agency has gone from that of an animal trainer to a wildlife 
conservationist. The animal trainer cared only about compliance, but the wildlife 
conservationist cares also cares about the survival of species (biodiversity). The trainer, 
like a policeman, curtailed unwanted activity, whereas the conservationist, like a parent, 
is interest in a balance, where animals are playful but also grow into responsible citizens 
of the jungle. 
  
                                                 
88 Such a bias can be deduced from comments such as the following: “I want to participate in IETF, at least 
once a year, but there is no recognition that standards work is connected to public safety,” Richard Hovey, 
FCC Engineer, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureu, FCC. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion, Limitations, and Future Work 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
It is time now to draw the threads of discussion that was led in the three preceding 
chapters together. The fundamental premise behind the inquiry in these chapters was that 
as the modular age created by the Internet disrupts the integral age of the past, it is posing 
discontinuities in technology architecture, industry structure, and the environment of 
firms and consumers. So what should be the role of telecommunications regulators in this 
environment, and how can they fulfill it? 
 
 Asking such a question may seem to accept regulator’s involvement in how 
Internet-based services develop. This research does take such a position. Voice 
communications market has traditionally endured regulation because of the fear of 
various market or institutional failures. Apprehensions about market failure arise from the 
fear of imperfect competition as firms exploit scale and direct network effect; whereas 
those about institutional failure arise because of the lack of collective action that may 
exclude marginalized populations from receiving affordable service. While the Internet 
may alleviate competition concerns, it introduces several new modes of possible market 
and institutional failures. The modular architecture of the Internet introduces 
unprecedented coordination issues among parties that provision the different functions of 
an end-to-end service. Such issues are apparent in complying with emergency service or 
lawful intercepts over the Internet. Additionally, the flexibility offered by the Internet 
architecture renders unstable the property rights, making it difficult to determine who 
should be responsible for such regulations. Finally, the Internet’s separation of 
application/service from infrastructure exacerbates the free rider problem, as services can 
now be offered without owning any infrastructure. Thus, despite all its shortcomings the 
regulatory involvement in how Internet-based services develop seems inevitable.   
  
 Taking a case of voice communications regulation in the United States, this 
dissertation has shown what the regulator should discontinue, how can regulators and 
managers anticipate uncertainty in the modular age, what should be the new role of the 
telecommunications regulator, and how can they fulfill it. Summarized below are the 
findings.  
5.1.1 What Does Not Work: The Existing Arrows in Regulatory Quiver are 
Blunt 
 
Chapter 2 analyzed the appropriateness of present telecommunications regulation along 
three dimensions: the objectives it serves, the obligations it imposes to fulfill those 
objectives, and the enforcement mechanisms it uses to enforce those obligations. This 
three-part framework provides more comprehensive evaluation of regulation, as using 
any one dimension involves tradeoffs. Focusing solely on objectives eases legitimating 
policy but makes assigning responsibility difficult; focusing on obligations eases 
assigning responsibility but makes legitimating policy difficult; and focusing on 
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enforcement mechanisms makes a policy more measurable and ostensibly objective but 
may suffer in terms of legitimacy and appropriate assignment of responsibility.  
 
The research in this dissertation concludes that the current regulation of voice 
communications is inadequate on all three fronts. To be able to evaluate the objectives we 
must understand whether they are appropriate for the telecommunications system to 
fulfill. The telecommunications system continues to perform an important role in 
achieving social and economic objectives that were fulfilled by traditional technologies, 
but here is the problem: the current debate around regulations is focused on efficiency 
questions (i.e., questions of who should have the regulatory burden and when) rather 
questions about how to meet the objectives at the societal level first. At the societal level, 
the telecommunications system is one of many subsystems that facilitate social and 
economic objectives. If the telecommunications system as a whole shirks its duty in 
fulfilling these objectives because some technologies are regulated and others not, other 
subsystems—maybe more labor-intensive ones—will necessarily have to pick up the 
slack. But this fact has not been recognized. Only after we understand the objectives at 
the societal level can we correctly devise obligations for the communications system as a 
whole, or for the technologies or industries within it.  
 
To be able to evaluate obligations we must understand whether they are 
appropriate for fulfilling the objective at hand, who should bear them, and when.  Pro-
market regulatory regimes have already responded to the “who” and “when” questions 
with partial and delayed regulation. Chapter 2 and 4 showed that considering the dynamic 
complexity that surrounds the Internet-based disruption, the use of these policy levers 
appears futile. Firstly, limiting regulatory scope in a modular architecture leads to 
inadequate provisioning of compliance and creates perverse incentives at two levels. At 
the industry level, it provides incentives to the regulated firms to flee to the unregulated 
technology segments. At the global level, it ignites competition in laxity between nation-
states trying to lure both consumers and firms with less regulation.  
  
Secondly, efficiently timing the delayed regulation of entrants is also nearly 
impossible given the far higher dynamic complexity of the modular age. The purpose of 
delayed regulation is to defer the regulatory costs until entrants mature, but the rate at 
which an unregulated segment might erode the existing regulatory compliance is difficult 
to predict as many competing factors mediate the rate of technology and industry 
disruption.  
 
Finally, if we imagine that regulators got both the scope and the timing of 
regulation right, a major issue still remains. These policies alone cannot remedy the loss 
of innovation and competition in the post-disruption period; unless they can be skillfully 
combined with antitrust regulation, which, in the United States remain narrow an 
inadequate today for addressing the challenges posed by the Internet.  
 
To be able to evaluate the current enforcement mechanisms we must understand 
whether they are effective for the system to be regulated. The enforcement mechanism 
for traditional telecommunications regulation has been command-and-control. Such an 
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adversarial approach alone cannot possibly be adequate for the modular age. In the 
integral age, this mechanism worked because the industrial interests were concentrated, 
which made it possible for the regulator to know who to command and where to exert 
control. Also, as a firm possessed full functional control over a service, it could easily 
develop and deploy compliance mechanisms post regulation. The modular age has 
completely changed the rules of the game.  
 
The modular forces blunt the mechanisms of command-and-control. In the 
modular age, the regulator finds it difficult to determine where a command-and-control 
mechanism ought to focus because the post-Internet era has multiple, equally capable 
interest groups that lack consensus over critical regulatory objectives. Ironically, these 
stakeholder factions that are in disagreement provision different functional components 
of a single voice communications service, so they must coordinate if regulatory 
compliance had to be provisioned. Naturally, the command-and-control mechanisms are 
completely ill-suited for building such consensus around regulatory issues. 
 
For the above reasons, this research concludes that the existing arrows in the 
regulatory quiver are blunt. Socio-technical systems usually exhibit fundamental conflict 
between the short-term and long-term consequences of a policy. The failure of current 
regulatory response in considering the long-term consequences exemplifies this 
observation. 
5.1.2 What Needs To Be Done: The New Role for Telecommunications 
Regulators 
 
It should now be perfectly apparent that the regulator’s new role is almost impossible to 
understand without grasping the dynamic complexity and emergent behavior of a system 
where regulators, firms, consumers, and technologists constantly interact. Dynamic 
complexity arises in such a system because of the strategic behaviors of these actors and 
the statistical nature of the various parameters. Therefore, the ultimate task of regulators 
and managers becomes that of managing the perpetual disequilibrium rather than hoping 
for an efficient equilibrium.  
 
Once we understand the emergent behavior of a system where a modular technology 
and industry disrupts an integrated one, it becomes quite clear that the only role worth 
while for a telecommunications regulator in such a system is to sustain the following vital 
combination, which we defined as the first best (FB) outcome:  
1. The necessary regulatory compliance is achieved,  
2. The high innovation and competition are preserved, and  
3. The reasonable cost of compliance is maintained. 
 
The idea of “sustaining” (not just “attaining”) such a combination arises because of the 
fundamental tradeoffs, between competition-innovation versus compliance-compliance 
cost, that occur across the different periods of disruption. In the pre-disruption period, 
just like the pre-AT&T break up period, compliance is high and compliance costs are 
well understood, but competition is low and there is little pressure to adopt innovation. 
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As the disruption occurs, just as with the first wave of competition to PSTN from 
wireless telecommunications service and now with VoIP, there is competitive pressure to 
adopt innovation, but regulatory compliance is compromised and incurring additional 
compliance cost is inevitable. In the post-disruption period, which we are yet to witness, 
entrants that triumph and incumbents that survive can be expected to deliver higher 
compliance at a relatively lower cost, but the competition and innovation adoption of the 
disruption phase will be lost. Thus, achieving the FB would require interventions that 
systematically reverse some of the structural influences that are natural to the system, and 
that inflict such tradeoffs across the different phase of disruption. 
 
The optimization exercises in chapter 4 illuminated that to achieve the FB, the following 
set of conditions must be met:  
1. The modular structure must enter the market and create competitive pressure,  
2. The modular structure must have the ability to comply with regulations at low 
cost, and  
3. The modular structure must remain modular in the post-disruption period. 
 
The first condition agrees with the current regulatory sentiments of “facilitating 
transudation to IP-enabled services” as expressed in the IP-Enabled Services NPRM of 
2004. However, as stated before, we disagree with the use of partial and delayed 
regulation for doing so, as these policies may meet the first condition in the short term 
but they have long-term consequences.  
 
Meeting the second condition of achieving high compliance at a low cost requires 
changing the relationship between modularity and the time and cost of complying with 
regulation fundamentally. Historical cases suggest that in highly modular architectures 
and industries, the time to build consensus and the coordination costs can be inordinately 
large. As it is, despite being vertically integrated, it took telecommunications service 
providers approximately 30 years to meet traditional regulations such as E911 or 
Universal Services. Given the dispersion of stakeholder interest that was demonstrated by 
the case in chapter 2, one can only conjecture that the process for meeting critical 
regulatory objectives will take longer in the modular environment created by the Internet, 
if not facilitated by a somewhat trusted third-party such as the government.  
 
Meeting the third condition of keeping the industry structure modular in the post-
disruption period requires preventing firms from gaining and abusing market power.  The 
most natural regulatory mechanism for achieving this objective is antitrust regulation. 
However, the current antitrust regulation in the United States is construed far too 
narrowly for addressing market power issues that can arise in the Internet realm. The 
flexibility offered by the modular age provides a fertile ground for firms to abuse market 
power in the environment of narrow and ambivalent regulatory thinking. Thus, meeting 
the third condition requires fundamental changes to the antitrust regulation in the United 
States.  
 
The policy sensitivity analysis on the fully endogenous model showed that a 
combination of two policy levers – Limiting Significant Market Power (SMP) 
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Accumulation and Building Broad-based Consensus around Regulatory Issues – can 
achieve the desired FB combination by meeting its conditions. However, both policies 
must be construed broadly.  
 
Limits to SMP accumulation must be construed broadly in two ways. First, from 
the economic perspective, it must be construed as limiting market power horizontally (in 
the same industry), vertically (in upstream and downstream markets), and collectively 
(through various agreements across industries). Doing so is critical because of the 
philosophy of the Internet architecture that hopes to promote any application on the top to 
run on any network at the bottom. Our recommendation hereis closer to that in the New 
Regulatory Framework for ICT under the European Union (EU) rather than the antitrust 
regulation in the United States. The US antitrust regulation evaluates mergers only from 
the viewpoint of horizontal concentration within one industry, and not from the 
perspective of collective market power across multiple upstream and downstream 
industries. While the concept of evaluating collective dominance has become well 
established in European case law, it is rarely invoked as a concern in the U.S. unless there 
is actual evidence of collusion. Hence, antitrust regulation is an area where the US might 
learn from the lessons learned by the EU regulators.   
 
Second, regulators must also evaluate SMP accumulation from the technological 
perspective. From the technology perspective, the SMP accumulation may be assessed by 
understanding how the accumulation of market power, in a single firm or a collection of 
them, results in making product interfaces proprietary. A measure as quantitative as 
market share, used for the economic perspective, does not exist today to quantify the 
standardized or proprietary nature of service or product interfaces. Therefore, such an 
assessment will have to rely on independent expert judgment, at least initially.   
 
The second policy lever of building broad-based consensus around regulatory 
issues may appear completely counter to the current thinking at the FCC. The FCC’s 
enforcement paradigm has been mostly adversarial with command-and-control as its 
primary mechanism. Broad-based consensus is generally built in two ways: by bringing 
all stakeholders to the negotiation table, or via the process of standards. The FCC, today, 
is hesitant to participate in Internet standards work actively. Also, they have not actively 
negotiated with players across the entire value chain the possibility of developing 
standard-based approaches to meeting the regulatory needs. Hence, being able to build 
broad-based consensus among stakeholders requires different skills, organizational 
arrangement and processes than those the FCC has.   
5.1.3 How To Do It: Balancing Regulation and Innovation in 
Telecommunications 
 
Limiting the consolidation of market power and building broad based consensus may be a 
nice theoretical solution, but knowing the solution is different from implementing it. The 
factors that complicate the implementation are: first, the difficulties of anticipation 
amidst the bewildering array of uncertainties that surround a disruption phenomenon; and 
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second, the institutional arrangements that may hinder adaptation necessary for 
implementing these solutions at the practical level.  
 
Anticipation  
Chapter 3 was dedicated to understanding anticipation uncertainty that surrounds 
disruption. With every emerging technology, the highest level uncertainty faced by 
regulators and mangers is whether there will be a disruption in the first place. The 
necessary and sufficient conditions for technology and industry disruption are not fully 
understood presently even at the theoretical level. Media and experts alike routinely 
misperceive the possibility of disruption, and such misperceptions lead to inefficient 
strategic decisions by managers and policymakers alike. Three such popular myths that 
arise due to misperceptions of feedback in complex systems and fog managerial decisions 
were shattered chapter 3. 
 
Chapter 3 identified a framework of conditions under which technology and 
industry disruption may or many not take place because of various types of uncertainties. 
It showed that not every potentially disruptive technology can cause technology 
disruption (i.e., an entrant technology displaces an incumbent technology), and not every 
technology disruption turns into industry disruption (i.e., where entrant firms displace 
incumbent firms).The analysis of disruption under market, technological, organizational, 
and regulatory uncertainty ultimately imparted guidance on what can be anticipated about 
the various parameters that define competitive and regulatory dynamics if disruption 
were to take place.  
 
Adaptation 
The final challenge in implementing the solution is adaptation. Do the institutional 
arrangements permit the regulators adapt to new challenges and implement the solutions 
at the practical level? Between chapter 2 and chapter 4, we have learned that to design 
regulations that are appropriate for the modular age in a practical sense, the following 
combination must occur: the regulatory debate around objectives must be pursued at the 
societal level; the necessary obligations must follow from the objectives construed at the 
societal level; and a new policy mechanisms cognizant of the dynamic complexity of the 
modular age, such as limiting SMP accumulation and building broad-based consensus on 
regulatory issues, must be implemented.  
 
This dissertation argues that to be able to address the objectives at the societal level, the 
FCC must be empowered to, and in fact must take a philosophical position on regulatory 
objectives, and thereby on the resulting obligations. While the dynamic complexity of the 
environment may complicate the enforcement of regulations, it does not obscure what the 
philosophical position on each objective ought to be. For example, the FCC must clearly 
state that objectives such as law enforcement and public safety cannot be compromised, 
and technologies that aspire to substitute existing channels of voice communications will 
be required to find a way to comply with the necessary obligations. Similarly, the FCC 
must clearly state that it considers promoting multi-modal competition and innovation to 
be of critical importance. Therefore, the interconnection obligations will be considered 
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across any two technologies, not just within a single mode such as PSTN. Similarly, 
universal service obligations may be fulfilled by any acceptable substitute, not just PSTN. 
 
Taking a clear philosophical stance on issues will help in several ways. First, it 
will prevent the entrenched interests from defocusing the regulatory debates. The analysis 
of the public comments in response to the 2004 IP-Enabled Services NPRM in chapter 2 
showed how the absence of a clear position on the objectives allows the political 
economy of entrenched interests to hijack the regulatory debate away from being 
objective-centered. For example, the state vs. federal, or local vs. long-distance service 
interests currently overwhelm the debate about the access charges, which really ought to 
be centered around how to achieve the objective of high competition. Similarly, interests 
trying to preserve the compensations that currently benefit them monopolize the debate 
about universal service, which really ought to be centered on how socio-economic benefit 
may be brought to remote areas through new technologies. As a result, today, the 
regulatory proceedings spend enormous energy on appeasing the entrenched interests, 
which ultimately does not achieve the goal.  
 
The second advantage of taking a clear position is that it reduces the regulatory 
uncertainty, and thereby makes both incumbents and entrants less risk averse. Firms do 
not risk investment in differentiating themselves from the competition when there is 
uncertainty about regulations that may neutralize the advantage. A clear position on the 
objectives makes it clear for the firm if they should expect to be regulated. And 
guaranteed regulation is often better than a threat of regulation.  
 
The third advantage of taking a clear position is that the obligations that follow 
from a clear position on objectives will eliminate misalignment that currently exists 
between opportunities, objectives, obligations, and capabilities. The obligations that 
follow from public safety, equal opportunity, and universal service objectives would then 
more aggressively leverage the new technologies that offer improved ways to achieve 
these objectives. The obligations that follow from critical areas such as law enforcement 
would not be partial or delayed. And, the obligations would not burden only parts of the 
value chain when the capacity to meet the obligation has moved to the other parts as a 
result of the movement in the functional control.  
 
Of course, simply taking a philosophical position will not be sufficient. To fulfill the 
objectives at the societal level, the government institutions, more broadly, and the FCC 
itself, more specifically, will have to organize differently. The fragmentation of 
government and the regulatory agency does not currently empower any party to be 
responsible for understanding and achieving the objectives at the societal level. While the 
full exploration of how to reorganize the government or the FCC is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation, here is an example.  
 
We know from our analysis that a merger between two firms can potentially 
compromise two objectives: promoting multi-modal competition and innovation 
experienced by an average consumer. Yet, no merger in telecommunications industry to 
date has evaluated competition between multiple technologies, nor has any been viewed 
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as a precursor to the impending loss of innovation. The reason clearly is the fragmented 
organizations sharing responsibility for evaluating a merger. The FCC is organized in 
technology-specific silos such as wireline, wireless, and media bureau. Despite that fact 
that large telecommunications firms today are invested in all technologies, every merger 
evaluation is assigned only to one of the FCC bureaus. Hence, the multimodal 
competition perspective is clearly lost. The FCC evaluates a merger from only the “public 
interest” perspective.  It is the Department of Justice (DoJ) that assesses if the merger will 
“substantially lessen” the competition, but the DoJ does not have the technological 
perspective, let alone that of multi-modal technology. FCC’s “public interest” analysis is 
also inadequate. It only involves the analysis of how the merger affects the consumer 
welfare, and does not recognize that with a merger, the industry integrates, product 
interfaces go from standardized to proprietary, and the industry turns from one that was 
innovation-focused to the one that is quality-focused. 
 
Apart from taking a position on objectives and reorganizing the agency as appropriate, to 
be able to build broad-based consensus, a whole new set of capabilities and processes 
will have to be added to the enforcement bureau. Broad-based consensus may be built in 
two ways: by bringing all stakeholders to the negotiation table, or via the process of 
standards. The enforcement bureau has never included negotiators, nor have they 
participated in standard body meetings. It may need to acquire both of these skills. Their 
paradigm has been command-and-control, which only uses fines and punishment.  
Unfortunately, the modular age renders the current enforcement paradigm of command-
and-control ineffective because of the enormous dynamic complexity. Today, the firms 
cannot easily comply with regulation because of the inordinate coordination cost due to 
the heterogeneity of architectures and competing interests. The regulator must focus on 
reducing effort required to a firm to comply with regulation, so the firm can focus on 
their core competencies. Being able to negotiate a broad-based consensus around 
regulatory issues will allow the FCC to reduce the burden of compliance on modular 
firms, so that these firms can comply with regulation and innovation at the same time.  
 
From Herding Sheep to Herding Cats 
Metaphorically, this is a tale of three animals – elephant, sheep, and cats. From the time 
the FCC was established (in 1934) until the break up of AT&T, the telecommunications 
regulator was a keeper of an elephant (AT&T). The elephant was monolithic and slow, 
but powerful and demanding because it faced no competition. It had negotiated with its 
keeper a suitable confinement in the form of the 1934 Telecommunications Act. With the 
break up of AT&T, the regulator became a shepherd herding a few sheep (the Baby 
Bells). The sheep were inherently less competitive, less innovative, and docile. They 
worked by consensus. To control a herd of sheep, the shepherd needed just a crook and a 
little guidance that came in the form the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its 
enforcement. But the transition from an integral age to a modular age transforms the 
regulator’s role from that of a shepherd who herded a few sheep to one who must now 
herd many cats. The cats are fiercely competitive, highly innovative, and agile. Most 
importantly, however, the cats lack consensus and are highly independent. To control cats 
requires a completely new mindset – maybe a net around them, or a set of incentives such 
as the mice, or something else. Neither the elephant’s confinement, nor the crook used for 
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the sheep will work for the cats. In other words, the effective control mechanisms for 
these species are radically different. Similar is the case of regulation in the integral versus 
the modular age: the effective control mechanisms for the two environments are starkly 
different. 
5.2 Limitations 
The limitations of this work may be thought of in two ways. One set of limitations stem 
from where we chose to, or had to, focus. If one thinks of this dissertation as challenges 
and solutions in regulating Internet-based services; this dissertation has had to focus more 
on problems than on solutions. The reason for such an imbalance in focus is that this 
dissertation does not have the luxury of standing on the shoulders of other works that 
apply systems principles to telecommunications regulation. Hence, we have had to devote 
a larger portion of time to researching and describing the problem vis-à-vis the solution. 
This fact introduces a limitation where the dissertation throws more light on anticipation 
under uncertainty, and less on adaptation once the solution is understood. That said, the 
research does offer a solution to the problem raised and discusses how it may be 
implemented.  
 
Another set of limitations are those of the research design, which consisted of a case in 
chapter 2, a case in chapter 3, and the systems model that spanned chapters 2, 3, and 4.  
 
Limitations of the Case on Pre- vs. Post-Internet Regulatory Environment 
In this case, to understand stakeholder concentration along the value chain and their 
position on central issues of the two NPRMs analyzed, we designated each commenter a 
value chain position they represent. Once a position (e.g., equipment provider, access 
provider, etc.) was assigned to a commenter (e.g., a corporation like Verizon), it was not 
changed throughout the analysis. Such a decision introduces two limitations. First, it only 
captures the value chain position that most closely represents the corporation’s central 
tendency and not the fact that the corporation may represent multiple value chain 
positions. Second, assigning a fixed value chain position to corporation does not capture 
shifts in its strategy over the period analyzed (1996-2009). Only correcting such a 
shortcoming, by recording the shifts in corporation’s value chain position, can really 
speak to the impact of this limitation, but the following may be said about it at the outset. 
First, general understanding of the communications industry does not point out any 
glaring examples of firms changing their strategy from focusing solely on one value 
chain position to a completely different one (i.e., becoming an application provider from 
an equipment provider, or a device provider from access provider, etc.), so recording 
such shifts are not likely to change the lessons learned; though, it will certainly make our 
understanding richer. Second, a cursory glance at the shifts in value chain strategies 
suggests that with the advent of the Internet, most firms are more aware of the importance 
of the edge-based innovations, so if anything, recording such shifts in strategies might 
render a more pronounced demonstration of the discontinuities in technology and 
industry structure.  
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Limitations of the Case on Misperceptions of Disruption 
In this case, after surveying the media for all technologies they proclaimed as disruptive, 
we restricted our analysis only to computer and communications industry. As described 
earlier, we made this choice consciously as these are fast clockspeed industries with 
higher likelihood of disruption, if any. However, such a choice imposes limitations on 
how generalizeable are the observations of the case study beyond the computer and 
communications industry. This is also the same generalization that applies to other case 
research based works on modularity, such as the Baldwyn and Clark’s Design Rules. 
 
Limitations of the Model 
The systems model we built in this dissertation rests upon the following assumptions: 
 
1. This is a behavioral model  
2. The simulation runs are for 30 year period 
3. This model only applies to cases where the modularity of technology and industry 
structure are positively correlated  
4. Firms  
4.1. Only 2 Firms – Incumbent, Entrant  
4.2. Each firm represents a typical firm in their industry  
4.3. Each firm has one service type (total 2 types of service in the market)  
4.4. Each service has only the following attributes: Price, Primary Performance 
(Quality), Ancillary Performance (Innovation), Network Effect, and Switching 
Cost 
4.5. Firms take only two decisions each time period: resource allocation and 
outsourcing  
4.6. Resource Allocation  
4.6.1. Both firms endowed with equal total attention (resources)  
4.6.2. Each firm allocates resources only to achieving Regulatory Compliance, 
Primary Performance (Quality) and Ancillary Performance (Innovation)  
4.7. Outsourcing  
4.7.1. Each firm makes its interfaces more integrated or more proprietary 
4.8. Capacity formulation is excluded 
5. Consumers  
5.1. Potential market size is constant  
5.2. Consumers are homogenous in their preferences, so the adoption process is 
simulated consumer segmentation only at the level of early adopters, mass 
market, and laggards are simulated 
5.3. Each consumer decides between the two services (to continue or to switch) every 
time period  
5.4. Consumer choice depends only on the service’s compatibility (network effect), 
price, primary performance (quality), and ancillary performance (innovation)  
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6. Technology  
6.1. Features of each service are separable into (identifiable as) primary performance 
(quality) and ancillary performance (innovation)  
6.2. The primary performance (quality) of each service depends only upon its 
architectural limit, attention/resources the firm devotes to it, and time necessary 
for it to improve/deteriorate  
6.3. The ancillary performance (innovation) of each service depends only upon its 
architectural limit, attention/resources the firm devotes to it, and time necessary 
for it to improve/deteriorate  
6.4. The whole system becomes a natural selection environment for the innovations   
7. Industry Structure  
7.1. A single attribute – Modularity – describes the state of each industry structure  
7.2. Modularity represents the level of integration/modularization in both technology 
and industry structure for that service  
7.3. Market Share, Time to Comply, Compliance Cost (and Resources), Enforcement 
Cost are industry-level properties  
8. Regulation  
8.1. Desired level of compliance is possible to achieve under integrated technology 
and industry structure  
8.2. Regulated firms pass the Compliance Cost on to their consumer  
8.3. Regulated firm always provides resources necessary for regulatory compliance  
8.4. Firm devotes a finite maximum amount of resources to regulatory compliance  
By nature every assumption is a simplification of reality, but a bad assumption is one that 
not only misrepresents reality but violating it reverses the outcome, thereby invalidating 
the lessons learned. Several of the above assumptions must be evaluated from this 
perspective.   
  
 Having only two firms and each representing a typical firm in their industry 
(assumptions 4.1 and 4.2) are assumptions that clearly misrepresent the reality. However, 
deploying them creates a useful tradeoff. Using a single firm to represent the industry 
does challenge us cognitively, since we must imagine the single firm to represent a 
cluster of firms when the industry is modular. But such a conceptual leap is worthwhile 
for several reasons. First, because using a single firm excludes from the model the 
dynamics of competition among modular firms, thereby greatly extending our ability to 
closely understand the competition between a modular and an integrated industry. 
Second, including the dynamics of multiple modular firms does not alter or enrich the 
insights for the issues we are interested in. If such a model were to be used for 
understanding competition between multiple incumbents or multiple entrants, including 
multiple firms would be a useful addition.  
 
 Excluding the capacity formulation (assumption 4.8) is also unrealistic and 
prevents us from studying the shorter-term boom-and-bust in communications market. 
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This may be acceptable for the present dissertation, but to study other emerging issues 
such as net-neutrality, it would be important to include the capacity formulation into the 
model.  
 
 From the consumer choice perspective, the assumptions of fixed market size and 
homogenous consumer preferences (assumptions 5.1 and 5.2, respectively) are not just 
unrealistic; they impact the understanding of limits to technology and industry disruption. 
The current formulation only simulates early adopters, mass market, and laggards. One 
might argue that this formulation is sufficient for studying the long term trends, but the 
communications market today shows additional peculiarities. Younger consumers have a 
dramatically different behavior from older consumers when it comes to using Internet-
base services. Of course, with time, the younger consumers are displacing the older ones, 
the simulation of which would require including net birth rate into the model. More 
importantly, however, the consumer segmentation of young versus old seems lumpier 
than the smooth S-curve of adoption. And, if these segments are rather permanent, they 
have a potential to prevent winner-takes-all outcomes in the market. Hence, even when 
the network effects are strong, the incumbents may not be able to hold on to the entire 
market since what attracts younger consumers is drastically different from what it offers. 
Adding such consumer segmentation to the model is at least a Master’s level thesis.  
 
5.3 Directions for Future Work 
This dissertation has begun answering where to focus attention and what to do as 
Internet-based services disrupt. The future work ought to answer, more deeply than did 
this dissertation, questions about how to respond. Listed below are four potential areas 
where substantial contributions can be made in this direction. 
 
Building Consensus 
Building consensus in modular structures is a very poorly understood area. Based on the 
analysis of the pre- and post-regulatory environments of the Internet, this research 
conjectured that increasing modularity may sharply increase the coordination cost and 
time to comply, limiting the achievable compliance in modular structures. But the exact 
nature of the relationship between modularity and the time to comply or coordination cost 
is far from being understood. One might retort to such assertion by saying that the 
hourglass architecture of the Internet, in some sense, has successfully done exactly that – 
it has built consensus among disparate application and network designers. We must not 
forget, however, that that architecture emerged with the support of government agencies 
and in times when major corporate interests were paying little attention to it. Today, all of 
that has changed. The key are of interest here are how time and cost of coordination 
changes with modularity, and what are the motivations and limits to coordination. These 
may be further understood with a modeling or qualitative frameworks that help us further 
understand behaviors in modular structures.  
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Institutional Arrangements 
The organization of the regulatory agency (the FCC), the US government, and 
international institutions at large will have profound impact on how effectively regulatory 
compliance and innovation are balanced. This research concluded that to fulfill such 
higher level objectives, these institutions will have to organize differently, as the current 
fragmentation of government and the regulatory agency does not empower any party to 
be responsible for understanding and achieving the objectives at the societal level. We 
cannot offer a full agenda of what this area of research should look like, but here are a 
few possible starting points: what institutional arrangements would empower and enable 
the FCC (or a combination of agencies) to take on regulatory issues at the societal level? 
How can the FCC reorganize considering the onset of the modular age? How can antitrust 
regulatory be construed comprehensively considering the nature of the Internet? 
 
Regulatory Capture 
In 1971, in his seminal work, The Theory of Economic Regulation, George Stigler 
developed a theory of regulatory capture that, to paraphrase, said: an industry that is 
regulated can benefit from ‘capturing’ the regulatory agency involved. This can occur 
because of political influence; superior technical knowledge that forces the regulatory 
agency to depend on the industry; appointees being selected from the regulated industry 
or the possibility of future position in the industry; and the agency’s need for recognition 
and informal cooperation from the industry. 
 
 Regulatory capture acquires an additional dimension in the modular age of the 
Internet. Movements such as Google, Wikipedia, Facebook, and others offer new 
platforms for collective action. It is not clear how much of such collective action provides 
the balance of power essential for a functioning democracy as against providing new 
ways for corporations, behind the veil of the consumers their platforms support, to 
capture regulation. The future work, therefore, must address the following question: what 
kinds of regulatory captures can occur in modular structures? 
 
Variations in Regulatory Environments 
Finally, the framework offered in this dissertation can be used for understanding the 
environments in different nations/regions in order to compare and contrast their 
regulatory policies and their impact. The model is currently formulated and estimated for 
the US environment. The author’s post-doctoral research hopes to estimate the model to 
compare the telecommunications regulation in the United States and the European Union.  
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Appendix A - A Brief Evolutionary Outline of Statutory 
Definitions and FCC Jurisdiction 
 
Several definitions set forth in the Communications Act and prior Commission orders are 
relevant for understanding the VoIP context.  
First, the Act defines the terms “common carrier” and “carrier” to include “any 
person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by 
wire or radio.” The Act specifically excludes persons “engaged in radio broadcasting” 
from this definition89.  
The Federal Communications Commission has long distinguished between 
“basic” and “enhanced” service offerings. In the Computer Inquiry line of decisions90, the 
Commission specified that a “basic” service is a service offering transmission capacity 
for the delivery of information without net change in form or content. Providers of 
“basic” services were subjected to common carrier regulation under Title II of the Act.  
By contrast, an “enhanced” service contains a basic service component but also 
“employ[s] computer processing applications that act on the format, content, code, 
protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber’s transmitted information; provide the 
subscriber additional, different, or restructured information; or involve subscriber 
interaction with stored information91.” 
The Commission concluded that enhanced services were subject to the 
Commission’s jurisdiction92. It further found, however, that the enhanced service market 
was highly competitive with low barriers to entry; therefore, the Commission declined to 
treat providers of enhanced services as “common carriers” subject to regulation under 
Title II of the Act93.  
The 1996 Act defined “telecommunications” to mean “the transmission, between 
or among points specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without 
change in the form or content of the information as sent and received94.”  
                                                 
89 47 U.S.C. § 153(10). 
90 See Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication 
Services and Facilities, Docket No. 16979, Notice of Inquiry, 7 FCC 2d 11 (1966) (Computer I NOI); 
Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication 
Services and Facilities, Docket No. 16979, Final Decision and Order, 28 FCC 2d 267 (1971) (Computer I 
Final Decision); Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second 
Computer Inquiry), Docket No. 20828, Tentative Decision and Further Notice of Inquiry and Rulemaking, 
72 FCC 2d 358 (1979) (Computer II Tentative Decision); Amendment of Section 64.702 of the 
Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Docket No. 20828, Final Decision, 77 
FCC 2d 384 (1980) (Computer II Final Decision); Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules 
and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), CC Docket No. 85-229, Report and Order, 104 FCC 2d 958 
(1986) (Computer III) (subsequent cites omitted) (collectively the Computer Inquiries). 
 
91 47 C.F.R. § 64.702; see also Computer II Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d at 420-21, para. 97. 
 
92 Computer II Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d at 432, para. 125. 
93 Id. at 432-35, paras. 126-132. 
94 47 U.S.C. § 153(43). 
    
183 
 
The 1996 Act also defined “telecommunications service” to mean “the offering of 
telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be 
effectively available to the public, regardless of facilities used95.” The Commission has 
concluded, and courts have agreed, that the “telecommunications service” definition was 
“intended to clarify that telecommunications services are common carrier services96.”  
Various entitlements and obligations set forth in the Act – including, for example, 
the entitlement to access an incumbent’s unbundled network elements for local service97 
and the obligation to render a network accessible to people with disabilities98 – attach 
only to entities providing “telecommunications service.”  
By contrast, the 1996 Act defined “information service” to mean “the offering of 
a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, 
utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications, and includes 
electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for the 
management, control, or operation of a telecommunications network or the management 
of a telecommunications service99.” 
The Act did not establish any particular entitlements or requirements with regard 
to providers of information services, but the Commission has exercised its ancillary 
authority under Title I of the Act to apply requirements to information services100. 
In a 1998 Report to Congress known as the “Stevens Report101,”the Commission 
considered the proper classification of IP telephony services under the 1996 Act.  In that 
                                                 
95 47 U.S.C. § 153(46). 
 
96 Cable & Wireless, PLC, Order, 12 FCC Rcd 8516, 8521, para. 13 (1997); see also Virgin Islands Tel. 
Corp. v. FCC, 198 F.3d 921, 926-27 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 
97 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3). 
98 See 47 U.S.C. § 255(c). 
 
99 47 U.S.C. § 153(20). “Information service” category includes all services that the Commission 
previously considered to be “enhanced services.” See Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of 
Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, CC Docket No. 96-149. 
 
100 See, e.g., Implementation of Section 255 and 251(a)(2) of the Communications Act of 1934, as Enacted 
by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, WT Docket No. 96-198, Report and Order and Further Notice of 
Inquiry, 16 FCC Rcd 6417, 6455-62, paras. 93-108 (1999) (Disability Access Order) (invoking ancillary 
authority to impose section 255-like obligations on providers of voicemail and interactive menu services); 
see also Computer II Final Decision; Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and 
Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Memorandum Opinion and Order, 84 FCC 2d 50 (1980) 
(Computer II Reconsideration Decision); Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and 
Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further Reconsideration, 88 
FCC 2d 512 (1981) (Computer II Further Reconsideration Decision) (asserting ancillary jurisdiction over 
enhanced services, including voicemail and interactive menus, as well as over CPE). 
 
101 Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, CC Docket No. 96-45, Report to Congress, 13 FCC 
Rcd 11501 (1998) (Stevens Report). 
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Report, the Commission declined to render any conclusions regarding the proper legal 
and regulatory framework for addressing these services, stating “definitive 
pronouncements” would be inappropriate “in the absence of a more complete record 
focused on individual service offerings102.”  
The Commission did, however, observe that in the case of “computer-to-
computer” IP telephony, where “individuals use software and hardware at their premises 
to place calls between two computers connected to the Internet,” the Internet service 
provider did not appear to be “providing” telecommunications, and the service therefore 
appeared not to constitute “telecommunications service” under the Act’s definition of that 
term.  In contrast, a “phone-to-phone” IP telephony service relying on “dial-up or 
dedicated circuits … to originate or terminate Internet-based calls” appeared to “bear the 
characteristics of ‘telecommunications services103,’” so long as the particular service met 
four criteria: (1) it holds itself out as providing voice telephony or facsimile transmission 
service; (2) it does not require the customer to use CPE different from that CPE necessary 
to place an ordinary touchtone call (or facsimile transmission) over the public switched 
telephone network; (3) it allows the customer to call telephone numbers assigned in 
accordance with the North American Numbering Plan, and associated international 
agreements; and (4) it transmits customer information without net change in form or 
content104. 
  
                                                 
102 See id. at 11541, para. 83. 
103 Id. at 11544, para. 89. 
104 Id. at 11543-44, para. 88. 
    
185 
 
Appendix B - The Model 
Presented in this appendix are four different views of the Systems Model of Regulation, 
Competition and Innovation in Telecommunications: causal loop diagrams (CLD), 
model-sectors diagram, parameter-input diagrams, and alphabetical list of model 
equations.  
 
Causal Loop Diagrams 
 
We start with causal loop diagrams (CLD), which are abstract representations of how 
cause and effects work in the model.  
 
 
Figure 58: Consumer and Firm Dynamics 
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Figure 59: Technology, Firm, and Industry Dynamics 
 
 
Figure 60: Firm and Industry Dynamics 
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Figure 61: Regulation, Firm, and Industry Dynamics 
 
 
Figure 62: Complete Causal Structure 
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Model-Sectors Diagram 
The next three representations—the model-sector diagram, parameter-input diagrams, 
and alphabetical listing of model equations—are meant to be read together. The model-
sector diagram represents different sectors of the model and important variables in those 
sectors.  
 
 
Figure 63: Model Sectors Diagram 
 
Parameter-input Diagrams 
The parameter-input diagram below shows what goes into formulating each parameter in 
the model. These diagrams should be read in conjunction with the equations listed below 
to under how each parameter is formulated. 
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Alphabetical Listing of Model Equations 
 
Equation Variables 
1 Achievable Compliance[Firm]= 
Potential Market * ((Switch to Make Consensus Exogenous * Exogenous Achievable Compliance and Fractional 
Deployment Multiplier\ 
[Firm]) + (1 - Switch to Make Consensus Exogenous) * (IF THEN ELSE(Switch for Effect of Modularity on Consensus 
=1, "Effect of Modularity on Achievable Compliance (Very Convex)" 
(Modularity[Firm]), 0) + IF THEN ELSE(Switch for Effect of Modularity on Consensus=2\ 
, "Effect of Modularity on Achievable Compliance (Convex)" 
(Modularity[Firm]), 0) + IF THEN ELSE(Switch for Effect of Modularity on Consensus=3\ 
, "Effect of Modularity on Achievable Compliance (Linear)" 
(Modularity[Firm]), 0) + IF THEN ELSE(Switch for Effect of Modularity on Consensus=4\ 
, "Effect of Modularity on Achievable Compliance (Concave)" 
(Modularity[Firm]), 0))) 
~ Unit 
~ Number of adopters for each firm's (industry's) network that can be \ 
covered given the level of consensus among firms. 
2 Actual Compliance[Firm]= INTEG ( 
Compliant Mechanism Deployment Rate[Firm]-Compliant Mechanism Obsolence Rate[Firm], 
Initial Compliance[Firm] * Potential Market) 
~ Unit 
~ Number of adopters of each firm's (industry's) network currently compliant. 
3 Adjustment for Month= 
12 
~ Month/Year 
~ Year to Month Adjustment 
4 Adopters[Firm]= INTEG ( 
Adoption[Firm]-Exit[Firm]-Switching[Firm]-Exit[Firm], 
Initial Installed Base[Firm]) 
~ Unit 
~ Adopters for each firm 
5 Adoption Fraction= 
0.3 
~ Unit/Contact 
~ 1/Number of Contacts it takes to convert a potential adopter to an adopter 
6 Adoption from Advertizing[Firm]= 
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Potential Adopters * Advertizing Effectiveness * Market Share of Attractiveness[Firm\ 
] 
~ Unit/Month 
~  
7 Adoption from Switching[Incumbent]= 
Market Entry Switch[Incumbent] * Total Demand from Switching * Market Share of Attractiveness\ 
[Incumbent] + (1 - Market Entry Switch[Entrant]) * Total Demand from Switching * Market Share of Attractiveness\ 
[Entrant] ~~ 
Adoption from Switching[Entrant]= 
Market Entry Switch[Entrant] * Total Demand from Switching * Market Share of Attractiveness\ 
[Entrant] + (1 - Market Entry Switch[Incumbent]) * Total Demand from Switching * Market Share of Attractiveness\ 
[Incumbent] 
~ Unit/Month 
~ When both firms are in the market, the firm gains consumers based on its \ 
market share of attractiveness. When only one firm is in the market, that \ 
firms gains all the consumers that decide to switch. 
8 Adoption from WOM[Firm]= 
Adoption Fraction * Contact Rate * ((Adopters[Firm] * Potential Adopters)/Potential Market\ 
) * Market Share of Attractiveness[Firm] 
~ Unit/Month 
~  
10 Adoption[Incumbent]= 
IF THEN ELSE(Potential Adopters>=0, Market Entry Switch[Incumbent] * (Adoption from Advertizing 
[Incumbent] + Adoption from WOM 
[Incumbent] + Adoption from Switching[Incumbent]), 0) ~~ 
9 Adoption[Entrant]= 
IF THEN ELSE(Potential Adopters>=0, (Market Entry Switch[Entrant] * (Adoption from Advertizing 
[Entrant] + Adoption from WOM 
[Entrant] + Adoption from Switching[Entrant])), 0) 
~ Unit/Month 
~ Formulates total gain of adopters for a firm. The gain part of equation \ 
(when there are Potential Adopters left) is simple. A firm gains adopters \ 
due to advertizing, word of mouth, or switching from the other firm. 
11 Advertizing Effectiveness= 
0.4 
~ 1/Month 
~ Fraction that Adopts due to advertizing every month 
12 Ancillary Performance Gain[Firm]= 
MAX(0, Switch to Endogenize Quality and Innovation * Market Entry Switch[Firm] * Resources to Ancillary Performance\ 
[Firm 
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] * ((Maximum Attainable Ancillary Performance 
[Firm] 
- Ancillary Performance[Firm])/Time to Acquire Ancillary Performance[Firm])) 
~ 1/Month 
~ Performance change given the gap between Maximum and the current ancillary \ 
performance, as weighted by the current resource allocation. 
13 Ancillary Performance Loss[Firm]= 
MAX(0, Switch to Endogenize Quality and Innovation * Market Entry Switch[Firm] * ((Ancillary Performance\ 
[Firm] - Maximum Attainable Ancillary Performance 
[Firm])/Time to Acquire Ancillary Performance[Firm])) 
~ Dimensionless/Month 
~  
14 Ancillary Performance[Firm]= INTEG ( 
Ancillary Performance Gain[Firm]-Ancillary Performance Loss[Firm], 
Initial Ancillary Performance[Firm]) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Firm's (or represented industry's) current ancillary performance. 
15 Appropriate Level of Compliance= 
1 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Assumption: Socially, it is desirable that all the traffic complies with \ 
regulation 
16 Attention on Ancillary Performance Gain[Incumbent]= 
Resources to Performance[Incumbent] * (Switch for Highly Reactive Reallocation of Attention and Resources 
*Effect of Highly Reactive Reallocation of Attention( 
Expected Market Share[Entrant]) + (1-Switch for Highly Reactive Reallocation of Attention and Resources\ 
)*Effect of Competitor's Expected Market Share on Attention to Ancillary Performance 
(Expected Market Share[Entrant])) ~~ 
Attention on Ancillary Performance Gain[Entrant]= 
Resources to Performance[Entrant] * (Switch for Highly Reactive Reallocation of Attention and Resources 
*Effect of Highly Reactive Reallocation of Attention( 
Expected Market Share[Incumbent]) + (1-Switch for Highly Reactive Reallocation of Attention and Resources\ 
)*Effect of Competitor's Expected Market Share on Attention to Ancillary Performance 
(Expected Market Share[Incumbent])) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Fraction of total attention on innovation. 
17 Attention on Ancillary Performance Loss[Firm]= 
Resources to Performance[Firm] * (1 - (Switch for Highly Reactive Reallocation of Attention and Resources 
*Effect of Highly Reactive Reallocation of Attention 
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(Expected Market Share[Firm])+(1-Switch for Highly Reactive Reallocation of Attention and Resources\ 
)*Effect of Competitor's Expected Market Share on Attention to Ancillary Performance 
(Expected Market Share[Firm]))) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Fraction of total attention on quality. 
18 Average Required Compliance= 
Required Compliance[Incumbent] * Market Share[Incumbent] + Required Compliance[Entrant\ 
] * Market Share[Entrant] 
~ Unit 
~ Emergent Behavior: market share weighted current level of compliance \ 
required by the regulator across all firms. 
19 Average Utilized Compliance= 
Actual Compliance[Incumbent] * Market Share[Incumbent] + Actual Compliance[Entrant] \ 
* Market Share[Entrant] 
~ Unit 
~ Emergent Behavior: market share weighted current level of compliance \ 
considering all services. 
20 Average Utilized Innovation= 
SUM(Weighted Firm Innovation[Firm!]) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Emergent Behavior: market share weighted innovation of both industries. 
21 Average Utilized Market Power= 
1 - Average Utilized Modularity 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Inverse of the Modularity. The less the average modularity the more the \ 
market power, and vice versa. 
22 Average Utilized Modularity= 
SUM(Weighted Firm Modularity[Firm!]) 
~ Dmnl 
~ Emergent Behavior: Market share weighted modularity of each industry \ 
(firm). 
23 Average Utilized Normalized Coordination Cost= 
SUM(Weighted Normalized Coordination Cost[Firm!]) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Market share weighted Normalized Coordination Cost 
24 Average Utilized Quality= 
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SUM(Weighted Firm Quality[Firm!]) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Emergent Behavior: market share weighted quality of both industries. 
25 Circum-Innovation Burst[Firm]= 
0 * (STEP(0.1, 50) + STEP(-0.1, 60)) 
~ Dmnl/Month 
~ This parameter allows the modeler to simulate loss of compliance due to \ 
innovation bursts. It represents loss of compliance in an already \ 
compliance network, as opposed to the rise of new technologies that are \ 
non-compliant and unregulated. 
26 Compliance Gap[Firm]= 
MIN( Required Compliance[Firm], Achievable Compliance[Firm]) - Actual Compliance[Firm\ 
] 
~ Unit 
~ Gap between the required or achievable and current compliance level for \ 
each firm. 
27 Compliant Mechanism Deployment Rate[Firm]= 
Market Entry Switch[Firm] * (IF THEN ELSE(Compliance Gap[Firm]>0, Fractional Deployment Rate of Compliance 
Mechanism\ 
[Firm]*Compliance Gap[Firm], 0)) 
~ Unit/Month 
~ Rate at which the compliant technology is deployed. 
29 Compliant Mechanism Obsolence Rate[Firm]= 
Market Entry Switch[Firm] * (IF THEN ELSE(Compliance Gap[Firm]<0, Actual Compliance[\ 
Firm]/Time to Lose Compliance, 0) + "Circum-Innovation Burst"[Firm 
] * Potential Market) 
~ Unit/Month 
~ Percentage of network in which the compliance becomes obsolete in the face \ 
of innovation. 
30 Contact Rate= 
20 
~ Contact/Unit/Month 
~ Contacts every user makes in a month 
31 Cost of Resources[Firm]= 
1 
~ Dollar/(Month*Unit) 
~  
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32 Demand Side Average Time to Deploy= 
(1/Fractional Deployment Rate of Compliance Mechanism[Incumbent]) * Market Share[Incumbent\ 
] * (MIN( Required Compliance[Incumbent], Achievable Compliance[Incumbent])/Potential Market 
) + (1/Fractional Deployment Rate of Compliance Mechanism[Entrant]) * Market Share 
[Entrant] * (MIN( Required Compliance[Entrant], Achievable Compliance[Entrant])/Potential Market\ 
) 
~ Month 
~  
33 Effect of Ancillary Performance on Attractiveness[Firm]= 
EXP(Sensitivity of Attractiveness to Ancillary Performance * Ancillary Performance[Firm\ 
]/Reference Ancillary Performance for Attractiveness 
) 
~ Dmnl 
~ Effect of Ancillary Performance on Attractiveness: The service is more \ 
attractive when the ancillary performance (innovation) is higher than the \ 
reference. 
34 Effect of Compatibility on Attractiveness[Firm]= 
EXP(Sensitivity of Attractiveness to Installed Base * Adopters[Firm]/Reference Installed Base for Compatibility\ 
) 
~ Dmnl 
~ The effect of compatibility on attractiveness captures the network and \ 
compatibility effects:  the larger the installed base, the greater the \ 
attractiveness of that product. There are a number of plausible shapes for \ 
the relationship between installed base and attractiveness.  The \ 
exponential function is used here to be consistent with the standard logit \ 
choice model. 
35 Effect of Competitor's Expected Market Share on Attention to Ancillary Performance( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(0.176259,0.016092),(0.352518,0.0390805),(0.53777,0.0735632),(0.696043\ 
,0.156322),(0.816547,0.255172),(0.890288,0.367816),(0.917266,0.448276),(0.942446,0.556322\ 
),(1,1)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This function represents how the firm reacts to competitor firm's market \ 
share. The Incumbent firm takes a wait-and-see approach in diverting \ 
resources towards innovation. Initially, when Entrant's market share is \ 
low, the Incumbent is tries to ascertain if this is a price-based \ 
competition or innovation-based competition, and keeps most of its \ 
resources focused on the current activity. When the Entrant's expected \ 
market share crosses a certain limit, it becomes clear that the future \ 
belongs to the Entrant-like innovations, so the Incumbent diverts \ 
resources to innovation (i.e. Ancillary Performance). The inverse is true \ 
for the Entrant. The Entrant initially focuses its attention on \ 
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innovation, but as it gains more market share, it diverts attention to \ 
quality (i.e. Primary Performance) that its increasing customer base \ 
demands. 
36 Effect of Competitors Market Share on Interface Standardization( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(0.477064,0.105263),(0.706422,0.214912),(0.83792,0.421053),(0.908257\ 
,0.618421),(1,1)) 
~ Dmnl 
~ This function represents how competitor's market share creates pressure to \ 
disintegrate. The pressure to disintegrate is increasing and convex as the \ 
competitor gains market share. The output of the function acts as \ 
multiplier for the Maximum Fractional Rate of Interface Standardization. 
37 Effect of Compliance Gap on Resources to Deployment( 
[(-1,0)-(1,1)],(-1,0),(0.001,0),(0.0011,1),(1,1)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~  
38 Effect of Highly Reactive Reallocation of Attention( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(1,1)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This function represents how an agressive firm would react to competitor's \ 
market share. This function is used for sensitivity tests. 
39 Effect of Market Share on Resources to Maintenance( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(1,1)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~  
40 Effect of Modularity on Achievable Compliance (Concave)( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,1),(0.201835,0.960526),(0.379205,0.925439),(0.58104,0.890351),(0.715596\ 
,0.868421),(0.82263,0.859649),(0.911315,0.850877),(0.993884,0.85)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This function "conjectures" how achievable compliance drops in a concave \ 
fashion with increasing modularity due to the lack of consensus among \ 
industry players. This one of four conjectured relationships between \ 
modularity and consensus that is selected wtih a switch for sensitivity \ 
analysis. 
41 Effect of Modularity on Achievable Compliance (Convex)( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,1),(0.211009,0.969298),(0.406728,0.925439),(0.626911,0.855263),(0.788991\ 
,0.785088),(0.883792,0.719298),(0.963303,0.644737),(1,0.6)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This function "conjectures" how achievable compliance drops in a convex \ 
fashion with increasing modularity due to the lack of consensus among \ 
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industry players. This one of four conjectured relationships between \ 
modularity and consensus that is selected wtih a switch for sensitivity \ 
analysis. 
42 Effect of Modularity on Achievable Compliance (Linear)( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,1),(1,0.75)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This function "conjectures" how achievable compliance drops in a linear \ 
fashion with increasing modularity due to the lack of consensus among \ 
industry players. This one of four conjectured relationships between \ 
modularity and consensus that is selected wtih a switch for sensitivity \ 
analysis. 
43 Effect of Modularity on Achievable Compliance (Very Convex)( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,1),(0.211009,0.969298),(0.406728,0.925439),(0.626911,0.855263),(0.847095\ 
,0.741228),(0.905199,0.653509),(0.963303,0.486842),(1,0.25)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This function "conjectures" how achievable compliance drops in a very \ 
convex fashion with increasing modularity due to the lack of consensus \ 
among industry players. This one of four conjectured relationships between \ 
modularity and consensus that is selected wtih a switch for sensitivity \ 
analysis. 
44 Effect of Modularity on Deployment Rate Due to Consensus (Concave)( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,1),(0.201835,0.960526),(0.379205,0.925439),(0.58104,0.890351),(0.715596\ 
,0.868421),(0.82263,0.859649),(0.911315,0.850877),(0.993884,0.85)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This function "conjectures" how deployment rate of compliant technology \ 
drops in a concave fashion with increasing modularity due to the lack of \ 
consensus among industry players. This one of four conjectured \ 
relationships between modularity and consensus that is selected wtih a \ 
switch for sensitivity analysis. 
45 Effect of Modularity on Deployment Rate Due to Consensus (Convex)( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,1),(0.211009,0.969298),(0.406728,0.925439),(0.626911,0.855263),(0.788991\ 
,0.785088),(0.883792,0.719298),(0.963303,0.644737),(1,0.6)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This function "conjectures" how deployment rate of compliant technology \ 
drops in a convex fashion with increasing modularity due to the lack of \ 
consensus among industry players. This one of four conjectured \ 
relationships between modularity and consensus that is selected wtih a \ 
switch for sensitivity analysis. 
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46 Effect of Modularity on Deployment Rate Due to Consensus (Linear)( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,1),(1,0.75)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This function "conjectures" how deployment rate of compliant technology \ 
drops in a linear fashion with increasing modularity due to the lack of \ 
consensus among industry players. This one of four conjectured \ 
relationships between modularity and consensus that is selected wtih a \ 
switch for sensitivity analysis. 
47 Effect of Modularity on Deployment Rate Due to Consensus (Very Convex)( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,1),(0.211009,0.969298),(0.406728,0.925439),(0.626911,0.855263),(0.847095\ 
,0.741228),(0.905199,0.653509),(0.963303,0.486842),(1,0.25)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This function "conjectures" how deployment rate of compliant technology \ 
drops in a very convex fashion with increasing modularity due to the lack \ 
of consensus among industry players. This one of four conjectured \ 
relationships between modularity and consensus that is selected wtih a \ 
switch for sensitivity analysis. 
48 Effect of Modularity on Effort to Coordinate (Concave)( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0.1),(0.333333,0.171053),(0.541284,0.20614),(0.746177,0.22807),(0.865443\ 
,0.236842),(0.993884,0.25)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This function "conjectures" how effort required to build consensus for \ 
regulatory purposes increases in a concave fashion with increasing \ 
modularity due to the lack of consensus among industry players. This one \ 
of four conjectured relationships between modularity and consensus that is \ 
selected wtih a switch for sensitivity analysis. 
49 Effect of Modularity on Effort to Coordinate (Convex)( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0.1),(0.409786,0.144737),(0.654434,0.267544),(0.82263,0.416667),(0.93578\ 
,0.535088),(0.996942,0.609649)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This function "conjectures" how effort required to build consensus for \ 
regulatory purposes increases in a convex fashion with increasing \ 
modularity due to the lack of consensus among industry players. This one \ 
of four conjectured relationships between modularity and consensus that is \ 
selected wtih a switch for sensitivity analysis. 
50 Effect of Modularity on Effort to Coordinate (Linear)( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0.1),(1,0.35)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This function "conjectures" how effort required to build consensus for \ 
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regulatory purposes increases in a linear fashion with increasing \ 
modularity due to the lack of consensus among industry players. This one \ 
of four conjectured relationships between modularity and consensus that is \ 
selected wtih a switch for sensitivity analysis. 
51 Effect of Modularity on Effort to Coordinate (Very Convex)( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0.1),(0.440367,0.122807),(0.59633,0.157895),(0.721713,0.232456),(0.792049\ 
,0.328947),(0.859327,0.460526),(0.908257,0.618421),(0.957187,0.776316),(1,1)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This function "conjectures" how effort required to build consensus for \ 
regulatory purposes increases in a very convex fashion with increasing \ 
modularity due to the lack of consensus among industry players. This one \ 
of four conjectured relationships between modularity and consensus that is \ 
selected wtih a switch for sensitivity analysis. 
52 Effect of Modularity on Enforcement Cost( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(0.477064,0.105263),(0.706422,0.214912),(0.83792,0.421053),(0.908257\ 
,0.618421),(1,1)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This function "conjectures" how enforcement cost for regulators increase \ 
in a convex fashion with increasing modularity. 
53 Effect of Modularity on Maximum Attainable Ancillary Performance( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0.5),(1,1)) 
~ Dmnl 
~ This function represents how modularity affects the achievable level of \ 
innovation. More innovation is possible to achieve in more modular \ 
structures. 
54 Effect of Modularity on Maximum Attainable Primary Performance( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,1),(1,0.5)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This function represents how modularity affects the achievable level of \ 
quality. More quality is possible to achieve in more integrated (i.e. less \ 
modular) structures. 
55 Effect of Modularity on Resource Reorientation Time( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0.67),(1,0.33)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This function represents the effect of modularity on organizational \ 
rigidity. Firms in more modular industries are more nible in reallocating \ 
resources and vice versa. 
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56 Effect of Modularity on Time to Acquire Ancillary Performance( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0.67),(1,0.33)) 
~ Dmnl 
~ This function represents how modularity affects dimensional complexity, \ 
and therefore the time to innovate. More modular product has less \ 
dimensional complexity and requires less time to innovate. Highy \ 
integrated products become dimensionally complex, requiring more time. 
57 Effect of Modularity on Time to Acquire Primary Performance( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0.33),(1,0.67)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This function represents how modularity affects functional control over \ 
components, and therefore the time to build in quality. The functional \ 
control is higher in more integrated products, requiring less time to \ 
acquire quality. Highy modular products create more dependencies when \ 
developing system-level quality, requiring more more time to develope \ 
quality. 
58 Effect of Outsourcing on Fixed Cost( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,1),(1,0)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This function represents how a firm reduces its fixed cost by outsourcing \ 
(or becoming modular). In reality, the fixed costs never go to zero, but \ 
it become small enough compared to that for the fully integrated structure 
59 Effect of Own Market Share on Interface Proprietization( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(0.477064,0.105263),(0.706422,0.214912),(0.83792,0.421053),(0.908257\ 
,0.618421),(1,1)) 
~ Dmnl 
~ This function represents how firm's own market share (i.e. market power) \ 
creates incentive to integrate. The incentive to integrate is increasing \ 
and convex as the firm gains market share. The output of the function acts \ 
as multiplier for the Maximum Fractional Rate of Making Interfaces \ 
Proprietary. 
60 Effect of Price on Attractivenss[Firm]= 
EXP(Sensitivity of Attractiveness to Price * Price[Firm]/Reference Price for Attractiveness\ 
) 
~ Dmnl 
~ Effect of Price on Attractiveness: The service becomes more attractive \ 
when the price is lower than the reference, and less attractive when it is \ 
higher. 
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61 Effect of Primary Performance on Attractiveness[Firm]= 
EXP(Sensitivity of Attractiveness to Primary Performance * Primary Performance[Firm]\ 
/Reference Primary Performance for Attractiveness 
) 
~ Dmnl 
~ Effect of Primary Performance on Attractiveness: The service is more \ 
attractive when the primary performance (quality) is higher than the \ 
reference. 
62 Effect of Scale on Marginal Cost( 
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,1),(1,0)) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This function represents the economies of scale a firm enjoyes with \ 
growing number of adopters. 
62 Exit[Incumbent]= 
IF THEN ELSE(Potential Adopters<0, (IF THEN ELSE(Adopters[Incumbent]>0, (Market Entry Switch\ 
[Incumbent] * Loss of Adopters Rate 
* (- Potential Adopters) * (1- 
Market Share of Attractiveness[Incumbent])) , 0)) + (IF THEN ELSE(Adopters[Entrant]>\ 
0, 0, (Market Entry Switch[Entrant] 
* Loss of Adopters Rate * (- Potential Adopters) * (1- 
Market Share of Attractiveness[Entrant]) ) ) ), 0) ~~ 
Exit[Entrant]= 
IF THEN ELSE(Potential Adopters<0, (IF THEN ELSE(Adopters[Entrant]>0, (Market Entry Switch\ 
[Entrant] * Loss of Adopters Rate 
* Potential Adopters * (1- 
Market Share of Attractiveness[Entrant])) , 0)) + (IF THEN ELSE(Adopters[Incumbent]>\ 
0, 0, (Market Entry Switch[Incumbent 
] * Loss of Adopters Rate * Potential Adopters * (1- 
Market Share of Attractiveness[Incumbent]) ) ) ), 0) 
~ Unit/Month 
~ Formulates the loss of adopters for a firm. The shrinking of the market is \ 
slighly involved. When market shrinks, firms lose adopters according to \ 
their Market Share of Product Attractiveness. The more attractive the \ 
product, the smaller is the firm's loss of adopters. When the market \ 
shrinks, the adjustment some times can be such that a firm may lose all of \ 
its adopters and would have lost more if it had them. So, when there is a \ 
situation that a firm loses all its adopters but the market continues to \ 
shrink, the remaining adopters come from the other firm. In other words, \ 
the the less popular firm first goes out of business, while the more \ 
popular one survices but with a few adopters. 
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63 Exogenous Fraction Willing to Adopt= 
1 
~ Dimensionless [0,1] 
~ This parameter is used a scenario when the effect of demand curve needs to \ 
be excluded to simplify the analysis. Range [0,1] 
63 Entrants Adopters from Market Expansion= 
(Fraction Willing to Adopt After Entrant - Fraction Willing to Adopt beore Entrant) \ 
* Initial Market Potential * Initial Adopter Adjustment Pulse 
~ Unit*Month 
~  
64 Expected Adopters[Firm]= 
Adopters[Firm] * EXP(Forecast Horizon[Firm] * Expected Growth Rate of Adopters[Firm]\ 
) 
~ Unit 
~ Expected Adopters after the forecast horizon. 
65 Expected Growth Rate of Adopters[Firm]= 
MIN(Indicated Growth Rate of Adopters[Firm], Maximum Expected Growth Rate/Adjustment for Month\ 
) 
~ 1/Month 
~ Behavioral parameter to cap the Trend function output. When the Input to \ 
the Trand function (in this case, the Indicated Growth Rate of Adopters) \ 
is initially 0, the first time this input becomes non-zero the Indicated \ 
Growth Rate is a large value. In practice, people don't react to unusually \ 
large forecast values, and so this MIN function provides that expected \ 
growth rate below which people consider the forecasts more  believable. 
66 Expected Market Share[Firm]= 
ZIDZ(Expected Adopters[Firm],Total Expected Adopters[Firm]) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Expected Market Share 
67 Firm: 
Incumbent, Entrant 
~ Dmnl 
~ In this model there is a single incumbent and multiple entrants. The \ 
entrants are combined as a single player. 
68 Firm's Initial Attention to Ancillary Performance[Firm]= 
0,1 
~ Dimensionless [0,1] 
~ Attention firms pay to innovation (Ancillary Performance) at time 0. \ 
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Typically, a dominant incumbent pays little attention to innovation, while \ 
the entrant pays most of its attention to innovation. 
69 Firm's Initial Resources to Ancillary Performance[Firm]= 
(1-Fraction of Resources to Unit Compliance[Firm]) * Firm's Initial Attention to Ancillary Performance\ 
[Firm 
] 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Adjusting for regulatory compliance, as the current assumption requires \ 
firms to allocate necessary resources for regulatory compliance and use \ 
the remaining for performance. 
70 Fixed Cost[Firm]= 
Switch to Endogenize Price * Initial Fixed Cost[Firm] * Effect of Outsourcing on Fixed Cost\ 
(Modularity[Firm]) + (1-Switch to Endogenize Price) * Initial Fixed Cost[Firm] 
~ Dollar/(Month*Unit) 
~ Fraction of total cost that is fixed cost. 
71 Fixed Maximum Attainable Ancillary Performance[Firm]= 
1,1 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Fixed and exgonenous limit on innovation (ancillary performance). Maximum \ 
attainable innovation normalized to 1. When used, this constant means that \ 
there is no architectural constraint on how much ancillary performance can \ 
be achieved in integrated structures. 
72 Fixed Maximum Attainable Primary Performance[Firm]= 
1,1 
~ Dimensionless [0,1] 
~ Fixed and exogenous limit on quality (primary performance. Maximum \ 
possible quality (primary performance) normalized to 1. When used, it \ 
means that modular structures are capable of attaining the same primary \ 
performance as the integrated structures. 
73 Forecast Horizon[Firm]= 
6 
~ Month 
~ Number of months over which to forecast. 
74 Fraction of Firms Regulated[Incumbent]= 
1 ~~ 
Fraction of Firms Regulated[Entrant]= 
1 
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~ Dimensionless [0,1,1] 
~ This parameter allows the modeler to create scenarios of full or parial \ 
regulation or deregulation of the industry. FCC's philosophy of regulating \ 
narrowly can be simulated with this parameter. 
75 Fraction of Resources to Unit Compliance[Firm]= 
(Fraction of Resources to Unit Deployment[Firm] + Fraction of Resources to Unit Maintenance\ 
[Firm] + Fraction of Resources to Unit Coordination 
[Firm]) 
~ Dimensionless 
~  
76 Fraction of Resources to Unit Coordination[Firm]= 
Maximum Fractional Resources to Coordination[Firm] * (IF THEN ELSE(Switch for Effect of Modularity on Consensus 
=1, "Effect of Modularity on Effort to Coordinate (Very Convex)" 
(Modularity[Firm]), 0) + IF THEN ELSE(Switch for Effect of Modularity on Consensus=2\ 
, "Effect of Modularity on Effort to Coordinate (Convex)" 
(Modularity[Firm]), 0) + IF THEN ELSE(Switch for Effect of Modularity on Consensus=3\ 
, "Effect of Modularity on Effort to Coordinate (Linear)" 
(Modularity[Firm]), 0) + IF THEN ELSE(Switch for Effect of Modularity on Consensus=4\ 
, "Effect of Modularity on Effort to Coordinate (Concave)" 
(Modularity[Firm]), 0)) * (Required Compliance[Firm]/Potential Market) 
~ Dimensionless 
~  
77 Fraction of Resources to Unit Deployment[Firm]= 
Normal Fractional Resources to Deployment[Firm] * Effect of Compliance Gap on Resources to Deployment\ 
(Compliance Gap 
[Firm]/Potential Market) 
~ Dimensionless 
~  
78 Fraction of Resources to Unit Maintenance[Firm]= 
Maximum Fractional Resources to Maintenance[Firm] * Effect of Market Share on Resources to Maintenance\ 
(MIN(Required Compliance[Firm]/Potential Market, Market Share[Firm])) 
~ Dimensionless 
~  
79 Fraction Willing to Adopt= 
MAX(0, MIN(1, (1 - MIN(Price[Incumbent], Price[Entrant])/Reference Price ))) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Fraction of the potential market willing to adopt as determined by minimum \ 
price 
80 Fractional Deployment Rate of Compliance Mechanism[Firm]= 
Maximum Fractional Deployment Rate Under Maximum Consensus[Firm] * ( (Switch to Make Consensus Exogenous\ 
* Exogenous Achievable Compliance and Fractional Deployment Multiplier[Firm]) + (1\ 
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- Switch to Make Consensus Exogenous) * (IF THEN ELSE(Switch for Effect of Modularity on Consensus 
=1, "Effect of Modularity on Deployment Rate Due to Consensus (Very Convex)" 
(Modularity[Firm]), 0) + IF THEN ELSE(Switch for Effect of Modularity on Consensus=2\ 
, "Effect of Modularity on Deployment Rate Due to Consensus (Convex)" 
(Modularity[Firm]), 0) + IF THEN ELSE(Switch for Effect of Modularity on Consensus=3\ 
, "Effect of Modularity on Deployment Rate Due to Consensus (Linear)" 
(Modularity[Firm]), 0) + IF THEN ELSE(Switch for Effect of Modularity on Consensus=4\ 
, "Effect of Modularity on Deployment Rate Due to Consensus (Concave)" 
(Modularity[Firm]), 0))) 
~ Dmnl/Month 
~ Fraction of non-compliant users that can be made compliant in a month. 
81 Fractional Net Population Growth Rate= 
0 
~ 1/Month 
~ Net of Birth-Death Rate 
82 Indicated Growth Rate of Adopters[Firm]= 
TREND(Adopters[Firm], Time to Perceive Trend[Firm], Minimum Initial Annual Growth/Adjustment for Month\ 
) 
~ 1/Month 
~ Indicated growth rate in adopter base. Output of the Trend function. 
83 Initial Ancillary Performance[Firm]= 
0.5,1 
~ Dimensionless [0,1] 
~ Firm's service innovation (ancillary performance) when entering the market. 
84 Initial Compliance[Firm]= 
1,0 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Compliance for each firm at time 0. 
85 Initial Fixed Cost[Firm]= 
0.5,0.5 
~ Dollar/(Unit*Month) 
~ Fraction of Total Cost that is Fixed Cost in the absence of Outsourcing \ 
(i.e. in a completely integrated structure) 
86 Initial Installed Base[Firm]= 
3e+008,0 
~ Unit [0,1] 
~ This parameter lets the modeler start the model at different points on the \ 
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timeline along which the disruption occurs (imagine two S-curves of \ 
disruption along the time axis). If set to [0,0], the model starts with no \ 
firm having any market share. If set to [1,0], the model starts with the \ 
incumbent having the whole market and the entrant having none. 
87 Initial Marginal Cost[Firm]= 
0.25,0.25 
~ Dollar/(Month*Unit) 
~ Fraction of total cost that is marginal cost in the absence of economies \ 
of scale. 
88 Initial Market Potential= 
3e+008 
~ Unit 
~  
89 Initial Modularity[Firm]= 
0,1 
~ Dmnl 
~ Modularity of each industry (firm) at time 0. 
90 Initial Primary Performance[Firm]= 
1,0.5 
~ Dimensionless [0,1] 
~ Firm's service quality (primary performance) when entering the market. 
91 Interface Proprietization[Firm]= 
MAX(0, Market Entry Switch[Firm] * Switch to Endogenize Modularity * Pressure to Integrate by Making Interfaces 
Proprietary\ 
[Firm] * Maximum Fractional Rate of Making Interces Proprietary 
* 
Modularity[Firm]) 
~ Dmnl/Month 
~ Fraction of interfaces made proprietary every month. 
92 Interface Standardization[Firm]= 
Market Entry Switch[Firm] * Switch to Endogenize Modularity * Pressure to Disintegrate by Standardizing Interfaces\ 
[Firm] * (Maximum Fractional Rate of Interface Standardization 
* (Maximum Modularity 
- Modularity[Firm])) 
~ Dmnl/Month 
~ Fraction of interfaces standardized every month. 
93 Loss of Adopters Rate= 
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1 
~ 1/Month 
~ Used when the market demand shrinks due to regulation. 
94 Marginal Cost[Firm]= 
Switch to Endogenize Price * Initial Marginal Cost[Firm] * Effect of Scale on Marginal Cost\ 
(Market Share[Firm]) + (1 - Switch to Endogenize Price) * Initial Marginal Cost[Firm\ 
] 
~ Dollar/(Month*Unit) 
~  
95 Market Entry Switch[Firm]= 
STEP(Market Entry[Firm], Market Entry Time[Firm]) 
~ Dmnl 
~  
96 Market Entry Time[Firm]= 
0,60 
~ Month 
~ Time at which the first entrant enters the market 
97 Market Entry[Firm]= 
1,1 
~ Dmnl [0,1,1] 
~ When set to ON, the firm enters the market; otherwise, it does not 
98 Market Share of Attractiveness[Firm]= 
Product Attractiveness[Firm]/Total Attractiveness of all Products 
~ Dmnl 
~ Market share is determined by the attractiveness of each firm's products \ 
relative to the  attractiveness of the other firms' products. 
99 Market Share[Firm]= 
ZIDZ( Adopters[Firm], Total Adopters) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Market share of each firm. 
100 Maximum Attainable Ancillary Performance[Firm]= 
Switch to Endogenize Modularity * Variable Maximum Attainable Ancillary Performance[\ 
Firm] + (1-Switch to Endogenize Modularity 
)*Fixed Maximum Attainable Ancillary Performance[Firm] 
~ Dimensionless 
~  
101 Maximum Attainable Innovation in a Fully Modular Technology and Industry= 
1 
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~ Dmnl 
~ Maximum attainable innovation, normalized to 1. 
102 Maximum Attainable Primary Performance[Firm]= 
Switch to Endogenize Modularity * Variable Maximum Attainable Primary Performance[Firm\ 
] + (1-Switch to Endogenize Modularity 
)*Fixed Maximum Attainable Primary Performance[Firm] 
~ Dimensionless 
~  
103 Maximum Attainable Quality in a Fully Integrated Technology and Industry= 
1 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Maximum attainable quality, normalized to 1. 
104 Maximum Expected Growth Rate= 
0.1 
~ 1/Year [0,1] 
~ Annual Maximum Growth Rate below which people pay attention to forecasts. 
105 Maximum Fractional Deployment Rate Under Maximum Consensus[Firm]= 
1/Time to Comply[Firm] 
~ Dmnl/Month 
~ Maximum fraction of non-compliant users that can be made compliant in a \ 
month. 
106 Maximum Fractional Rate of Interface Standardization= 
0.01 
~ Dmnl/Month 
~ This parameter represents the rate at which the remaining fraction of \ 
integrated structure (architecture or industry structure) is being \ 
standardized. This parameter has a flavor of clockspeed thinking. The \ 
higher value represents faster clock speed. 
107 Maximum Fractional Rate of Making Interces Proprietary= 
0.01 
~ Dmnl/Month 
~ This parameter represents the rate at which the remaining fraction of \ 
modular structure (architecture or industry structure) is being \ 
integrated. This parameter has a flavor of clockspeed thinking. The higher \ 
value represents faster clock speed. 
108 Maximum Fractional Resources to Coordination[Firm]= 
0.25,0.25 
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~ Dimensionless 
~ Fraction of resources the firm allocates for coordination with other firms \ 
inorder to comply with regulation. This parameter allows the modeler to \ 
change the coordination cost. 
109 Maximum Fractional Resources to Maintenance[Firm]= 
0 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Fraction of resources the firm allocates to maintaining compliance if it \ 
had the whole market. This parameter allows the modeler to change the \ 
maintenance cost. 
110 Maximum Modularity= 
1 
~ Dmnl 
~ Normalized to 1. 
111 Maximum Unit Coordination Cost[Firm]= 
Maximum Fractional Resources to Coordination[Firm] * Cost of Resources[Firm] 
~ Dollar/(Unit*Month) 
~ Maximum per unit cost of coordination required for regulatory compliance 
112 Minimum Initial Annual Growth= 
0.02 
~ 1/Year 
~ Minimum annual growth rate of adopters. 
113 Modularity[Firm]= INTEG ( 
Interface Standardization[Firm]-Interface Proprietization[Firm], 
Initial Modularity[Firm]) 
~ Dmnl 
~ Current level of modularity of the technology and industry structure for \ 
each industry structure (as manifested in their representative firm). 
114 Net Population Growth Rate= 
Fractional Net Population Growth Rate * Potential Market 
~ Unit/Month 
~  
115 Normal Fractional Resources to Deployment[Firm]= 
0 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Fraction of resources th firm allocates to compliance as long as there is \ 
compliance gap. This parameter allows the modeler to change the deployment \ 
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cost. 
116 Normal Resource Reorientation Time= 
15 
~ Month 
~ This parameter allows the modeler to vary the time it takes the firm to \ 
resources its resources as desired for sensitivity tests. 
117 Normal Time to Acquire Innovation= 
15 
~ Month 
~ This parameter allows the modeler to vary the time it takes to innovate in \ 
a sensitivity test. Currently set such that a modular firm takes 1/3rd of \ 
the time whereas the integrated firm takes 2/3 of this time. 
118 Normal Time to Acquire Quality= 
15 
~ Month 
~ This parameter allows the modeler to vary the time it takes to acquire \ 
quality in a sensitivity test. Currently set such that a modular firm \ 
takes 2/3rd of the time whereas the integrated firm takes 1/3 of this time. 
119 Normalized Coordination Cost[Firm]= 
Unit Coordination Cost[Firm]/Maximum Unit Coordination Cost[Firm] 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Normalized Coordination Cost 
120 Percentage Attractiveness from Compatibility[Firm]= 
Effect of Compatibility on Attractiveness[Firm]/Product Attractiveness[Firm] 
~ Dimensionless 
~  
121 Percentage Attractiveness from Price[Firm]= 
-Effect of Price on Attractivenss[Firm]/Product Attractiveness[Firm] 
~ Dimensionless 
~  
122 Percentage Required Compliance[Firm]= 
100*Required Compliance[Firm]/Potential Market 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Percentage of Total Market that is required to be compliant if the firm \ 
owned complete market share 
123 Potential Adopters= 
(Switch for Exogenous Demand * Exogenous Fraction Willing to Adopt +(1 - Switch for Exogenous Demand\ 
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) * Fraction Willing to Adopt) * Potential Market- Total Adopters 
~ Unit 
~ Ramaining Market Potential 
124 Potential Market= INTEG ( 
Net Population Growth Rate, 
Initial Market Potential) 
~ Unit 
~ Population Eligible to become Potential Adopters 
125 Pressure to Disintegrate by Standardizing Interfaces[Incumbent]= 
Effect of Competitors Market Share on Interface Standardization(Market Share[Entrant\ 
]) ~~ 
Pressure to Disintegrate by Standardizing Interfaces[Entrant]= 
Effect of Competitors Market Share on Interface Standardization(Market Share[Incumbent\ 
]) 
~ Dmnl 
~  
126 Pressure to Integrate by Making Interfaces Proprietary[Incumbent]= 
Effect of Own Market Share on Interface Proprietization(Market Share[Incumbent]) ~~ 
Pressure to Integrate by Making Interfaces Proprietary[Entrant]= 
Effect of Own Market Share on Interface Proprietization(Market Share[Entrant]) 
~ Dmnl 
~  
127 Price[Firm]= 
((1 - Switch for Subsidy[Firm]) * Switch to Endogenize Regulatory Cost and Resources\ 
* Unit Compliance Cost[Firm]) + Total Cost of Service[Firm] 
~ Dollar/(Month*Unit) 
~ Price of the service. 
128 Primary Performance Gain[Firm]= 
MAX(0, Switch to Endogenize Quality and Innovation * Market Entry Switch[Firm] * Resources to Primary Performance\ 
[Firm] 
* ((Maximum Attainable Primary Performance[Firm 
] - Primary Performance 
[Firm])/Time to Acquire Primary Performance[Firm])) 
~ 1/Month 
~ Performance change given the gap between Maximum and the current primary \ 
performance, as weighted by the current resource allocation. 
129 Primary Performance Loss[Firm]= 
MAX(0, Switch to Endogenize Quality and Innovation * Market Entry Switch[Firm] * ((Primary Performance\ 
[Firm] - Maximum Attainable Primary Performance 
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[Firm])/Time to Acquire Primary Performance[Firm])) 
~ Dimensionless/Month 
~  
130 Primary Performance[Firm]= INTEG (Primary Performance Gain[Firm]-Primary Performance Loss\ 
[Firm], 
Initial Primary Performance[Firm]) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Firm's (or represented industry's) current primary performance. 
131 Product Attractiveness[Firm]= 
Effect of Compatibility on Attractiveness[Firm] * Effect of Price on Attractivenss[Firm\ 
] * Effect of Primary Performance on Attractiveness[Firm] * Effect of Ancillary Performance on Attractiveness\ 
[Firm] 
~ Dmnl 
~ Combined Effect of Price and Installed Base 
132 Reference Ancillary Performance for Attractiveness= 
0.5 
~ Dmnl [0,1] 
~ The reference is a scaling factor representing the reference beyond which \ 
ancillary performance effects become important. Ancillary performance is \ 
synonymous with "Innovation". 
133 Reference Installed Base for Compatibility= 
3e+007 
~ Unit 
~ The reference is a scaling factor representing the size of the installed \ 
base above which network effects become important. 
134 Reference Price for Attractiveness= 
0.5 
~ Dollar/(Unit*Month) 
~ Price Customer Expects to pay for Incumbent's Service. The reference is a \ 
scaling factor representing the price below which price effects become \ 
important. 
135 Reference Price= 
1 
~ Dollar/(Month*Unit) 
~ Calibration point for the demand curve 
136 Reference Primary Performance for Attractiveness= 
0.5 
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~ Dmnl [0,1] 
~ The reference is a scaling factor representing the level beyond which \ 
primar performance effects become important. Ancillary performance is \ 
synonymous with "Quality". 
137 Required Compliance[Incumbent]= 
0 +STEP(Fraction of Firms Regulated[Incumbent]*Potential Market,Time of Regulation Incumbent\ 
) ~~ 
Required Compliance[Entrant]= 
0 +STEP(Fraction of Firms Regulated[Entrant]*Potential Market, Time of Regulation Entrant\ 
) 
~ Unit 
~ Number of adopters for each firm's (industry's) network that is required \ 
to be compliant. 
138 Resource Allocation Rate for Ancillary Performance[Firm]= 
Switch to Endogenize Resources[Firm] * (MAX(0, (Attention on Ancillary Performance Gain\ 
[Firm] - Resources to Ancillary Performance[Firm])/Resource Reorientation Time 
[Firm])) 
~ Dimensionless/Month 
~  
139 Resource Allocation Rate to Primary Performance[Firm]= 
Switch to Endogenize Resources[Firm] * (MAX(0, (Resources to Ancillary Performance[Firm\ 
] - Attention on Ancillary Performance Loss[Firm])/Resource Reorientation Time 
[Firm 
])) 
~ Dimensionless/Month 
~  
140 Resource Reorientation Time[Incumbent]= 
Normal Resource Reorientation Time * Effect of Modularity on Resource Reorientation Time\ 
(Modularity[Incumbent]) * Test Parameter to Make Incumbent Inherently Agile or Sluggish\ 
~~ 
Resource Reorientation Time[Entrant]= 
Normal Resource Reorientation Time * Effect of Modularity on Resource Reorientation Time\ 
(Modularity[Entrant]) * Test Parameter to Make Entrant Inherently Agile or Sluggish 
~ Month 
~ Time to reorient resources. This includes writing a report, convincing the \ 
management, and convincing your best people to move from their current \ 
activity to the new focus. 
141 Resources to Ancillary Performance[Firm]= INTEG ( 
Resource Allocation Rate for Ancillary Performance[Firm]-Resource Allocation Rate to Primary Performance\ 
[Firm], 
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Firm's Initial Resources to Ancillary Performance[Firm]) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Fraction of total resources to innovation. 
142 Resources to Performance[Firm]= 
(1 - (Fraction of Resources to Unit Compliance[Firm]*Switch to Endogenize Regulatory Cost and Resources\ 
)) * Total Resources[Firm] 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Fraction of firm's (or represented industry's) total resources to quality \ 
and innovation. 
143 Resources to Primary Performance[Firm]= 
(1 - Switch for Regulatory Cost to Additional Functionality) * Resources to Regulation\ 
[Firm] + MAX (0, (Resources to Performance[Firm] - Resources to Ancillary Performance\ 
[Firm])) 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Fraction of total resources to quality. 
144 Resources to Regulation[Firm]= 
Fraction of Resources to Unit Compliance[Firm] * Switch to Endogenize Regulatory Cost and Resources\ 
* Total Resources[Firm] 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Fraction of firm's (or represented industry's) total resources to \ 
regulatory compliance. 
145 Sensitivity of Attractiveness to Ancillary Performance= 
13.5 
~ Dimensionless [0,100] 
~ This parameter allows the modeler to vary the effect of ancillary \ 
performance on product attractiveness in sensitivity tests. 
146 Sensitivity of Attractiveness to Installed Base= 
1 
~ Dmnl [0,100] 
~ The parameter allows the modeler to vary the strength of the effect of \ 
compatiblity (i.e. network effect) on product attractiveness in \ 
sensitivity tests. 
147 Sensitivity of Attractiveness to Price= 
-5 
~ Dmnl [-100,0] 
~ The parameter allows the modeler to vary the strength of the effect of \ 
price on product attractiveness in sensitivity tests. It is price \ 
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elasticity of product attractiveness. A value of 100 means, 1% increase in \ 
price causes 100% change in attractiveness. 
148 Sensitivity of Attractiveness to Primary Performance= 
5 
~ Dimensionless [0,100] 
~ This parameter allows the modeler to vary the effect of primary \ 
performance on product attractiveness in sensitivity tests 
149 Supply Side Average Time to Deploy= 
(1/Fractional Deployment Rate of Compliance Mechanism[Incumbent]) * (MIN( Required Compliance\ 
[Incumbent], Achievable Compliance[Entrant])/Potential Market 
) + (1/Fractional Deployment Rate of Compliance Mechanism[Entrant]) * (MIN( Required Compliance\ 
[Entrant], Achievable Compliance[Entrant])/Potential Market) 
~ Month 
~  
150 Switch for Effect of Modularity on Consensus= 
1 
~ Dimensionless [1,4,1] 
~ When 1, achievable compliance is decreasing and very convex with \ 
increasing modularity. When 2, achievable compliance is decreasing and \ 
convex with increasing modularity. When 3, achievable compliance is \ 
decreasing and linear with increasing modularity. When 4, achievable \ 
compliance is decreasing and concave with increasing modularity. 
151 Switch for Exogenous Demand= 
1 
~ Dimensionless [0,1,1] 
~ When set to 1, exogenous demand of 1 (i.e. the entire potential market) is \ 
used. When set to 0, the demand curve is used. 
152 Switch for Highly Reactive Reallocation of Attention and Resources= 
0 
~ Dimensionless [0,1,1] 
~ When set to 0 (OFF), a real-life-like policy for resource allocation is \ 
used. This policy of wait-and-watch is deduced from interviews with \ 
incumbents and entrant firms. When set to 1 (ON), a highly reactive \ 
policy, where resources,commensurate with the expected market share of the \ 
competitor is used. 
153 Switch for Regulatory Cost to Additional Functionality= 
1 
~ Dimensionless [0,1,1] 
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~ When set to 1 all of the regulatory cost is allocated to functionality \ 
additional to the primary and ancillary features that the firm markets \ 
(i.e. to neither primary or ancillary performance). For example, \ 
wiretapping (CALEA compliance), emergency calling (911) will require \ 
additional functionality, whereas supporting universal service obligations \ 
does not require new functionality but only needs more of the same. When \ 
set to 0, all of the regulatory cost is provided to maintain certain \ 
minimum primary performance. 
154 Switch to Endogenize Modularity= 
0 
~ Dimensionless [0,1,1] 
~ When ON, industry level modularity is endogenous and reacts to competitive \ 
pressures. When OFF, industry level modularity stays at the initial level. 
155 Switch to Endogenize Price= 
0 
~ Dimensionless [0,1,1] 
~ When ON, there is economies of scale. When OFF, the price remains constant \ 
at the initial value. 
156 Switch to Endogenize Quality and Innovation= 
1 
~ Dimensionless [0,1,1] 
~ When ON, it limits the attinable ancillary performance as a function of \ 
modularity. 
157 Switch to Endogenize Regulatory Cost and Resources= 
1 
~ Dimensionless [0,1,1] 
~ When ON, the regulation affects firm's cost (hence the price) and resources 
158 Switch to Endogenize Resources[Firm]= 
1 
~ Dimensionless [0,1,1] 
~ When ON, firms reallocate resources. When OFF, the firms keep their \ 
initial resource allocation. 
159 Switch to Make Consensus Exogenous= 
0 
~ Dimensionless [0,1] 
~ When ON, exogenous function of modularity is used to calculate the effort \ 
required to bulid consensus, fractional deployment of compliance, and the \ 
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coordination costs. This parameter is turned on only for sensitivity test. \ 
For example, for a result of Paper 1. 
160 Switching Cost[Firm]= 
0.95, 0.95 
~ 1/Month [0,1] 
~ Percentage customers that make a decision about switching every year 
161 Switching[Firm]= 
Adopters[Firm] * (1 - Switching Cost[Firm]) 
~ Unit/Month 
~ Number of customers that make a switching decision every month 
162 Test Parameter to Change Entrants Time to Acquire Innovation= 
1 
~ Dimensionless [0,3] 
~ This variable can be used to change the Time to Acquire Innovation for the \ 
entrant. When = 1, it has no effect on the Time to Acquire Innovaion as \ 
calculated by other variables. When >1, it increases the time taken to \ 
acquire innovation above normal. The value of <1 reduces it below normal. 
163 Test Parameter to Change Entrants Time to Acquire Quality= 
1 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This variable can be used to change the Time to Acquire Quality for the \ 
entrant. When = 1, it has no effect on the Time to Acquire Performance as \ 
calculated by other variables. When >1, it increases the time taken to \ 
acquire quality above normal. The value of <1 reduces it below normal. 
164 Test Parameter to Change Incumbents Time to Acquire Innovation= 
1 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This variable can be used to change the Time to Acquire Innovation for the \ 
incumbent. When = 1, it has no effect on the Time to Acquire Performance \ 
as calculated by other variables. When >1, it increases the time taken to \ 
acquire innovation above what it would otherwise be. The value of <1 \ 
reduces it below its value otherwise. 
165 Test Parameter to Make Entrant Inherently Agile or Sluggish= 
1 
~ Dimensionless [0,3] 
~ This factor simulates conditions where the Entrant is inherrently agile or \ 
slugish. A value = 1 means Entrant has the same Normal Resource \ 
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Reorientation Time. A value< 1 means the Entrant is more agile and takes \ 
less time to reorient resources. A value > 1 means the Entant is more \ 
slugish and takes longer to reorient resources. 
166 Test Parameter to Make Incumbent Inherently Agile or Sluggish= 
1 
~ Dimensionless 
~ This factor simulates conditions where the incumbent is inherrently agile \ 
or slugish. A value = 1 means Incumbent has the same Normal Resource \ 
Reorientation Time. A value< 1 means the Incumbent is more agile and takes \ 
less time to reorient resources. A value > 1 means the Incumbent is more \ 
slugish and takes longer to reorient resources. 
167 Time (Years)= 
Time/Adjustment for Month 
~ Year 
~  
168 Time of Regulation Entrant= 
96 
~ Month [0,240] 
~ Time at which Entant is regulated. This parameter allows the modeler to \ 
create the different timing-related scenarios of when the Incumbent and \ 
Entrant are regulated or deregulated. 
169 Time of Regulation Incumbent= 
0 
~ Month [0,10] 
~ Time at which the Incumbent is regulated. This parameter allows the \ 
modeler to create the different timing-related scenarios of when the \ 
Incumbent and Entrant are regulated or deregulated. 
170 Time to Acquire Ancillary Performance[Incumbent]= 
Normal Time to Acquire Innovation * Effect of Modularity on Time to Acquire Ancillary Performance\ 
(Modularity[Incumbent] 
) * Test Parameter to Change Incumbents Time to Acquire Innovation ~~ 
Time to Acquire Ancillary Performance[Entrant]= 
Normal Time to Acquire Innovation * Effect of Modularity on Time to Acquire Ancillary Performance\ 
(Modularity[Entrant])  
* Test Parameter to Change Entrants Time to Acquire Innovation 
~ Month 
~ Total time required to attain the desired innovation. 
171 Time to Acquire Primary Performance[Incumbent]= 
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Normal Time to Acquire Quality * Effect of Modularity on Time to Acquire Primary Performance\ 
(Modularity[Incumbent]) ~~ 
Time to Acquire Primary Performance[Entrant]= 
Normal Time to Acquire Quality * Effect of Modularity on Time to Acquire Primary Performance\ 
(Modularity[Entrant]) * Test Parameter to Change Entrants Time to Acquire Quality 
~ Month 
~ Total time required to attain the desired quality. 
172 Time to Comply[Firm]= 
96,96 
~ Month 
~ Total Time to Deploy the lower of the achievable or maximum compliance. 
173 Time to Lose Compliance= 
3 
~ Month 
~ Time it takes for innovation that erode compliance to be adopted. 
174 Time to Perceive Trend[Firm]= 
12 
~ Month 
~ Period for accumulating observations before deducing the trend. 
175 Total Adopters= 
SUM(Adopters[Firm!]) 
~ Unit 
~ Installed base of Incumbent and Entrants 
176 Total Attractiveness of all Products= 
SUM(Product Attractiveness[Firm!]) 
~ Dmnl 
~ Total attractiveness is the sum of the attractiveness levels of all \ 
products in the marketplace. 
177 Total Cost of Service[Firm]= 
Fixed Cost[Firm] + Marginal Cost[Firm] 
~ Dollar/(Month*Unit) 
~  
178 Total Demand from Switching= 
SUM(Switching[Firm!]) 
~ Unit/Month 
~ Customers from Incumbent and Entrant that make a switching decision every \ 
month 
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179 Total Expected Adopters[Firm]= 
SUM(Expected Adopters[Firm!]) 
~ Unit 
~  
180 Total Resources[Firm]= 
1,1 
~ Dimensionless 
~ Total resources with each firm, normalized to 1. Both firms endowed with \ 
equal and constant resources. 
181 Unit Compliance Cost[Firm]= 
Unit Deployment Cost[Firm] + Unit Maintenance Cost[Firm] + Unit Coordination Cost[Firm\ 
] 
~ Dollar/(Month*Unit) 
~ The fraction of total cost of making the service to a single adopter \ 
compliant. This cost is passed on to the adopter when the regulator does \ 
not subsidize the firm. 
182 Unit Coordination Cost[Firm]= 
Fraction of Resources to Unit Coordination[Firm] * Cost of Resources[Firm] 
~ Dollar/(Month*Unit) 
~ Fraction of total cost towards coordination for regulatory compliance for \ 
a single user. 
183 Unit Deployment Cost[Firm]= 
Fraction of Resources to Unit Deployment[Firm] * Cost of Resources[Firm] 
~ Dollar/(Month*Unit) 
~ Fraction of total cost towards deploying regulatory compliance for a \ 
single user. 
184 Unit Enforcement Cost[Firm]= 
Base Enforcement Cost * Effect of Modularity on Enforcement Cost(Modularity[Firm]) *\ 
(Required Compliance[Firm]/Potential Market) 
~ Dollar/(Month*Unit) 
~ Marginal enforcement cost. 
185 Unit Maintenance Cost[Firm]= 
Fraction of Resources to Unit Maintenance[Firm] * Cost of Resources[Firm] 
~ Dollar/(Month*Unit) 
~ Fraction of total cost towards maintaining regulatory compliance for a \ 
single user. 
186 Unit Regulatory Cost[Firm]= 
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Unit Compliance Cost[Firm]+ Unit Enforcement Cost[Firm] 
~ Dollar/(Month*Unit) 
~ Such summing of the two regulatory costs is notional. The real costs are \ 
difficult to assess here. 
187 Variable Maximum Attainable Ancillary Performance[Firm]= 
Maximum Attainable Innovation in a Fully Modular Technology and Industry * Effect of Modularity on Maximum Attainable 
Ancillary Performance 
(Modularity[Firm]) 
~ Dmnl 
~  
188 Variable Maximum Attainable Primary Performance[Firm]= 
Maximum Attainable Quality in a Fully Integrated Technology and Industry * Effect of Modularity on Maximum Attainable 
Primary Performance\ 
(Modularity[Firm]) 
~ Dimensionless 
~  
189 Weighted Firm Innovation[Firm]= 
Ancillary Performance[Firm] * Market Share[Firm] 
~ Dimensionless 
~  
190 Weighted Firm Modularity[Firm]= 
Modularity[Firm] * Market Share[Firm] 
~ Dimensionless 
~  
191 Weighted Firm Quality[Firm]= 
Primary Performance[Firm] * Market Share[Firm] 
~ Dimensionless 
~  
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Appendix C – Instructions for Reproducing Experiments 
Reproducing Chapter 2 Figures 
Required vs. Actual Compliance (Figure 7(a)) 
Variable Value Notes 
Market Entry 1,0 Only incumbent in the market 
Initial Installed Base 3.0e+08,0 Incumbent owns the entire market 
Switching Cost 1,0 Incumbent retains the entire market 
Initial Compliance 0,0  
 
Required vs. Achievable vs. Actual Compliance (Figure 7(b)) 
Variable Value Notes 
Market Entry 1,1 Both firms in the market 
Initial Installed Base 0,3.0e+08 Entrant owns the entire market 
Switching Cost 0,1 Entrant retains the entire market 
Initial Compliance 0,0  
 
Partial Regulation (Figure 8(a)) 
Variable Value Notes 
Market Entry 1,0 Only incumbent in the market 
Initial Installed Base 3.0e+08,0 Incumbent owns the entire market 
Switching Cost 1,0 Incumbent retains the entire market 
Initial Compliance 0,0  
Fraction of Firms Regulated 1,0 (Run 1) 
0.8,0 (Run 2) 
0.6,0 (Run 3) 
All, 80%, and 60% of the 
Incumbent firms are regulated 
 
Delayed Regulation (Figure 8(b)) 
Variable Value Notes 
Market Entry 1,0 Only incumbent in the market 
Initial Installed Base 3.0e+08,0 Incumbent owns the entire market 
Switching Cost 1,0 Incumbent retains the entire market 
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Initial Compliance 0,0  
Time of Regulation 
Incumbent 
0 (Run 1) 
60 (Run 2) 
120 (Run 3) 
Incumbent regulated at time 0, 
month 60 (year 5), and month 120 
(year 10) 
 
Disruption Base Case (Figure 9) 
Variable Value Notes 
Switch to Endogenize 
Regulatory Cost and 
Resources 
0 Regulation does not affect 
competition 
Market Entry Time 0,60 Entrant enters at year 5 
Initial Installed Base 3.0e+08,0 Incumbent owns the entire market 
Fixed Cost 0.5, 0.25 Entrant has half the fixed cost 
compared to that of the incumbent 
Quality 1,0.5 Entrant has half the quality 
compared to that of the incumbent 
Innovation 0.5,1 Entrant has double the innovation 
compared to that of the incumbent 
Switching Cost 0.95,0.95 5% consumers consider switching, 
and may switch products based on 
attractiveness 
Sensitivity of Attractiveness 
to Ancillary Performance 
9 To create disruption because of 
entrant’s high innovation 
 
Average Utilized Compliance Sensitivity (Figure 14) 
Variable Value Notes 
Switch to Endogenize 
Regulatory Cost and 
Resources 
0 Regulation does not affect 
competition 
Market Entry Time 0,60 Entrant enters at year 5 
Fraction of Firms Regulated 1,1 Both fully regulated 
Time of Regulation Entrant 60 Entrant regulated upon entry 
Switch to Make Consensus 
Exogenous 
1 Consensus in the industry structure 
is exogenous 
Exogenous Achievable 
Compliance and Fractional 
1, 0.25-0.85 Sensitivity test. The integral 
structure can achieve full 
compliance. The modular 
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Deployment Multiplier structure’s compliance level and 
time to deploy compliance varies.  
 
Average Utilized Compliance (Market Share: 80% incumbent, 20% entrant)  
(Figure 15(a)) 
Variable Value Notes 
Fraction of Firms Regulated 1,0.5 100% incumbent firms regulated, 
50% entrant firms regulated 
Initial Compliance 1,0.5 Incumbent 100% compliant, entrant 
50% compliant 
Initial Installed Base 2.4e+08,0.6e+08 Market share: 80% incumbent, 20% 
entrant 
Switching Cost 1,1 No switching in between services 
 
Average Utilized Compliance (Market Share: 20% incumbent, 80% entrant) 
(Figure 15(b)) 
Variable Value Notes 
Fraction of Firms Regulated 1,0.5 100% incumbent firms regulated, 
50% entrant firms regulated 
Initial Compliance 1,0.5 Incumbent 100% compliant, entrant 
50% compliant 
Initial Installed Base 0.6e+08,2.4e+08 Market share: 20% incumbent, 80% 
entrant 
Switching Cost 1,1 No switching in between services 
 
Timing of Delayed Regulation (Figure 17) 
Variable Value Notes 
Time of Regulation 
Incumbent 
60 (Run 1) 
60 (Run 2) 
120 (Run 3) 
Entrant regulated at month 60 (i.e., 
upon entry), months, 72, 84, 90, 92, 
94, 96, 108, 120. The close together 
runs near months 90-96 is show the 
high degree of sensitivity due to 
nonlinear forces. 
 
Price Sensitivity (Changes additional to Disruption Base Run) (Figure 18 (a)) 
Variable Value Notes 
Initial Marginal Cost 0.25, 0.27 Entrant price higher than the base 
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run 
Initial Marginal Cost 0.25, 0.23 Entrant price lower than the base 
run 
 
Innovation Sensitivity (Changes additional to Disruption Base Run) (Figure 18 (b)) 
Variable Value Notes 
Initial Ancillary 
Performance 
0.5,1.01 Entrant more innovative than the 
base run 
Initial Ancillary 
Performance 
0.5,0.99 Entrant less innovative than the 
base run 
 
Quality Sensitivity (Changes additional to Disruption Base Run) (Figure 18c) 
Variable Value Notes 
Initial Primary Performance 1.0, 0.51 Entrant has higher quality than the 
base run 
Initial Primary Performance 1.0,0.49 Entrant has lower quality than the 
base run 
 
Reproducing Chapter 3 Figures 
Network Effect Phase Plot (Changes additional to Disruption Base Run) 
Variable Value Notes 
Sensitivity of Attractiveness 
to Installed Base 
0, 0.1, 0.2…1.9, 2.0 In total, 21 runs with different 
values of Sensitivities. 
 
Switching Cost Phase Plot (Changes additional to Disruption Base Run) 
Variable Value Notes 
Switching Cost 0.91, 0.95 
(incumbent, entrant) 
0.92, 0.95 
0.93, 0.95 
… 
0.99, 9.95 
In total, 9 runs with different values 
of incumbent’s switching cost. 
 
Comparative Effect Phase Plot (Changes additional to Disruption Base Run) 
Variable Value Notes 
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Base Sensitivities 1 (Sens. Inst. Base) 
-5 (Sens. Price) 
5 (Sens. Quality) 
5 (Sens. Innovation) 
Set such that maximum 
attractiveness due to each parameter 
is equal. 
Sensitivity of Attractiveness 
to Installed Base 
0, 0.2, 0.4…2.8, 3.0 In total,15 runs with different 
values of Sensitivities. 
Sensitivity of Attractiveness 
to Price 
0, -1, -2…-14, -15 In total,15 runs with different 
values of Sensitivities. 
Sensitivity of Attractiveness 
to Innovation 
0, 1, 2…14, 15 In total,15 runs with different 
values of Sensitivities. 
Sensitivity of Attractiveness 
to Quality 
0, 1, 2…14, 15 In total,15 runs with different 
values of Sensitivities. 
 
Multiple Disruptions (Changes additional to Disruption Base Run) 
Variable Value Notes 
Base Sensitivities 1 (Sens. Inst. Base) 
-5 (Sens. Price) 
5 (Sens. Quality) 
13.5 (Sens. 
Innovation) 
 
 
Technological Uncertainty Incumbent’s Superior Quality Myth (Changes additional to 
Disruption Base Run) 
Variable Value Notes 
Base Sensitivities 0 (Sens. Inst. Base) 
9 (Sens. Innovation) 
 
Switch to Endogenize 
Regulatory Cost and 
Resources 
0 No regulatory effects to study the 
dynamics of only the industry 
structure 
Initial Fixed Cost 0.5,0.5  
Initial Marginal Cost 0.25,0.25  
Test Parameter to Change 
Entrants Time to Acquire 
Quality 
4  
Switch to Endogenize 
Modularity 
0 (Open MM) 
1 (Closed MM) 
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Switch to Endogenize Price 0 (Open MM) 
1 (Closed MM) 
 
 
Technological Uncertainty Entrant’s Superior Innovation Myth (Changes additional to 
Disruption Base Run) 
Variable Value Notes 
Base Sensitivities 0 (Sens. Inst. Base) 
9 (Sens. Innovation) 
 
Switch to Endogenize 
Regulatory Cost and 
Resources 
0 No regulatory effects to study the 
dynamics of only the industry 
structure 
Initial Fixed Cost 0.5,0.5  
Initial Marginal Cost 0.25,0.25  
Test Parameter to Change 
Incumbents Time to 
Acquire Innovation 
4  
Switch to Endogenize 
Modularity 
0 (Open MM) 
1 (Closed MM) 
 
Switch to Endogenize Price 0 (Open MM) 
1 (Closed MM) 
 
 
Organizational Uncertainty Agility Myth (Changes additional to Disruption Base Run) 
Variable Value Notes 
Base Sensitivities 0 (Sens. Inst. Base) 
9 (Sens. Innovation) 
 
Switch to Endogenize 
Regulatory Cost and 
Resources 
0 No regulatory effects to study the 
dynamics of only the industry 
structure 
Initial Fixed Cost 0.5,0.5  
Initial Marginal Cost 0.25,0.25  
Test Parameter to Make 
incumbent Inherently Agile 
or Sluggish 
4  
Switch to Endogenize 
Modularity 
0 (Open MM) 
1 (Closed MM) 
 
Switch to Endogenize Price 0 (Open MM)  
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1 (Closed MM) 
 
 
Technological Uncertainty Functional Control and Quality (Changes additional to 
Disruption Base Run) 
Variable Value Notes 
Base Sensitivities 0 (Sens. Inst. Base) 
9 (Sens. Innovation) 
 
Switch to Endogenize 
Regulatory Cost and 
Resources 
0 No regulatory effects to study the 
dynamics of only the industry 
structure 
Initial Fixed Cost 0.5,0.5  
Initial Marginal Cost 0.25,0.25  
Test Parameter to Change 
Entrants Time to Acquire 
Quality 
4  
Switch to Endogenize 
Modularity 
0 (Open MM) 
1 (Closed MM) 
 
Switch to Endogenize Price 0 (Open MM) 
1 (Closed MM) 
 
 
Regulatory Uncertainty (Changes additional to Disruption Base Run) 
Variable Value Notes 
Base Sensitivities 0 (Sens. Inst. Base) 
9 (Sens. Innovation) 
 
Switch to Endogenize 
Regulatory Cost and 
Resources 
0 No regulatory effects to study the 
dynamics of only the industry 
structure 
Initial Fixed Cost 0.5,0.5  
Initial Marginal Cost 0.25,0.25  
Maximum Fractional Rate 
of Making Interfaces 
Proprietary 
0.1, 0.01, 0.001 Corresponds to High, Medium, and 
Low Limits on SMP, respectively 
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Reproducing Chapter 4 Figures 
Emergent Behaviors (Figure 38-Figure 42(a), Figure 43-Figure 47) 
 
Base Run (Initial Conditions) 
Regulatory 
Choice 
 Corporate 
Strategy 
Choice 
 Consumer 
Choice 
 Technology  Industry 
Structure 
 
Variable Value Variable Value Variable Value Variable Value Variable Value 
Initial 
Compliance 
1.0 Initial 
Primary 
Perform-
ance 
1,0.5 Initial 
Installed 
Base 
3e+8, 
0 
  Initial 
Modul-
arity 
0,1 
Fraction of 
Firms 
Regulated 
1,1 Initial 
ancillary 
Perform-
ance 
0.5,1       
Normal 
Fract. 
Resources to 
Deployment 
0 Fixed Cost 0.5, 
0.25 
      
Max. Fract. 
Resources to 
Maintenance 
0 Initial 
Marginal 
Cost 
0.25, 
0.25 
      
Max. Fract. 
Resources to 
Coordination 
0.25 Firm’s 
Initial 
Attention 
to 
Ancillary 
Perform-
ance 
0,1       
ON OFF Switches 
Switch to 
Endogenize 
Regulatory 
Cost and 
Resources 
1 Switch to 
Endogenize 
Price 
1 Switch for 
Exo-
genous 
Demand 
1 Switch to 
Endo-
genize 
Quality and 
Innovation 
1 Switch 
to Endo-
genize 
Modul-
arity 
1 
  Switch to 
Endogenize 
Resources 
1       
Decision/Choice Parameters 
Time for 
Regulation 
Incumbent 
0 Switching 
Cost 
 Sens. Of 
Attractive-
ness to 
Installed 
Base 
1     
Time for 
Regulation 
Entrant 
120 Market 
Entry 
1,1 Sens. Of 
Attractive-
ness to 
Price 
-5     
  Market 0,60 Sens. Of -5     
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Entry Time Attractive-
ness to 
Primary 
Perf. 
    Sens. Of 
Attractive-
ness to 
Ancillary 
Perf. 
11.5     
 
  
Average Compliance Cost (Figure 42(b)) 
Variable Value Notes 
Time for Regulation Entrant 120  
Sens. Of Attractiveness to 
Ancillary Performance 
11.5  
 
 
Policy Lever I (Figure 49-Figure 52) 
Variable Value Notes 
Maximum Fractional Rate 
of Interfaces Proprietary 
1  0.1 (Low Limits on 
SMP) 
0.01 (Medium 
Limits on SMP) 
0.001 (High Limits 
on SMP) 
 
 
Policy Lever I-II (Figure 54-Figure 57) 
Variable Value Notes 
Maximum Fractional Rate 
of Interfaces Proprietary 
 0.1 (Low Limits on 
SMP) 
0.01 (Medium 
Limits on SMP) 
0.001 (High Limits 
on SMP) 
 
Switch for Effect of 
Modularity on Consensus 
4 (Very Convex) 
3 (Convex) 
2 (Linear) 
1 (Convex) 
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Appendix D – Notes on Model Validation and Testing 
 
Validation 
The following steps were taken for model validation as well as building confidence in 
model: 
1. The model in this dissertation uses, where possible, standard/proven System 
Dynamics formulations such as the Bass Model of Diffusion, Logit Choice 
Model, etc. 
2. The formulations are grounded in theory such as theories of technology and 
industry disruption, etc., where possible. 
3. Unstructured interviews with appropriate stakeholders were used for the 
formulations where the theory is not well-developed. 
4. This model as been shared with a number of stakeholder audiences over the past 
two years. The most prominent among them were author’s presentation of the 
model to: 
a. Multiple presentations to The Communications Futures Program 
(http://cfp.mit.edu) participants. This group consists of a number of 
experienced architects and managers from the communications industry in 
the United States and Europe as well as some leading academics 
researching various aspects of communications technology and industry. 
b.  Two presentations to regulatory agencies with audiences that consisted of 
lawyers, economists, and technologists; first, at the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) on December 10, 2007; and second, 
at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Tokyo, Japan on 
January 16, 2008. 
5. The analysis was carried out in two phases: 
a. Analysis of a unit (moralized model) model to understand structural forces 
and incentives  
b. Analysis of calibrated model (shared in chapter 3) to understand timing 
and magnitude of the forces 
 
Testing 
The following steps outline the model testing strategy: 
 
1. Partial Model Testing: this model has several switches (see model variable with 
names starting with “Switch for…” in the alphabetical listing of equations 
provided in Appendix B) that can be used to isolate parts of the model to be tested 
with exogenous inputs.  
2. Sensitivity of each exogenous parameter (including those that were made 
endogenous later) was done to test for intendedly rational behavior and behavior 
under extreme conditions. 
3. The model outcome was analyzed under the following Industry Structure 
Scenarios (at all steps of model expansion and for the whole model): 
a. Integrated Incumbent Remains Dominant  
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b. Niche Entrant, modular in technology and industry structure, displaces the 
Incumbent  
c. Erstwhile Entrant (new Incumbent in the modular structure) remains 
dominant with a new modular entrant present 
4.  The model outcome was analyzed under the following regulatory scenarios (at all 
steps of model expansion and for the whole model):  
a. Only Incumbent is Regulated  
b. Both Incumbent and Entrant are Regulated  
c. Delayed Regulation of the Entrant 
d. Delayed Deregulation of the Incumbent 
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